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Current events in southern Lebanon are connected to a
territorial dispute that emerged over sixty years ago, when
leading Zionists claimed the region. That claim, which was
based upon the projected economic and security needs of the
Jewish national home in Palestine, did not prevail in the
course of post-World War I Anglo-French diplomacy. Since
then the Zionist leaders of Palestine and Israel have tried
to overcome the negative economic and security implications
of the boundary settlement. Yet Zionist access to southern
Lebanese water has been consistently blocked, and the fron-
tier has proven vulnerable to raids and rocket attacks by
hostile forces. It appears however that Israel has recently
converted the border region from a long-standing liability
into a current geopolitical asset. Recent Israeli policies
in southemLebanon have (1) aggravated sectarian tensions
in Lebanon; (2) kept Syria tied downin a difficult sta-
bility operation; and (3) made Israel's northern settlements
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 1 March 1920 a small Jewish outpost located in the
northwestern corner of the Hula Valley—a region claimed by
both Great Britain and France, but defended by neither—was
attacked and overwhelmed by a force of Damascus-based Arabs.
Joseph Trumpeldor, a well-known Jewish war hero, was killed
along with seven others trying to defend Tel Hai. The sur-
vivors fled for their lives, and the Jewish residents of
Palestine—an area as yet undefined politically—angrily
voiced demands that the British military authorities in
Jerusalem do something to guarantee the physical security
of outlying Jewish settlements. As a result of the in-
cident at Tel Hai, the Hula Valley and lands adjacent to
it became the northernmost section of Palestine rather than
2part of southern Lebanon.
During the early morning hours of another day in March,
fifty-eight years later, in places not far removed from the
site of the Tel Hai massacre, some 20,000 Jewish soldiers
3breached the border fence with Lebanon in five places.
See Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New
York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), pp. 177-178.
2See section II below.
^The strength estimate of 20,000 is drawn from the
Arab Report and Record , 1-15 March 1978, No. 5, p. 18^.
8

They swept methodically across southern Lebanon in an
operation designed to uproot Arab commandos whose activities
had plagued Jewish settlements for over a decade. Ninety-
one days later the Israeli Army withdrew from Lebanon,
leaving in its wake approximately 1,000 dead Arab civilians,
100,000 refugees, a vast amount of physical devastation,
and a terribly confusing political situation that contributed
to chronic unrest in the remainder of Lebanon.
For six decades Zionists in Palestine and Israel have
experienced frustration and failure in dealing with problems
relating to the common frontier with Lebanon. They initially
failed after World War I to procure for Palestine a northern
boundary that would satisfy their economic and security re-
quirements; they consistently failed to arrange access to
Lebanese water resources which they deemed to be essential
to the economic development of Palestine and Israel; and
they failed in the late 1930s and again since late 1968 to
provide adequate security to their exposed northern settle-
ments being harassed by Arab raiders using Lebanon as a
base area and sanctuary. Yet both the magnitude of Israel's
March 1978 invasion and political developments that have
unfolded in its aftermath, suggest that the leaders of
4
The statistic on civilian deaths is from a survey by
the International Committee of the Red Cross as reported in
the Arab Report and Record , 1-15 April 1978, No. 7, p. 2^7.
The refugee estimate is from the Jerusalem Post (International
Edition), 21 March 1978.
9

Israel have found a way to convert southern Lebanon from a
source of endless frustration to a useful foreign policy
tool.
Despite six decades of controversy in the common
frontier area of these two small Levantine states, very
little exists in print which seeks to elucidate the modern
political history of the region. Much of what appears in
newspapers, periodicals, and books concerning the Israeli-
Lebanese border region concentrates on events which have
taken place during the past ten years. This is understand-
able, because a decade of fighting between Palestinian
commandos ( f edaveen ) and Israeli forces has victimized the
frontier residents—both Arab and Israeli--and has facili-
tated the virtual destruction of Lebanon. It may be asked,
however, to what extent was the disaster that began to
unfold in the Israli-Lebanese frontier region in 1968 rooted
in events which had transpired over the previous five decades,
-'While research was being conducted for this thesis a
study was published entitled South Lebanon , edited by
Elaine Hagopian and Samih Farsoun (Detroit: Association of
Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., August 1978).
The work contains much valuable data. It is however written
from a very partisan (pro-Arab) point of view, and does not
attempt to address the Israeli perspective on southern
Lebanon in a dispassionate manner.
£
The Arabic word f edayeen means "self-sacrif icers .
"
In its modern military connotation it refers to armed
Palestinians organized in somewhat irregular patterns, who
undertake activities normally associated with commando
missions, such as raids and reconnaissance. See William B.
Quandt, Faud Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of
Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973). pp. 118-120.
10

events which received only sporadic attention in the
international news media? Can current problems in the
Israeli-Lebanese frontier area best be analyzed when viewed
from a historical perspective? Finally, do events of the
past suggest courses of action that could lead to a peaceful
resolution of the problems which have plagued this extremely
volatile frontier zone?
This research effort actually began as an attempt to
see to what extent, if any, a resolution of the Israeli-
Lebanese frontier crisis could contribute to other Arab-
Israeli accomodations. What started as a routine search
for background data about the frontier region itself led to
the surprising discovery that nothing existed which addressed
the area's political history as such. Furthermore, as data
about the region was collected it became clear that the
frontier area had not (as has been widely assumed) been the
scene of bucolic tranquility prior to 1968. Rather it had
been, since 1916, a stage for conflicting imperial and
national ambitions. It was decided therefore that the
Israeli-Lebanese frontier region required a thorough inves-
tigation on its own merits rather than merely as a facet of
the broader Arab-Israeli dispute. An effort would be made
to find out whether or not current events in southern
Lebanon could be elucidated by an examination of the past,
and what meaning (if any) those past events might have in
the shaping of a settlement.
11

Several months of research produced the following
thesis: that current events in southern Lebanon are indeed
connected to a complex territorial dispute that first
emerged over sixty years ago, when leading Zionists laid
claim to the region. Consequently, these events can best
be understood within the context of that long-standing
controversy. The Zionist claim, which was opposed by the
territorial aspirations of Christian Lebanese nationalists,
was based upon the economic and security requirements pro-
jected for the Jewish national home in Palestine. The
Zionist desires did not however prevail in the workings of
post-World War I Anglo-French diplomacy. A boundary was
drawn which gave to Lebanon most of the disputed area, an
impoverished zone populated largely by Shi'ite Muslim
peasants and villagers but distinguished by the presence of
two streams coveted by Zionist planners: the Litani and
Hasbani Rivers, Furthermore, the boundary was demarcated
in such a way as to leave Palestine vulnerable to attack
from the north, particularly in the form of harassment by
irregular military forces. For nearly six decades the
Zionist leaders of Palestine and Israel have tried, usually
without success, to offset the negative economic and security
implications of the initial Anglo-French territorial arrange-
ment for Palestine and Lebanon. In recent years Israel
seems to have concluded, in the light of f edayeen military
activity and the Lebanese civil war, that she must now
control events in southern Lebanon and must be willing to
12

risk war in order to do so. Furthermore, recent developments
suggest that Israel, by cultivating a "special relationship"
with the Christian minority in southern Lebanon, has trans-
formed the border region from a historical liability into
a current asset. By supporting the activities of a
distinctively Maronite militia in southern Lebanon, Israel
has succeeded in (l) encouraging Maronite separatism in
Lebanon; (2) forcing arch-enemy Syria to deploy significant
forces in central Lebanon rather than opposite Israeli-
controlled territory; and (3) bringing, at last, a measure
of security to the Jewish side of the Israeli-Lebanese
boundary.
In order to present the results of the thesis research
systematically, an approach will be utilized which will
elucidate the traditional two-dimensional character of the
Zionist approach to southern Lebanon: economics and
security. Section II, immediately following this intro-
duction, will analyze the manner in which the Palestine-
Lebanon frontier was created during and after World War I.
That analysis will of course focus on Zionist aspirations,
but will also examine the input of three other actors in
the political arena of the postwar Levant: Great Britain,
France, and the Christian nationalists seeking to establish
a distinctively Lebanese state. Section III will examine
in some detail the geography of the frontier region, the
characteristics of the boundary itself, and the broad con-
sequences of the frontier settlement from the perspectives
13

of three very interested parties: the predominantly Arab
population of the partitioned frontier region; the Zionists
of Palestine; and the Christian Lebanese nationalists of
the French-created Lebanese state. Section IV will focus
on the evolving water controversy growing out of the fron-
tier settlement. The discussion will center on several
themes: the continued Zionist desire for access to Lebanese
water, notwithstanding the boundary agreement reached by
Great Britain and France; Lebanon's failure, under the
French mandate and during the early years of independence,
to tap the hydro graphic resources of the south; the useful-
ness of Beirut's inattention to the south to Zionists as a
means of justifying Israel's claims to Lebanese water; and
Lebanese developmental efforts aimed at preempting Zionist
claims. The issue of Lebanon's short-lived and ineffective
participation in Arab efforts to divert away from Israel
the sources of the Jordan River will also be addressed in
Section IV. Section V will examine the evolving security
consequences of the Anglo-French frontier settlement.
Specific issues to be discussed include the security
problems made manifest within the Palestine-Lebanon frontier
in 1938 by the Arab revolt in Palestine; the military lessons
learned from the Allied invasion of Vichy-controlled Lebanon
in June 19^1, an operation supported by Jewish commandos;
combat operations in the frontier area during the 19^8 Arab-
Israeli war and their consequences; the military implications
of the 19^-9 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement; and
14

the consequences of f edayeen military operations after the
1967 Arab-Israeli war. Section VI will analyze the impact
of the recent Lebanese civil war on southern Lebanon, with
special attention to Israeli efforts to develop ties to the
Christians of southern Lebanon. The Israeli invasion of
southern Lebanon in March 1978 will be discussed, as will
Israel's continued support for the Maronite militia in the
south and the implications deriving therefrom. Section
VII will summarize the findings of the research effort,
analyze Israel's recent departure from her traditional
approaches(economic and security) to the problem of southern
Lebanon, and discuss both the shape of a possible settlement
and the essential precondition needed for it to come about.
15

II. THE CREATION OF THE PALESTINE-LEBANON BOUNDARY
Prior to the outbreak of World War I in 1914 , the entire
eastern Mediterranean coastal region was part of the Ottoman
Empire. Within the framework of Ottoman local jurisdiction,
"Palestine" did not exist as a political entity. That
Palestine did indeed exist in the minds of Biblical scholars
and Zionists' is beyond dispute; yet nowhere can the name
be found in a roster of Ottoman provinces or districts.
Lebanon, on the other hand, did exist, although not in
its present form. For reasons discussed below, Lebanon en-
joyed special status as an autonomous district within the
Ottoman Empire. As such it covered a much smaller area than
does modern-day Lebanon.
This section will examine the manner in which the
boundary between Palestine and Lebanon was created. In the
course of so doing it will be necessary to discuss in broad
terms the way in which the two states themselves came about,
for the process which created the boundary and the states is
one and the same. It was a process which brought into focus
the demands of powerful political forces vying for influence
in the postwar Levant: British and French imperialism,
Zionism, and Christian Lebanese nationalism.
7 Zionism is defined as a "Movement of Jewish national
revival calling for the return of the Jewish people to
Palestine. The name (coined by the Viennese Jewish writer
Nathan Birnbaum in 1885) is derived from 'Zion,' one of the
biblical names for Jerusalem. " Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar
Levine, eds., Political Dictionary of the Middle East in
the 20th Century
.
(New York: Quadrangle. 1974). p. 431.
16

A. OTTOMAN POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
In order to properly depict the genesis of the Palestine-
Lebanon boundary, it will first be necessary to examine the
Ottoman political subdivisions that existed in the coastal
region of the eastern Mediterranean as of 191^. Map #1
on page 18 shows the jurisdictions established by the empire
in the area ranging from the city of Alexandretta in the
Q
north to the Egyptian boundary in the south.
It can be seen from map ffl that most of the area under
examination fell within the jurisdiction of the Vilayet
(Province) of Beirut, which extended along the coast from
a point north of Latakia down to the northern outskirts
of Jaffa. The province was further subdivided into five
sanjaks (districts). These were, from north to south,
Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut (which included the province's
capital city by the same name), Acre, and Nablus. Beirut,
the present-day capital of Lebanon, was therefore in the
early twentieth century the Ottoman administrative center
for a large portion of what is now Israel, and for all of
what is today coastal Syria.
The city of Beirut had no jurisdiction however over
much of the territory which today comprises the Republic
of Lebanon. The Lebanese mountain, whose population was
Q
Map #1 is drawn from two sources: George Adam Smith,
Atlas of the Historical Geography of the Holy Land
,
(London,
Hodder and Stoughton, 1915). Plate 59: and Zeine N. Zeine,
The Struggle for Arab Independence
,
(Beirut: Khayat's, i960),
Plate 5» which is turn is drawn from the Palestine Royal
Commission Report of 1937-
17
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predominantly Maronite (with an influential Druze minority),
was a separate political entity known as the Autonomous
Sanjak (District) of Lebanon. The governor of Lebanon re-
ported not to Beirut, but directly to the Ottoman Ministry
of the Interior in Istanbul. The special status accorded
to Mount Lebanon was the product of European intervention
following a bloody civil war between the Maronite and Druze
communities in 1360. In 1861 the Ottoman Empire agreed, at
European (mainly French) insistence, to create a distinct
Lebanese jurisdiction to be governed by a Christian. This
extraordinary treatment aided immeasurably in the rise of
Lebanese nationalism, which was itself an outgrowth of the
Maronite national identity that had oeen formed during a
millenium of relative isolation on the Lebanese mountain.
In its more virulent form, Lebanese nationalism would
eventually develop irredentist territorial claims to the
12
entire Ottoman Province of Beirut. ~ Such claims were
destined to conflict with the territorial aspirations of
Zionism.
q
'The term Maronite refers to "An Eastern Christian Church
in communion with Rome, with its centre in Lebanon." (Shimoni
and Levine, p. 2^9)- "The Druze sect, an offshoot cf the
Isma' ilivva (itself an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam) developed
in the 11th century around the figure of the Fatimid Caliph
al -Hakim bi-Amr Illah, regarded by his followers as an
incarnation of the divine spirit." (Ibid., p. 107).






iI.F. Frischwasser-Ra' anan. The Frontiers of a Nation ,
(London: The Batchworth Press, 1955). p. 101.
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The Province of Beirut was, therefore, bisected by the
Autonomous District of Lebanon. Other Ottoman jurisdictions
bordering on the Province of Beirut included the Province
of Aleppo in the north, the Independent District of
Jerusalem in the south, and the Province of Syria in the
east. Where then, within the contest of Ottoman adminis-
trative subdivisions, was Palestine? Although no province
or district by that name existed, it is clear that Palestine
did indeed "exist," albeit as a somewhat shadowy religio-
geographical expression which transcended Ottoman
administrative boundaries. No less an authority than Djemal
Pasha, the Turkish wartime Governor of Syria, understood
"Palestine" to include the Ottoman districts of Jerusalem,
13Nablus , and Acre. J
B. THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT
The decision of the Ottoman Empire to go zo war in 1914
as an ally of Germany opened the way for the partition of
the Arab Levant by the Empire's enemies. The first step ir.
the disposal of Turkey's Arab possessions was taken in May
1916, with an exchange of notes between British Foreign
Minister Sir Edward Grey, and the French Ambassador to
Great Britain, M. Paul Cambon. Later endorsed by Russia,
the provisional arrangement—commonly known as the Sykes-
Picot Agreement—provided the foundation for future struggles
13^Cemal Pasa, Memories of a Turkish Statesman
,
(London:




over the boundary between Palestine and Lebanon. With
regard to Ottoman territories along the eastern Mediterranean,
the agreement provided that the region would be divided into
three sections as shown on map #2 (page 22): -? an "inter-
national sphere" to be governed as an Allied condominium;
a "British sphere" encompassing the ports of Haifa and Acre;
and a "French Sphere" consisting of the coastal region north
of the international sphere.
The map used by British and French negotiators to delimit
Allied spheres of influence did not depict Ottoman adminis-
trative subdivisions; " consequently, the Sykes-Picot
arrangement (had it ever been implemented literally) would
have played absolute havoc with existing political units.
The District of Acre, for example, contained parts of all
three "spheres" projected by the Allies. When however actual
military operations in "Palestine" against the Turks began
to make serious headway in 1913, Great Britain and France
were obliged to deal with the concrete problem of adapting
14
The text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement may be found
in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series Volume IV
1919 « (London: His Majesty s Stationery Office, 1952), pp.
241-251. Subsequent references to these edited diplomatic
documents will appear under the citation of Documents , with
the series and volume numbers.
''Map #2 is drawn from two sources: Frischwasser-
Ra'anan, The Frontiers of a Nation
, p. 151 » and Jukka
Nevakivi , Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-
1920 (London: The Athlone Press, 1969) > p- 38.
16 *See Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence , Plate 6,




MAP #2 « ORIGINAL "SYKES -PICOT" BOUNDARIES
MAY 1916


















the Sykes-Picot map to actual zones of military occupation.
Consequently, the Allies agreed, on 19 September 1913, to
establish Occupied Enemy Territorial Administrations
(O.E.T.A.) in order to govern captured Ottoman territories
17
along the eastern Mediterranean coastal region.
Map #3 on page 2^ depicts the O.E.T.A. boundary, which
extended from Achzib on the Mediterranean coast to Lake
1 a
Hula. The O.E.T.A. line differed somewhat from the line
established by the Sykes-Picot agreement, which left the
coast at the same point but which had intersected with the
northwestern shore of Lake Tiberias. Why the difference?
According to Frischwasser-Ra' anan, the change in boundaries
was most likely a simple administrative adjustment, designed
"to make the O.E.T.A. boundaries coincide as far as possible
19
with the Turkish district divisions." Such an adjustment,
had that been the rationale, would have been fully in
accordance with normal military government procedure, which
presumes that the administrative jurisdictions and practices
of the former civil authority will, wherever possible, be
utilized to the maximum extent by the occupying military
forces. Longrigg concurs with the notion that the change
was primarily an administrative act, noting that "These
17Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under
French Mandate
, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 66.
-1 Q
Map #3 is based on Frischwasser-Ra' anan. The Frontiers
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[O.E.T.A.] administrations were to be of neither British
nor French nor Arab nationality," and that the nationalities
of the soldiers occupying the zones "would in no way
20
prejudice forthcoming Peace Conference decisions."
There are however other aspects of the O.E.T.A.
arrangement which suggest that the deviation from the Sykes-
Picot boundary may have been something other than an
apolitical exercise in textbook public administration. The
appointment of French and British Chief Administrators for
21O.E.T.A. North and South respectively was suggestive of
an eventual partition. Viewed in that light, it could be
construed that Great Britain was in fact nibbling away at
territory which she had promised to France in 1916. France,
due to the preponderance of British arms in the area at
22
war's end, was obliged to accept the O.E.T.A. delimitation.
Nevertheless, the fact that the military administration of
General Edmund Allenby (the British commander of the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force) saw fit to draw a line which
was more generous to Great Britain than that already
established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, gave rise to much
Gallic resentment. The following passage captures the
essence of French disquietude:
20






22There were an estimated 200,000 British soldiers com-
pared with a combined force of 6,000 French and Armenians.
See Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East:
1914-192^
. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969). p. 253.
25

Ignorant deliberement la limite Sykes-Picot, le general
Allenby avait, des Octobre 1918, deplace la frontiere
vers le nord en rattachant le caza de Safed a la zone
palestinienne. Jugeant cette acquisition encore insuf-
fisante, les Brittaniques pretendaient englober dans la
Palestine le cours presque entier du Jourdain, celui du
Yarmuk, /et/ le cours inferieur du Litani . . . ^3
In short, Great Britain appeared, in the eyes of the French,
to be using the O.E.T.A. boundary adjustment as the opening
gambet in a strategy designed to exclude France from all of
"Palestine. "
Pichon's reference to the Safed subdistrict changing
hands with the drawing of the O.E.T.A. boundary further
suggests that the border adjustment involved something more
than the dry application of sound administrative principles.
The Safed subdistrict, which under the terms of the Sykes-
Picot agreement would have gone to France, contained a
Zh
number of Jews. Did this factor help motivate the
drawing of a military zonal boundary which placed the sub-
district under British administration? The answer to this
question lies in the examination of two closely related
issues: the attitude of Great Britain toward the prospect
23
-^"Intentionally ignoring the Sykes-Picot boundary,
General Allenby had, since October 1918, moved the frontier
toward the north, joining the subdistrict of Safed to the
Palestinian zone. Judging this acquisition still insuffi-
cient, the British claimed to include in Palestine virtually
the entire Jordan River, the Yarmuk, /and/ the lower course
of the Litani. . . " Jean Pichon, Le Partage du Proche Orient
(Paris: J. Peyronnet & Cie, 1938), p. 188.
ZK





of a French presence in the "international sphere" mandated
by the Sykes-Picot agreement; and the relationship between
Great Britain and the Zionist movement.
C. THE ZIONIST FACTOR IN BRITISH DIPLOMACY
At the time of the Sykes-Picot agreement the position
of Great Britain in the Middle East was exceedingly weak.
Not only had the British suffered military setbacks in the
Galipoli and Kut campaigns, ^ but France was bearing the
heaviest manpower burden against Germany on the Western
26
front. Operating from a feeble bargaining position, the
most Great Britain could achieve in the Levant was to
"preclude the threat of direct French access to the Sinai
27Peninsula" by agreeing to the establishment of an
"international sphere." From the point of view of her
railroad interests in southern Syria and the defense of the
Suez Canal Great Britain naturally would have preferred to
establish her own direct rule over the area which had
instead been designated for rule by an Allied condominium.
In his note to Cambon of 16 May 1916, Grey pointedly noted
that his country's acquiescence to the Sykes-Picot
territorial formula involved "the abdication of considerable
25For an analysis of those operations see Edmund
Dane
, British Campaigns in the Nearer East, 191^-1918
(London! Hodder and S toughton, 1917-1919, 2 7.)






British interests." Yet neither the relative weakness of
Great Britain vis a vis France nor her willingness to abide
by the exact terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement persisted
throughout the war. Howard M. Sachar describes the British
change of heart as follows:
As the months passed . . . the prospect of a French military
enclave in Palestine, even as an integral part of an
Allied condominium, became increasingly unpalatable
to London. The idea was to become altogether unacceptable
when Allenby launched his full-scale invasion of the Holy
Land. . . 29
The problem faced by Great Britain was essentially one
of diplomatic etiquette. How could France be removed from
the international sphere, and how could the projected condo-
minium itself be terminated in favor of outright British
rule, without the unseemly use of naked force against a
wartime ally? Leonard Stein suggests in the following
passage how the British decided to approach the problem.
They /the French/ might, in the end, be compelled to
recognize a British title to Palestine by right of
conquest and actual possession, but might not some moral
weight be added to the British claim--was it not even
possible that the French themselves might be impressed--
if it could be shown that Jewish opinion throughout the
world strongly favored a British trusteeship for Palestine
or some other form of British control?30
In short, the political clout of international Zionism could
be harnessed by Great Britain with the objective of easing
France out of an area deemed by the British to be
strategically significant.
28
Documents, First Series Volume IV
, p. 2^5.
9Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East
, p. 188
30Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York:




After protracted negotiations between the British
Foreign Office and the Zionists, unofficially represented
31
in Great Britain by Dr. Ghaim Weizmann, Anglo-Zionist
collaboration in Palestine was formally instituted on 2
November 1917. Great Britain declared its "sympathy with
Jewish Zionist aspirations" in a letter from the Foreign
Office to Lord Rothschild, a leading British Zionist. The
letter, known as the "Balfour Declaration," acknowledged
British support for "the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people," and pledged to help
32bring it about. Having won such a pledge from the British
government, much of the Zionist movement was then able to
define its own interests in terms of replacing the inter-
national and British spheres mandated by the Sykes-Picot
agreement with a single British protectorate over all of
"Palestine.
"
It would appear therefore that the inclusion of the
Safed region within O.S.T.A. South in September 1913 was
motivated partly by the British desire to "liberate"
from the prospective French-controlled region as many of
the already-established Jewish communities as possible
31The executive body of the World Zionist Organization
remained in Berlin during World War I. Weizmann's diplomatic
efforts, aided immeasurably by Herbert Samuel (an influential
British politician) , were undertaken even though "he held no
official position in the world Zionist movement. " Walter
Laqueur, A History of Zionism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1972) , p. 175-
32A facsimile of the Balfour Declaration is found on
the Frontispiece of Stein's The Balfour Declaration .
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without completely ignoring the broad boundary guidance
established by the Sykes-Picot agreement.
Great Britain's strategy of using Jewish opinion to
remove France from the international sphere, combined with
the preponderance of British arms in the Levant at war's
end, achieved the desired result. Faced with a fait
accompli , Premier Georges Clemenceau of France agreed in
33
December 1918 that "Palestine" would be British. J
D. ZIONIST TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS
It remained for the statesmen to determine the
territorial shape of the new political entity, and nowhere
was this process destined to be more controversial and
3^
potentially explosive than in the Upper Galilee, where
the interests of four parties— British, French, Zionist, and
Lebanese— collided. The balance of this section will deal
with the conflicts and compromises surrounding the delimit-
ation of the Palestine-Lebanon boundary.
-^Clemenceau' s acquiescence, along with his cession
of Mosul to British Iraq, constituted the so-called "Clemen-
ceau-Lloyd George agreement." See David Lloyd George, The
Truth About the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd,
1938), Volume 2, p. IO38.
34J Upper Galilee is defined as an area bordered on the
west by the Mediterranean coast, on the east by the Rift
Valley (through which the Jordan River flows), on the south
by the Bet ha-Karem Valley and the gorge of the Ammud Stream
(both of which are now in Israel) , and on the north by the
gorge of the Litani River in Lebanon. See Efraim Orni and
Elisha Efrat, Geography of Israel (Philadelphia: The
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1971). pp. 76-78.
30

The Zionists did not view Palestine merely as a refuge
for persecuted Jews or as the object of a religious longing.
Through the initiative of Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist movement
adopted the point of view that Palestine should be trans-
formed into an economically-viable and militarily-defensible
nation-state. Even though the Zionist movement had chosen
to link its Palestine program to Great Britain, the Zionists
retained totally independent ideas about Palestine's pro-
spective position on the map. The initiative to procure
for Palestine an economically and militarily advantageous
northern frontier came not from Great Britain, but from
the Zionists.
One of the better-known Zionist boundary proposals for
northern Palestine was made by Harry Sacher, a noted
journalist and businessman, in a book which he edited in
1916 entitled Zionism and the Jewish Future . A brief
chapter on geography written by Sacher called for a northern
boundary which would follow "the first five miles of the lower
course of the Nahr-el-Auwali ; thence a straight line to the
south-east, skirting the southern extremity of the Lebanon
and of Mount Hermon and running" to a point situated at
36 15'N ..." Sacher's boundary proposal is depicted on
map #4, page 32 .
Sacher's concept of the northern boundary was motivated
by two factors: economics and security. The economic factor
-^-5H. Sacher, ed. , Zionism and the Jewish Future (New










was crucial, because the development of Palestine's
agricultural and industrial potential was the essential
precondition for massive Jewish immigration. The common
denominator linking both agricultural and industrial
prospects was water. Water would be needed not only to
irrigate Palestinian lands already under cultivation, but
to make the Negev desert in the south bloom and support an
agrarian Jewish economy of its own. As early as 190 5 plans
had been drawn to divert the Litani River into the Hasbani
River (the main source of the Jordan River) for irrigation
projects further south. Hydroelectric power for in-
dustrialization was also critical to Palestine's development,
and could likewise be procured through a diversion of the
Litani. Sacher's proposal could have secured for
Palestine the entire lower course of the Litani River, plus
all of the sources of the Jordan River. The Sacher boundary
plan would have also contributed to the military defense
of Palestine, by gaining control "in the north over the
Beka'a valley, which constitutes a gate of entry between
the slopes of the Lebanon and Mount Hermon. "^
Moshe Brawer, "The Geographical Background of the
Jordan Water Dispute," in Essays in Political Geography
,








During the course of negotiations leading to the
issuance of the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist leaders
apparently believed that the Sacher proposal was eminently
feasible. As one observer put it,
At the beginning of 1917 the Zionist leadership was still
under the naive illusion that France was not interested
in the country which lay to the south of 3eirut and
Damascus and that the whole area up to these cities
could be claimed for the Jewish homeland. 39
When the war ended in 1913, and the process of
dismembering the Ottoman Empire began in earnest, the Zionist
movement found itself obliged to formally stipulate its
conception of Palestine's territorial extent. Although the
provisional O.E.T.A. boundary had placed the Jewish residents
of Safed under the British wing,, the Zionists regarded that
line as falling far short of Palestine's proper northern
limit. On 6 November 1913 the Advisory Committee on
Palestine in Great Britain, which included many leading
Zionist personalities, drafted a document calling for a
northern boundary that would follow the lower course of the




The Zionist Organization itself enlarged the
claim, perhaps in anticipation of having to make concessions
to France during the negotiating process. On 27 February








before the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference
in the form of a written statement dated 3 February 1919-
With regard to the northern boundary, the official Zionist
proposal differed somewhat from that made by Sacher in
1916, and that suggested by the Advisory Committee on
Palestine in November 1918 The official proposal called
for a boundary leaving the Mediterranean coast south of
the town of Sidon. The line would run in a northeasterly
direction, crossing the Litani River and eventually turn
south toward the Golan Plateau. Map #5 on page 3& depicts
the Zionist boundary proposal of February 1919-
The Zionist statement emphasized the economic
justification for the boundary proposal and ignored the
security aspect. The area to the north of Palestine would,
after all, be under the control of France. It would have
been impolitic for the Zionists to frame their proposal in
military terms, because Great Britain and France were
ostensible allies. Water was the main justification for
the Zionist boundary request, as demonstrated by the following
passage from the statement of 3 February 1919:
4lStatement of the Zionist Organization Regarding
Palestine
. 3 February 1919. 1^ pp. Copy available at
Hoover Library, Stanford University.
Map #5 is based on the text of the Statement of the
Zionist Organization Regarding Palestine , and on an explan-
ation of the Zionist claim found in Frischwasser-Ra' anan,
The Frontiers of a Nation , p. 107.
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The Hermon is Palestine's real "Father of Waters" and
cannot be severed from it without striking at the very
root of its economic life. The Hermon not only needs
reafforestation but also other works before it can again
adequately serve as the water reservoir of the country.
It must therefore be wholly under the control of those
who will most willingly restore it to its maximum utility .
Some international arrangements must be made whereby the
riparian rights of the people dwelling south of the
Litani River may be fully protected. Properly cared for
these head waters can be made to serve in the development
of the Lebanon as well as of Palestine . ^Emphasis added_7^3
Subsequent Zionist claims to the water resources of southern
Lebanon, based upon the failure of other parties to exploit
those resources and the presumed collateral benefits to
Lebanon resulting from Zionist exploitation, originated
44
with the above passage.
E. REACTIONS TO THE ZIONIST PROPOSAL
Inasmuch as the Zionists were the first of the interested
parties to present a concrete and detailed boundary proposal,
it would be appropriate to represent the positions of others
as reactions to the Zionist plan. Although Lebanese irre-
4<5dentist claims have been extant for years, J the Zionisms
clearly seized the political initiative in the postwar
diplomatic environment.
43^Statement of the Zionist Organization Regarding
Palestine
. p. 8.
44See Section IV of this study below.
45^See William I. Shorrock, French Imperialism in the
Middle East: The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon




The reaction of Great Britain to the Zionist frontier
claim was predictably favorable. What, after all, could
possibly be wrong with maximizing the territorial extent
of her own protectorate at the expense of France? Yet
Great Britain's endorsement of the Zionist proposal was
flawed in a manner which would eventually undermine the
position of her Zionist proteges. Instead of adopting the
sober economic arguments relentlessly advanced by Dr.
Weizmann, the somewhat sentimental Christian statesmen of
Great Britain chose to base their own concept of Palestine's
northern extent on the Old Testament: The following non-
public statement of 5 December 1918 by Lord Curzon, a
member of Prime Minister David Lloyd George's Inner War
Cabinet, illustrates quite succinctly the official British
approach to the question of Palestine's northern frontier:
Now, as regards the future of Palestine... I imagine
we shall agree that we must recover for Palestine its
old boundaries. The old phrase "Dan to Beersheba'
still prevails. Whatever the administrative sub-divisions,
we must recover for Palestine, be it Hebrew or Arab, the
boundaries up to the Litani on the coast, and across
to Banias , the old Dan, or Huleh in the interior. 40
Curzon obviously believed that the Litani River fell within
a region defined Biblically by the phrase "Dan to Beersheba.
"
What is important however was that the Biblical injunction
itself was the operative feature of the British approach,
not the hydrographic aspects of the Upper Galilee.
Do re en Ingrams , Palestine Papers 1917-1922; Seeds
of Conflict (London: John Murray, 1972), p. ^9.
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France's reaction to the Zionist proposal was entirely
negative. Having been removed from the international con-
dominium agreed to in 1916, and having been maneuvered into
accepting exclusive British rule over Palestine, France was
not inclined to make further concessions. On 17 March 1919
Clemenceau gave the back of his hand to the Zionist claim
by giving Lloyd George a note stating that France insisted
upon the line (Achzib to Lake Tiberias) of May 1916.
Thus, the two extreme territorial claims--depicted on map
#6 (page^O )--were established. Longrigg evaluated the
situation prevailing in the Spring of 1919 as follows:
Whereas the French demanded the Safed area, which their
O.E.T.A. North (later West) did not include, the Jews
asked for a wide area of southern Lebanon, the whole
Litani River and southern Biqa', Hermon and the sources
of the Jordan. . . In terms of the Balfour Declaration
there was no applicable criterion whereby to establish
boundaries for 'Palestine,' and the Jews not unnaturally
claimed everything within reach. At the same time, the
French claim to annex territory which included Palestine-
Jewish settlements was clearly inappropriate. 4"
An important aspect of the French diplomatic counter-
offensive to the Zionist proposal involved the Lebanese.
As Frischwasser-Ra' anan has noted, "Possession of the Upper
Galilee was useful to the French because of their relations
^9
with the Lebanese national leaders." Indeed, just as the
'Pichon, Le Partage du Proche Orient
, pp. 188-189.
48Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate
,
p. 67.






















British relied on the Zionists to advance Great Britain's
interests in the Levant, so the French used Lebanese
nationalism to solidify their own grip on the disputed
region. Prior to the start of World War I France received
"numerous appeals from Lebanese organizations and individuals
for French assistance in achieving the annexation of Beirut,
Baalbek, and the Bekaa' to the Lebanon." Although France
cautioned the Lebanese to be patient, "their aspirations
were not entirely discouraged."^ The Maronite community
of Mount Lebanon regarded France as its protector from
Turks, Arab nationalists, and Muslims in general, and was
eager to see an expanded Lebanon operating under the aegis
of France. In 1908 the Lebanese nationalist, Paul Nujaym,
demanded (in a book written in French and published in
France) that the Autonomous District of Lebanon be expanded
to include an area roughly approximating present-day
Lebanon. >
In August 1919 France sponsored the presence at the
Paris Peace Conference of a Lebanese Delegation headed by
the Maronite Patriarch, Monseigneur Huwayyik, who presented
a memorandum of his own on 27 August. The Lebanese memorandum
closely paralleled the general thrust of the Zionist
statement, albeit in the opposite direction. The Patriarch
demanded that Lebanon be detached from a larger "Syrian"
entity; that Lebanon's historic frontiers, which were held
Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East
, p. 112,
K. S, Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) , p. 118.

to be economically crucial be restored; and that the
assistance of France, which was deemed to be essential to
the success of Lebanese political and territorial goals,
52
be mandated by the peace conference. with the arrival of
the Lebanese Delegation the "battle by proxy" between the
local representatives of Great Britain and France was
fully joined. Still, no amount of pressure brought to
bear by Zionists or Lebanese nationalists would signifi-
cantly alter the diplomatic facts of life. The line
delimiting French and British spheres of influence on the
eastern Mediterranean coast would have to be hammered out
by the principals themselves.
F. THE "DEAUVILLE" COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
The diplomatic stalemate over Palestine's northern
frontier was loosened first by a British compromise proposal
made in September 1919. In an Aide-Memo ire dated 13
September and handed to the French, Great Britain affirmed
its intention to withdraw its forces from areas which had
been promised to France. Point six of the Aide-Memoire
stated that, "The territories occupied by British troops
will then be Palestine, defined in accordance with its
ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba- . . "-^ Map #7 on
page ^3 depicts the British conception of the proper
northern frontier of Palestine. It is identical with the
proposal drafted by the Advisory Committee on Palestine
52Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence
, p. 122.
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-^The complete text of the Aide-Memoire may be found
in Documents
. First Series Volume I, pp. 700-701.
^2
















in November 1913. The proposed boundary followed the Litani
River from the Mediterranean coast, and then continued
eastward encompassing the village of Banias , thought by
British statesmen to be the ancient Dan»
The significance of the Deauville proposal lay in its
simultaneous abandonment of the Zionist proposal and the
formal commitment of Great Britain to the somewhat nebulous
"Dan to Beersheba" formula. By addressing the boundary
question from the somewhat slipper/ basis of Scriptural
geography, the British left themselves and their Zionist
friends vulnerable to conflicting claims arising from
Biblical scholarship. If a prestigeous Bible scholar could
demonstrate, for instance, that Banias was not ancient Dan
or that the Litani River lay outside of Biblical Israel,
the entire British position would be gravely undermined.
It appears that once Great Britain fell back upon the
Deauville formula, the Zionists countered with the argument
that possession of the south bank of the Litani would not
satisfy the economic requirements of Palestine. In November
1919 Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, Allenby's Chief
Political Officer in Palestine, wrote a letter to General
Headquarters of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force which
attacked the Deauville Line as "not satisfying the economic
interests of Palestine. "" The ardently pro-Zionist
54
Frischwasser-Ra'anan, The Frontiers of a Nation
, p. 115.
5
-'Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary





(though non- Jewish) Me inert zhagen made a proposal of his
own which may well have represented the Zionist counter-
proposal to the Deauville compromise. The "Meinertzhagen
Line," depicted by map #8 on page k6 , started at the
Mediterranean just north of the Litani, and paralleled the
river eastward and then northward, crossing it in the
vicinity of the Litani gorges. The Meinertzhagen proposal
would have kept all of the Litani River's lower course
within Palestine. The line proposed by Allenby's Chief
Political Officer differed from the Zionist Organization's
claim only in that it "sacrificed" the expendable coastal
strip between Sidon and the mouth of the Litani.
Events proved the Meinertzhagen proposal to be an
exercise in futility. France, whose Lebanese clients
considered the town of Tyre to be part of historic Lebanon,
eventually rejected the Deauville Line. The diplomatic
stalemate was firmly reestablished as negotiations dragged
on into the critical year of 1920.
G. BREAKING THE STALEMATE
In Feburary 1920 France officially sealed the fate of
the Deauville proposal (and that of the Meinertzhagen
D Ibid.
, p. 62 Map #8 is based on Meinertzhagen'
s
description of his proposed boundary, and on the map depict-
ing his proposal on page 64 of his Diary . However, the map
appearing in the Diary incorrectly places the line south of
the Litani, contrary to Meinertzhagen' s written description.
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proposal also) by insisting that the Litani River remain
completely under her control. Then, according to
Frischwasser-Ra' anan, "Lloyd George finally dropped his
support for Zionist boundaries because he feared France
would use the issue as a lever to gain more important con-
cessions elsewhere, i.e. Tangier, Gambia, or Trans jordania. " D
Thanks to her consistent reliance on the "Dan to
Beersheba" slogan Great Britain was able to salvage some
honor in abandoning her Zionist allies. The transcripts
of the negotiating sessions leading up to an Anglo-French
understanding reveal in fact that Lloyd George made one
final attempt to rescue the Deauville Line by arguing that,
The waters of Palestine were essential to its existence.
Without those waters, Palestine would be a wilderness;
and all Jews were unanimously agreed that the waters
of Hebron ^sic--Hermon_7 and the headwaters of the Jordan
were vital to the existence of the country. On the other
hand, those same waters were of no use to anyone holding
Syria. 59
The Foreign Minister of France, M. Philippe Berthelot,
rejected Lloyd George's argument.
In regard to the watersheds, undoubtedly the rivers of
southern Syria possessed a certain degree of utility for
the areas north of the Jordan, but that was all. On the
other hand, the snows of Hebron /sic--Hermon7 dominated
the town of Damascus and could not be excluded from Syria.
Again, the waters of the Litanya fsicj irrigated the most
fertile regions of Syria. °0
58 Ibid.
, p. 129






Seeing that France would not give in with regard to the
Litani, Lloyd George took the crucial step in completely
undermining the Zionist boundary proposal.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he would like to recognize
the very conciliatory and helpful spirit in which M.
Berthelot had approached the subject, and he begged to
assure him that the British Government would respond in
a like spirit. These questions were to be settled as
between Allies and friends, and not as between competitors.
However, he thought the present conference was not one in
which details of frontiers could be determined. A book
written by a Scottish theological professor, Professor
Adam Smith, had been brought to his notice. The book had
been written before the war, and although the work of a
theologian, was so accurate in matters of geography thax
it had been used by Lord Allenby during his campaign. °1
Lloyd George offered the book to Berthelot, who drily
remarked that he "would be delighted to read the book on
Palestine, as he was partial both to the Scottish and to
theologians.
"
The British Prime Minister had known for quite some
time what Smith's book would reveal, because several months
earlier, when preparing the Deauville proposal, he had
ordered that Professor Smith's book and Atlas of the Histori -
cal Geography of the Holy Land be sent to him in Paris. ^
Plate 3^ of the Atlas , depicting Palestine Under David and
Solomon, was the map used by Lloyd George to form his own
conception of Palestine's territorial extent. Map #9 on


















the map which Berthelot no doubt examined with great
interest. It can be seen that although the Kingdom of
Israel (Samaria) (according to Smith) did touch the Litani
in the northeast, it did not even reach Acco (Acre) in the
northwest. Since the western portion of the Sykes-Picot
line had already been drawn north of Acre, it seemed fair
that the new boundary be lowered somewhat in its eastern
sector. Hence, the entire Litani River would be outside
of Palestine.
When the negotiations reconvened Lloyd George handed the
French representative a telegram that he had received from
Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court.
Brandeis, cabling on behalf of the Zionist Organization of
America, urged that the Litani and Hermon watersheds be
64included within Palestine. Berthelot ' s reply was
stinging.
M. Berthelot, after commenting on the fact that the
contents of the telegram seemed to indicate that Judge
Brandeis had a much exaggerated sense of his own im-
portance, said that he had carefully studied an
authoritative work on Palestine which Mr. Lloyd George
had been good enough to lend him. The work clearly showed
that the historic boundaries of Palestine had never extended
beyond Dan and Beersheba, and he was quite prepared to
recommend to his Government that these should be
recognized as the correct boundaries... The Litany Riyer,
however, had never been included in the Jewish state. °5





In other words, the British Deauville proposal had,
according to a book used by Lloyd George himself, mis-
represented the northern limit of a state which had presumably
stretched from Dan to Beersheba. Only at one point—where
the Litani River abruptly turns west toward the Mediterranean--
did the Deauville proposal conform with Adam Smith's map.
In June 1920 France made a boundary proposal which
reflected the rough understanding reached by Lloyd George
and Berthelot. It corresponded closely with what was to
become the final boundary between Lebanon and Palestine.
It called essentially for a line which would leave the coast
at Ras En Naqurah, a few miles north of the Sykes-Picot
line, and proceed eastward. It was then to turn sharply
north, so as to include within Palestine a "finger" of
territory containing the northernmost Jewish settlement
(Metulla) and the Hula Valley. The Litani would be left
under complete French control.
H. ZIONIST OPPOSITION AND FINAL AGREEMENT
The French boundary proposal of June 1920 formed the
basis for the final negotiations with Great Britain. Con-
fident of achieving frontiers satisfactory to her Lebanese
clients, France declared on 31 August 1920 the establishment
67
of the state of Greater Lebanon. "By act of the French
66Frischwasser-Ra'anan, The Frontiers of a Nation
, p. 136,
'Sidney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History




government. .. the largely undeveloped and non-Christian
areas of present-day South Lebanon, the Bekaa and North
Lebanon were annexed to the relatively prosperous and
6fl
largely Christian district of Mount Lebanon.
"
The Zionists regarded the French boundary proposal as
a disaster. The sense of urgency felt by the Zionist Or-
ganization with regard to the boundary issue had been
heightened by the Tel Hai incident of 1 March 1920. The
massacre which took place at that northern Jewish settlement
reinforced the determination of the Zionists to place all
Jewish settlements under the protection of a British
69
administration in Palestine. Unfortunately for the
defenders of Tel Hai, General Allenby's forces had with-
70drawn to the O.E.T.A. boundaries in November 1919-
France did not move to permanently garrison the areas
evacuated by the British, so the Hula Valley and surrounding
areas which contained Jewish settlements were left completely
undefended. Having pocketed Lloyd George's concession of
the Litani River, the French acquiesced to the principle of
drawing a boundary in such a way as to include all Zionist
outposts within Palestine.
6R
Michael Hudson, "Fedayeen are Forcing Lebanon's
Hand," Mid East , Vol X, No. 1, February 1970, p. 11.
69Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New York:
Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), pp. 177-178.




Having secured the northern settlements, the Zionist
then waged a determined rearguard action from June through
December 1920 aimed at salvaging the Litani River for
Palestine. The following exerpt of a letter from Dr.
Weizmann to Lord Curzon, dated 30 October 1920, clearly
reflects both the determination and exasperation of the
Zionists.
Your Lordship, I am sure, realises the enormous
importance of the Litany to Palestine. Even if the whole
of the Jordan and the Yarmuk are included in Palestine, it
has insufficient water for its needs. The summer in
Palestine is extremely dry, and evaporation rapid and
intense. The irrigation of Upper Galilee and the power
necessary for even a limited industrial life must come from
the Litany. Experts agree that the Litany is of little
use to the well-watered Lebanon and we have always agreed
that the requirements of the territory not included in
Palestine should be adequately met.
It is hardly possible that France even realises the
extent to which the frontier she has proposed would
cripple the economic life of Palestine. For if Palestine
were cut off from the Litany, Upper Jordan and Yarmuk,
to say nothing of the western shore of the Galilee, she
could not be economically independent. And a poor and
impoverished Palestine would be of no advantage to any
Power . /"Emphasis added.
J
7 71
Weizmann' s blatant appeal to British imperial sentiments was
useless. In his autobiography he stated that, "I tried to
convince General Gouraud {the French High Commissioner for
Syria7 of the importance to Palestine of the waters of the
72
river Litani, but could arouse no interest...'
Although middle-level British negotiators charged with
transforming the Lloyd George-Berthelot understanding into
71Documents
, First Series Volume XIII, p. ^19.
72Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 19^9), p. 289-
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a treaty tried their very best to satisfy the Zionists,
they found themselves thoroughly undermined by the Prime
Minister's Biblical diplomacy. Part of a letter written
by one of the British diplomats illustrates this point.
As our case for extended Palestine frontiers had always
been argued at the Supreme Council generally on the
'historical' ground and in particular (however unfor-
tunate it may now seem) on the basis of plate No. 3^
of Adam Smith's Atlas of the Historical Geography of
the Holy Land , you will readily understand how difficult
it was to meet the French argument as regards the inclu-
sion in Palestine of territory east of the Jordan and
north of the Yarmuk. It would not have been so difficult,
if the above plate be taken as the test, to argue for a
frontier including part of the Litani but, as I have said,
the course of the discussion at San Remo practically
excluded that point being taken up again. ?3
Final agreement in principle was reached by Great
Britain and France on 23 December 1920. The French proposal
of the previous June was accepted entirely with regard to
the Palestine-Lebanon boundary. A commission was established
to demarcate the exact line of the boundary, and on the
subject of water, Article 8 of the Franco-British Convention
provided that,
Experts nominated respectively by the administrations of
Syria and Palestine shall examine in common within six
months after the signature of the present convention the
employment, for the purposes of irrigation and the pro-
duction of hydroelectric power, of the waters of the
Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and of their tributaries,
after satisfaction of the needs of the territories under
the French mandate.
In connection with this examination the French
government will give its representatives the most liberal
instructions for the employment of the surplus of these
waters for the benefit of Palestine. 7^-
^Documents , First Series Volume XIII, p. ^19.
Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on
C'ertain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria and the
Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia /"Cmd. 1195J7 (London: His
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1921), p. k.
5^

It should be noted that the Franco-British Convention made
no mention whatsoever of the Litani River.
The boundary commission established by the Franco-
British Convention submitted its final report in February
7 S
1922. J "This agreement was signed on the 3rd February
1922. It was ratified by the British Government on the
7 £1
7th March 1923» and came into effect three days later.'
Map #10 on page 56 traces the final Palestine-Lebanon
boundary in relation to the many proposals that had been
made previously.
The final agreement made no further mention of Zionist
access to French-controlled waters. The only aspect of the
boundary left subject to possible renegotiation was a short
stretch of border between Metulla and Banias , half of which
was part of the Palestine-Lebanon boundary and half of which
divided Palestine and Syria. The boundary had been drawn
parallel to and 100 meters south of a path linking Metulla
and Banias. France had insisted on keeping the entire path
so as to preserve and control an east-west road link. The
final agreement upheld the French position, but included a
provision stating that,
7 S^Agreement Between His Majesty's Government and the
French Government Res-pectina: the Boundary Line Between Syria
and Palestine from the Mediterranean to SI Hamme ^"Cmd. 1910/
(London:- His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1923).
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H. ¥. V. Temperley, ed. , A History of the Peace
Conference at Paris , Volume VI (London: Henry Frowde and
Hodder & Stoughton, 192*0, P- 166.
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The British Government shall be free to reopen the question
of readjusting the frontier between Banias and Metallah on
such terms as may be agreed between the two mandatory
Powers with a view of making the north road between these
two villages the final frontier. "'
77
' ' Agreement Between His Majesty's Government and the
French" Government Z"Cmd. 191Q/5 pp. 5-8.
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III. THE BOUNDARY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
According to a report submitted to London by Herbert
Samuel, the British High Commissioner for Palestine,
The boundary between the two areas /Palestine and
Lebanon-SyriaJ was adjusted in April, 192^, in accordance
with an Anglo-French Convention of March, 1923- An area
of 75 square miles with 20 villages was brought within
the frontiers of Palestine. It included the ancient
district of Dan, and its addition re-established the
Biblical boundaries of Palestine-- "from Dan even unto
Beersheba. "78
It soon became evident however that the new boundary was
anything but divinely-inspired. The seemingly minor
territorial compromise had been necessitated by the need
of two great powers to maintain a harmonious postwar
relationship. Yet what seemed to be minor from a great
power perspective proved to be of great significance to
three groups: the predominantly Arab population of a region
abruptly subjected to political partition; the Zionists of
Palestine; and the Lebanese nationalists of Greater Lebanon.
The purpose of this section is to examine the
significance of the boundary settlement for those three
groups. This will be accomplished after first analyzing the
geographical implications of the boundary settlement. It
will be seen that in light of subsequent events, the




Herbert Samuel, Palestine. Report of the High Com-
missioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-1925




The political boundary agreed upon in 1923 bisected
three natural geographical regions: the Galilean Coast,
Upper Galilee, and that portion of the great Rift Valley
lying to the east of Upper Galilee. Map #11 on page 60
depicts the approximate extent of the three regions under
79
examination.
The Galilean Coast extends from the city of Acre north
to the mouth of the Litani River. It is bisected very
decisively however by the white limestone cliffs of Ras
En Naqurah, a striking topographical feature known
historically as the "Ladder of Tyre." Due to the obstacle
presented by the cliffs, the traditional land route between
Acre and Tyre passed not over the Tyrian Ladder, but further
inland through the village of Bint Jubail. In October
1918 however, General Allenby decided to proceed to 3eirut
via the direct coastal route, so his Chief Engineer was
31
obliged to blast a passage way through the limestone.
79Map #11 and much of the geographical terminology used
in this section are based on information contained in
Efraim Orni and Elisha Efrat, Geography of Israel
(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America,
1971).
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Yehuda Karmon, Israel: A Regional Geography (London:
Wiley Interscience, 1971), p. 73.
8lCyril Falls, Armageddon: 1918 (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1964, p. 14-1).
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The part of the Galilean Coast lying to the south of Ras
En Naqurah is known as the Acre Plain, and the section
north of the cliffs is called the Tyre Valley. Although
the two parts are, strictly speaking, different (the Acre
Plain being a true coastal plain, while the Tyre Valley
is actually a mountain valley) , they share in common some
rich and well-watered soil which has supported a prospering
agricultural (especially citrus fruit) development.
Ras En Naqurah is actually a coastal extension of the
second region under discussion: Upper Galilee. The word
"upper" refers to the elevation of the region, not its
geographic location (although Upper Galilee is also north
of Lower Galilee). The region's natural borders are the
Galilean Coast on the west, an east-west line on roughly
the same latitude as Acre in the south, the Rift Valley
in the east, and the lower course of the Litani River in
the north. Unlike the Galilean Coast, Upper Galilee has
never supported a prospering agricultural economy. The
Lebanese portion of the region, known as Jabal Aamel , is
an extremely poor area whose meagre natural assets are well-
Q p
suited to the growth of only one product: tobacco. The
O p
See Halim Said Abu-Izzeddin, ed. , Lebanon and its
Provinces: A Study by the Governors of the Five Provinces
(Beirut: Khayats , 1963) . According to the Governor of
South Lebanon, "The South, and Jabal ' Amal in particular,
plants 29,000 dunums of tobacco out of 45,000 dunums
licensed by the Government for all districts of Lebanon.
The soil of Jabal 'Amal is one of the best for growing
tobacco in Lebanon." (Page 64.)
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terrain of Jabal Aamel is exceedingly rugged, and one
observer has noted that "deep dissection and the absence of
water-bearing strata reduce the cultivated area to less than
35^ of the total available." D Although the Israeli part of
Upper Galilee is not so severely handicapped topographically
as Jabal Aamel, it too was traditionally an area of subsis-
tence agriculture. The Litani River is both the northern
boundary of Upper Galilee and the region's most prized
natural feature. Rising near Ba'albek in northern Lebanon,
the Litani flows southwesterly until it approaches the
village of Deir Mimass, where it veers sharply to the west
and empties into the Mediterranean Sea north of Tyre.
Between Deir Mimass and the sea the river is known locally
as El Qasimiyeh. The Litani is not navigable, and- much
of the area through which the lower course flows is not
84particularly well-suited for large scale irrigation.
The river does however irrigate large parts of Lebanon's
fertile Biqa' Valley, and the waters of its lower course were
viewed by Zionists as necessary for irrigation projects
planned for Palestine.
The third region divided by the new political boundary
was a small portion of the Rift Valley, a massive scar in
\. B. Fisher, The Middle East: A Physical, Social
and Regional Geography (London: Methuen & Co., 1971),
p. 405-
84See James Hudson, "The Litani River of Lebanon: An
Example of Middle Eastern Water Development," The Middle
East Journal
. Volume 25, Winter 1971, Number 1, pp. 1-14.
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the earth's surface stretching from Turkey to East Africa.
Within the context of the Palestine-Lebanon frontier region,
the Rift Valley contains two subsections: the Merj Valley
of Lebanon, and the Hula Valley of Palestine. The Merj
Valley is a continuation of the Biqa' , but it is separated
from Lebanon's most fertile region by two chains of hills
known as Jabal Arabi and Jabal Bir ed Dahr. Bordered on
the west by Jabal Aamel and on the east by the slopes of
Mount Hermon, the Merj Valley is separated from the Hula
Valley by the Metulla Hills. The Hula Valley is bordered
on the west by the Neftali Ridge of Upper Galilee, on the
east by the Golan Plateau, and on the south by the Rosh
Pinna Sill, through which the Jordan River flows into
Lake Tiberias.
The importance of the Rift Valley to the frontier region
lies in its water resources. The Hasbani River, one of
the Jordan River's three sources, rises on the northwestern
slope of Mount Hermon some 32 miles northeast of Metulla.
The stream becomes perennial however only about 12 miles
north of Metulla, near the village of Hasbaya. D The Hasbani
does not flow through the Merj Valley, but rather through
the hills to the east of the valley in an area known as the
Arqub. Although the Arqub was not contiguous with the ori-
ginal Palestine-Lebanon boundary, it was of interest to the
Zionists because of the presence of the Hasbani River.
Furthermore, when Israel occupied the Golan Heights in June




1967 "the Lebanese-Israeli border was in effect lengthened
so as to bring the Arqub into direct contact with Israeli-
controlled territory. Like the rest of southern Lebanon,
the Arqub region is very poor. According to one authority
on the region's geography,
Despite being drained by the Hasbani. . . this is a remote
and largely inaccessible area with a low density of
population. Its villages are poor, since possession
of elevated, defensible sites has deprived them of
adequate water and cultivable land. 80
The Merj Valley on the other hand is drained by a small
intermittant stream (the Bureighit) and supports a relatively
prosporous agrarian economy during times of peace.
The Hula Valley, measuring ljJll miles north to south
by 4 to 6 miles east to west, consisted of a large swamp
and a lake at the time of the boundary demarcation. Lake
Hula, a shallow body of water roughly 5 square miles in
area, was the dominant feature in the southern part of the
valley. The three sources of the Jordan River-- the Hasbani,
Dan, and Banias--entered the northern Hula Valley, joined
01-7
together, and then "got lost in the Hula swamp and lake."
The Jordan River then reemerged from Lake Hula and flowed
south through the Rosh Pinna Sill into Lake Tiberias. 3y
the late 1950s the swamp and lake of the Hula Valley were
completely drained by Israel and converted into rich
86
Peter Beaumont , Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm
Wagstaff, eds., The Middle East: A Geographical Survey
(London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p. 367.
87
Brawer, "The Geographical Background of the Jordan
Water Dispute," p. 231.
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agricultural land. At the time the boundary was created
the Hula Valley was inhabited mainly by Arab peasants
88
engaged in subsistence agriculture.
Inasmuch as the boundary agreement of December 1920
directed that a political demarcation line be drawn through
the three natural regions described above, it is no wonder
that the boundary passed through some unremarkable terrain.
In fact, though the Convention of 23 December 1920 specified
that the boundary would run from Metulla to Ras En Naqurah,
it gave precious little guidance as to where the line would
actually be drawn. The boundary commission was obliged
therefore to stake out a line which would make use of what-
ever distinguishable terrain was available, and which would
avoid, wherever possible, the division of property owned
by individuals, single villages, or religious foundations.
It proved to be an impossible task, as both the topography
of the region and patterns of land ownership served to
present insurmountable difficulties.
One geographer has stated flatly that "no topographic
89break marks the political border next to Lebanon. " 7
The absence of such clearly-defined terrain—a potential
deficiency that would have been avoided had the political
88
See Yehuda Karmon. "The Drainage of the Huleh Swamps,"
geographical Review , April i960
, pp. 169-193.
89 George B. Cressey,. Crossroads: Land and Life in




boundary been drawn to coincide with the northern or
southern limits of Upper Galilee- -make a simple character-
ization of the line itself impossible. According to the
90boundary commission's report, the line began at Ras En
Naqurah and followed a well-defined topographic crest
eastward for 3*500 meters. Thereafter the surveyors simply
ran out of suitable terrain and were obliged to improvise.
Boundary markers were placed more or less alternately in
wadis (small valleys) or along the crest of a small
plateau which tended to slope sharply to the south ( into
Palestine) and gently toward the north (into Lebanon.)
At roughly 33 06'N by 35 30'2 the line ceased moving
eastward and veered abruptly to the north, as it began to
form the "finger" of territory containing the northernmost
Jewish settlements. The line moved northward, paralleling
a ridgeline whose crests were left within Palestine over-
looking the Hula Valley to the east. After passing to the
east of the Lebanese hamlet of Kfar Kila, the boundary
looped around Metulla and proceeded in a southeasterly
direction through gently descending terrain, eventually
linking up with the Palestine-Syria boundary near the
Hasbani River. Due to the absence of suitable landmarks,
90Agreement Between His Majesty's Government and the
French Government Respecting the Boundary Line Between Syria
and Palestine from the Mediterranean to El Hamme /"Cmd. 1910/
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923).
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many of the thirty-eight markers placed along the Palestine-
Lebanon boundary were connected by straight lines.
B. LOCAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT
It is not likely that the British and French diplomats
who contrived to partition Upper Galilee and the adjoining
regions imagined the impact their action would have on the
inhabitants of the area. Had they known, it is even less
likely that they would have cared. The area was an economic
and social backwater, a depressed region populated almost
entirely by Arabs (except of course for those few Jewish
settlements around the Hula Valley) engaged in subsistence
agriculture. It hardly seemed possible that the drawing of
an international boundary through such an area would have
much of an impact, positive or negative, on anything.
Yet for the Arab inhabitants of the new frontier region
the boundary was at best an inconvenience and at worst a
potential economic and security disaster. Its very
demarcation—a seemingly innocuous piece of surveying—caused
unwelcomed changes. Prior to the boundary imposition the
Merj and Hula Valleys had functioned as an economic unit.
According to Karmon the village of Merj 'Uyun served as the
area's urban center. "Here lived the landowners, the
proprietors of the water mills, the grain merchants and
moneylenders, on whom the inhabitants of the Hula Valley
depended. With the establishment of the British mandate,
Marj 'Uyun became part of Lebanon."" The insertion of
917 Karmon, "The Drainage of the Huleh Swamps, p. 191.
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a boundary partitioned the region and left the Hula Valley
without an urban center until the creation of Qiryat Shemona
92
by Israel. Although Hourani maintains that "There was no
good reason, economic or ethnic, for the inclusion of the
93
Hulah district in Palestine,' '•* it is probably more accurate
to conclude that it was the regional partition itself--
irrespective of which side gained or lost--that made little
sense. Had it not been for the existence of a few isolated
Jewish settlements, it is likely that the Hula and Merj
Valleys would have remained together under French
jurisdiction.
Upper Galilee also suffered from the demarcation.
Traditionally the village of Bint Jubail , which ended up
in Lebanon, had served as an important junction for roads
9Z4.
leading to Tyre from Acre, Safed, and the Hula Valley.
Although the coastal road would have become the primary
land link between Acre and Tyre in any event, it is never-
theless true that Bint Jubail ' s role in Upper Galilee was
seriously jeopardized by the appearance of a boundary.
Much the same can be said for the Palestinian town of
Safed, which most likely would have eventually served as
92Ibid.
, p. 192.
93yjk. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political








the principal urban center for all of Upper Galilee. y
Regrettably however the boundary nullified the area's few
potentialities and worsened an already bleak economic
picture.
Yet that was not all. If the mere act of drawing a
boundary caused disruptions, its eventual closure could
lead to catastrophe. One of the few factors which tended
to mitigate the poverty of the area was the ability of
people to move with relative freedom to graze livestock,
sell produce, and seek odd jobs for cash. The presence of
an international boundary threatened to change all of that.
If political problems were ever to cause the border to
close, the economic options of the Arab farmers and
villagers on both sides of the line would be reduced. They
would be obliged either to accept an even lower standard of
living, or else flock to the cities of their respective
countries in order to find employment, The citizens of
southern Lebanon were particularly vulnerable to the potential
effects of a border closing due to their own central govern-
ment's lack of interest in developing the economy of the
area.
Soon after the boundary went into effect in 1924, the
mandatory authorities in Jerusalem and Beirut discovered
that the inhabitants of the frontier area were acting as if




block human traffic from moving from one side of the
boundary to the other--a policy which probably would have
encountered violent resistance— the British and French
officials wisely chose instead to legalize the border
crossing proclivities of their subjects. On 2 February 1926
an agreement was signed involving Palestine, Lebanon, and
Syria. The accord had the objective of "regulating certain
administrative matters in connection with the fronter" in
such a way as to facilitate "good neighbourly relations in
connection with frontier questions." The treaty defined the
frontier region as including the subdistricts of Acre and
Safed in Palestine, Tyre and Merj 'Uyun in Lebanon, and
Quneitra in Syria. Special privileges were also extended
to the Lebanese • subdistrict of Hasbaya (the Arqub) even
96though it did not touch on the Palestine-Lebanon border.
The agreement constituted an attempt to deal with problems
caused by the boundary demarcation. One such problem was
with the status of private, village, and religious property
which had been bisected by the boundary. Instead of asking
for a new demarcation, the 1926 accord left the boundary as
it was and established equitable procedures governing the
collection of taxes on divided property and subsequent title
97transfers. The accord also stated that grazing, cultivation,
96Agreement Between Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon to
Facilitate Good Neighbourly Relations in Connection with
Frontier Questions (London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1927) , pp. 1,8.
97 Ibid.
, pp. k, 6.
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and water rights predating the existence of the boundary
would remain in effect. The following passage specified
the border crossing rights of the local inhabitants:
They shall be entitled. .. to cross the frontier freely
and without a passport and to transport, from one side
to the other of the frontier, their animals and the
natural increase thereof, their tools, their vehicles,
their implements, seeds and products of the soil or sub-
soil of their lands, without paying any customs duties
or any dues for grazing or watering or any other tax
on account of passing the frontier and entering the
neighbouring territory. 98
Another provision of the accord permitted the people of the
frontier area to transport (duty free) across the boundary
any crops or local industrial goods produced anywhere
within the frontier zone destined for family consumption in
99
any of the subdistricts covered by the agreement. y
The treaty also facilitated the maintenance of public
order along the common border. Police from both sides were
permitted to use tracks and roads which ran along parts of
the boundary "without passport or toll of any kind.
"
Furthermore, Palestinian police and civilians were granted
the use, for their convenience, of certain paths located
wholly within Lebanon. In cases of emergency the
signatories were allowed "to use the tracks and roads











of such use shall be given to the other Government concerned
102
as soon as possible." However neither side was granted
the right of "hot pursuit" in attempts to apprehend
common criminals, political dissidents, or terrorists
101
seeking refuge on the other side of the border. J
The "good neighbourly relations" accord of 1926 enabled
the people of the frontier region to escape— though only
temporarily—the greatest dangers inherent in the creation
of the boundary. The benefits of the liberal frontier
policy accrued most noticeably to the citizens of southern
Lebanon. Thanks to Beirut's lack of interest, the region
functioned economically for several years as a virtual
extension of northern Palestine. According to one observer,
During the Mandatory period most South Lebanese families
had at least one member working in Palestine; and a large
number of frontier villages lived on the proceeds of
smuggling—hashish (en route to Egypt), arms and food-
stuffs, and often "illegal" Jewish immigrants to Palestine;
Jewish manufactured goods to Lebanon and Syria. 10^
The Arab-Israeli war of 19^8 and the subsequent General
Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon caused the
suspension of the 1926 agreement. The treaty was completely
voided on 30 October 1953 » when Israel's ambassador to the








Ray Alan, "Lebanon: Israel's Friendliest Neighbor,"
Commentary
. Volume 13 Number 6, June 1952, p. 556.
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international treaties signed by the United Kingdom as
mandatory power. . . " ^ The closing of the border was a
severe blow to southern Lebanon. As is discussed in section
V below, the 19^8 war caused a dramatic demographic trans-
formation in the frontier region. On Israel's side of the
line Arab villages were vacated during and after the
fighting, and occupied by Jewish settlers who had neither
the need nor inclination to develop economic relationships
with their Arab neighbors on Lebanon's side of the border.
Cut off from economic opportunities in Israel, southern
Lebanon languished. Beirut's traditional lack of concern
for the predominantly Shi'ite region was reinforced by the
belief, commonly held by members of Lebanon's political
elite, that Israel would someday seize the area anyway.
By the latter part of the 1960s the south 's misery was
compounded by fighting in the frontier area between
Palestinian commandos and the Israel Defense Force. Again
Beirut seemed justified in not Investing significantly
in southern Lebanon. Yet, as The Economist pointed out,
-'Abraham H. Hirsh, "Utilization of International
Rivers in the Middle East," American Journal of International
Law
, Volume 50, Number 1, January 1956, p. 8ln. According
to Kenneth J. Keith, Israel is the only state which refuses
to "succeed" to the treaties made by its predecessor. See
"Succession to Bilateral Treaties by Seceeding States,"
American Journal of International Law , Volume 6l Number 2,
April 1967, p. 52k.
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The presence of the Palestinian guerrilla units and the
Israeli raids have provided an excuse for inaction, but
it is hard not to suspect that there has been a lack of
concern for the section of the population which is least
strongly represented in the corridors of power. 10o
The great suffering endured by the people of southern
Lebanon, consisting of economic depression compounded in
recent years by widespread death and destruction, is
undoubtedly the most lamentable consequence of the 1920
Franco-British Convention.
C. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The impact of the new boundary was not limited to the
inhabitants of the frontier region. The decision of Great
Britain and France to place the boundary where they did
carried with it some significant implications both for
Zionism and Lebanese nationalism.
From the Zionist perspective the implications of
Palestine's new frontier were quite serious indeed.
As Howard M. Sachar has observed,
To the north and northeast, the country was deprived of
almost all the major water resources— the Litani River,
the northernmost sources of the Jordan, the spring of
Hermon, and the greater part of the Yarmuk--needed for
the power and irrigation plans that were even then being
formulated. . .Moreover , by failing to approximate any
"Not Just a Tiny Strip of Land," The Economist
,




natural geographic boundaries, the borders left the
country all but indefensible militarily. . .10?
Zionist misgivings about the new boundary were not
however shared by Great Britain. The actual British approach
to the question of water resources--as opposed to the
negotiating posture maintained through the early months of
1920—may be summarized by the following exchange between
some very prominent British officials which took place on
10 September 1919 • Arthur Bonar Law, the Lord Privy Seal,
asked his colleagues to define "the value of Palestine."
General Allenby replied "that it had no economic value
whatsoever." Lloyd George had nothing to say about economics,
but insisted nonetheless that "The mandate over Palestine
would give us great prestige." Later, when questioned
in Parliament about his government's failure to secure the
waters of the Litani River for Palestine, the Prime Minister
responded by shouting
107
'Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East: 191^-2^
,
p. 28^. It should also be noted however that in addition to
including the northern Jewish settlements within Palestine,
the British and Zionists secured from France two water-
related concessions at the expense not of Lebanon, but of
Syria. First, that part of the Jordan River north of Lake
Tiberias was kept entirely within Palestine by demarcating
the boundary about 500 meters to the east of the river.
Second, Lake Tiberias itself was kept entirely within
Palestine, to include a ten meter-wide strip of its north-




Ingrams , Palestine Papers 1917-1922: Seeds of
Conflict , p. 77-
75

No '. They have never been included in Palestine. The
agreement entered into M. Clemenceau and myself [in
December 191SD was that Palestine was to be the old
historic Palestine, that is, from Dan to Beersheba.
That does not include the Litani River. 109
The economy of Palestine was obviously not considered to be
an issue of great importance by the British Empire.
Likewise Great Britain did not share the Zionist
apprehension over the military aspects of the northern
frontier. Having excluded France from playing a role in the
governing of Palestine, the British had succeeded in placing
strategic depth between the Suez Canal and French forces in
the Levant. A northern defense line anchored on the Litani
River, one which certainly would have appealed to the
Zionists, would have added little to Britain's ability to
defend the canal. Nevertheless, as Palestine's High
Commissioner reported in 1925* "Palestine is a small
territory, but it is broken up by hills and mountains...
Its frontiers to the north and east are open at almost any
point." Indeed, one would be hard pressed to identify
terrain anywhere along the boundary that is well suited for
either defensive military operations or routine border
security. This is especially the case when viewing the
ground from the perspective of Palestine (Israel). After
1097Khalid Kishtainy, Whither Israel? A Study of Zionist
Expansionism (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization
Research Center, 1970, p. 21.




leaving the imposing natural obstacle of Ras En Naqurah,
the boundary meanders through the open terrain of Upper
Galille through wadis and along a plateau which slopes
sharply to the south (into Israel) and gently toward north
(into Lebanon). Only along the Neftali Ridge, which overlooks
the Hula Valley to the East and Wadi Dubbah to the west, can
terrain be identified as suitable (from the Israeli per-
spective) for security operations. The only "natural"
feature of the area which tended to discourage attacks from
the north was the fact that the major lines of communication
in the upper Galilee region ran west and east rather than
north and south. Yet the Zionists of 1923» perhaps antici-
pating the day when force would have to be used to transform
Palestine into the Jewish State, still had good reason to
be dissatisfied with the security aspect of the northern
boundary.
Notwithstanding the existence of substantial economic
and military problems (which will be discussed below in
greater detail, in sections IV and V respectively), the
Zionist movement was not, in 1923. in any position to reverse
the Anglo-French decision on the northern frontier. It is
clear however that the Zionists did retain hope that the
boundary could someday be adjusted in Palestine's favor,
and such an adjustment need not come as a result of war.
In the 1920s the French authorities in Beirut were approached
on the subject of permitting Zionist settlements to be
established in southern Lebanon. Dr. Weizmann himself
ll

reported that he was told by the French High Commissioner
that, "Of course... I would not want you to work in southern
Syria, because immediately after you'd come to Tyre and
Saida you would want the frontier rectified." Weizmann
neither confirmed nor refuted the High Commissioner's
observation. It is in any event clear that although the
northern boundary settlement frustrated Zionist economic
and security planning, it did not shut the door on the
matter forever. Instead of acknowledging their defeat and
writing it off as a lesson learned in the tangled web of
international diplomacy, Zionist leaders in Palestine
continued to believe that their setback could somehow be
reversed. As recently as 21 March 1978, the Defense Minister
of Israel was berated by a member of the Knesset (the
Israeli parliament) for not simply seizing the Litani River
during Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon. The MK, Mrs.
Kohen, shouted, "Your uncle, the late President Weizman,
knew at the time the historic significance of the Litani."
Ezer Weizman' s reply: "It is not from you that I will
112
receive references about Hayyim Weizman. " In retrospect
it appears that Dr. Weizmann's calm diplomacy, based as it
was upon economic justifications for the inclusion of the
Litani and Hasbani in Palestine, helped to insure that
Chaim Weizmann, Trial, and Error, The Autobiography
of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper & Brothers, 19^9)
»
pT" 366,
112Jerusalem Domestic Service , 21 March 1978, as quoted
by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service , FBIS-MEA-78-56,
22 March 1978, p. N3.
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mainstream Zionist irredentism toward southern Lebanon
would not have a strong religious component. Unlike post-
194*8 Arab Jerusalem or that part of mandatory Palestine
annexed by Jordan (the "West Bank"), few Zionists would
point to southern Lebanon as being part of the "Eretz
Israel" (Land of Israel) promised by God to the Hebrews.
Had Weizman adopted some of Lloyd George's religious fervor
and declared the Litani to be part of Eretz Israel, Zionist
irredentism probably would have been fulfilled long ago.
Zionism's strong desire to expand Palestine in such a
way as to secure hydrographic resources and defensible
terrain contrasted sharply with the indifference shown by
Lebanese nationalists toward their southern districts.
France, to be sure, had scored a 'victory" by securing a
very generous southern frontier for the new state of
Greater Lebanon. The new borders of the Lebanese state
substantially satisfied the expansionist dreams of Lebanese
nationalists, and served French imperial interests by
extending the political sway of a narrow, largely Franco-
phile Christian majority over the largest land area possible
111Yet by attaching the largely Shi'ite south J and other
113^According to a census conducted by the French
government in 1921, the sectarian composition of southern
Lebanon's population was as follows: 13.397 Sunni Muslims
(located mainly in the towns of Tyre and Sidon) 5 62,796
Shi'ite Muslims; 3.519 Druze; and 31,071 Christians. See
Arnold J. Toynbee, ed. , Survey of International Affairs 1925
Volume I (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 355.
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Muslim areas to the predominantly Maronite Mount Lebanon,
France also institutionalized unrest within the Lebanese
political system. Philip Hitti pointed out that the
creation of Greater Lebanon by France was at best a mixed
blessing and at worst a political time bomb. "What the
country gained in area it lost in cohesion. It lost its
internal equilibrium, though geographically and economically




In order to appreciate the attitude of Greater Lebanon's
political elite toward the south, it is necessary to recall
that the 'Lebanese nationalism" of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was really an outgrowth of the
Maronite national identity which had developed during that
sect's 1,000-year occupation of Mount Lebanon. Inasmuch as
Greater Lebanon was the offspring of Lebanese (Maronite)
nationalism and French imperialism, it comes as no great
surprise that the rulers of the new political entity mani-
fested little interest in the rural, poor, and predominantly
non-Christian south. Consequently, "The French concentrated
their development efforts on the mountain and Beirut,, . . " ^
By ignoring the south France accurately reflected the desires
of her Lebanese collaborators. Even after independence the
first President of the Lebanese Republic, Bishara al-Khouri,
reportedly told an interviewer that "the 'Lebaneseness '
11^Phillip K. Hitti. Lebanon in History: From the Earliest
Times to the Present (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. ^90.







( Lubnaniyat ) of the predominantly shi'i southern region had
not been finally established," and for that reason the area
was not entitled to large-scale developmental assistance.
Recent research has also revealed that in 1932 Emile Edde,
a leading Maronite politican who would serve as his country's
President from 193& to 19^1. tried to convince France to
get rid of Lebanon's southern region. He wrote a memorandum
to the Under-Secretary of State in the French Foreign
Ministry suggesting (among other things) that southern
Lebanon, consisting as it did of an overwhelming Shi'ite
majority, be detached from Lebanon and transformed into an
117
autonomous state under a French administrator. Although
France never acted upon Edde's suggestion, the memorandum
provides an insight into the thinking of a leading member of
the Maronite elite during the mandate period, and helps to
explain why the Lebanese government paid little attention
to the needs or potentialities of the south.
Beirut's policy of ignoring the south would eventually
facilitate the destruction of Lebanon itself. The south,
regarded by Lebanon's leaders as a virtually useless
appendage, became a military vacuum which in some areas was
eventually filled by Palestinian commandos who would use
1 ~\ f>
N. Raphael!, "Development Planning: Lebanon," "Western
Political Quarterly , Volume XX No . 3, September 1967, p. 719.
117Meir Zamir, "Emile Edde and the Territorial Integrity
of Lebanon," Middle Eastern Studies , Volume l4, No. 2,
May 1978, pp. 232-233.
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Lebanese territory as a base from which to attack Israeli
military and civilian targets. As discussed in some detail
below in sections V and VI, the absence of an effective
official Lebanese presence in the frontier area encouraged
Israel to act unilaterally against the armed Palestinians.
Lebanon suffered repeated attacks at the hands of Israel,
I
some of which were in retaliation for the activities of
Palestinian commandos and terrorists, but all of which had
the objective of forcing a confrontation in Lebanon between
Lebanese nationalists (who wanted nothing to do with the
Arab-Israeli conflict) and Palestinian/pan-Arab nationalists
for whom the struggle against Zionism was the fundamental
reason for political activity. 3y the Spring of 1975 Israel
had succeeded in fostering civil war in Lebanon. It is very
doubtful that Israel would have succeeded in Lebanon had
the authorities in Beirut made sincere efforts from the
beginning to integrate the south into the rest of the country.
Yet southern Lebanon's "value" to the Lebanese nationalists
of the post-World War I era lay solely in the space occupied
by the region on the map. The inclusion of the area in
Greater Lebanon satisfied the emotional yearning of Lebanese
nationalists for the territory of "historic" Lebanon, but
the land and the people living on it were irrelevant to the
French-orchestrated political and economic processes taking
place in Paris and Beirut.
The broad political significance of the 1923 boundary
settlement can therefore be summarized as follows: Palestine
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was deprived of an area which the Zionists wanted and which
they thought they needed very badly; Lebanon was handed a
piece of territory which it "wanted" but for which it had
no particular use; and the people living in the contested
region were considered to be irrelevant by everyone concerned.
The Anglo-French compromise may have helped to facilitate
a smooth working relationship between the two wartime allies,
but the cost was high. Zionism lost an area which it deemed
essential for the defense and development of Palestine;
Lebanon gained an area which would later prove to be an
enormous political liability; and the people of the frontier
region found their livlihoods and eventually their lives
in jeopardy. It was the fundamental assymetry between
Zionist irredentism toward southern Lebanon and Beirut's
indifference toward the region that kept alive a territorial
controversy supposedly sealed by the accords of 1920 and
1923. Succeeding sections of this study will examine the
evolution of that controversy in terms of economic and
security factors, and analyze how the controversy has
brought into question the very existence of Lebanon.
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IV. THE EVOLVING WATER CONTROVERSY
Between 1923 and 1968 "the issue of southern Lebanon's
abundant water resources and their disposition was the
prime ingredient in the residue of distrust and disappoint-
ment left behind by the boundary settlement. The purpose
of this section is to analyze the hydrographic legacy of
the Anglo-French territorial compromise, focusing on
Zionist efforts to undo or at least mitigate the setbacks
contained within the accords of 1920 and 1923- It will be
seen that the intensity of Zionist irredentism toward
southern Lebanon was largely a function of Beirut's failure
to exploit the region's water resources. It was not until
the Lebanese government completed, in the late 1960s, the
first phase of a project designed to exploit the Litani
River that Israeli pressure on Lebanese water resources
began to subside.
The boundary agreements of 1920 am1 1923 cut sharply
into the most optimistic Zionist estimates as to the amount
of water available to support extensive Jewish agricultural
colonization in Palestine. As discussed above in section
II, Zionist planners had hoped to divert part of the flow
of the Litani River eastward into the Hasbani, where it would
flow south into the Jordan Valley and eventually be piped
overland to the Negev Desert. Yet the 1920 compromise had
left the Litani entirely within Lebanon, fewer than 4-, 000
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tantalizing meters from the Palestine border at its closest
point. Furthermore, neither the 1920 nor 1923 agreements
even mentioned the Litani in the context of future bilateral
developmental schemes. The 1920 accord, as noted in section
II above, did call for the creation of a commission to
study the possibility of jointly exploiting the "Upper
Jordan" (Hasbani) River. Yet as Hirsch commented in 1956,
the commission "seems [never] to have been formed." In
short, the Zionists had failed to secure even limited access
to the waters of southern Lebanon.
The issue of water resources in the Palestine/lsrael-
Lebanon frontier region will be examined in three aspects:
(l) continuing Zionist interest in southern Lebanon's most
important waterway, the Litani River; (2) the role played by
independent Lebanon in Arab efforts to divert the headwaters
of the Jordan River away from Israel's Hula Valley; and (3)
the climax of water-related tensions before, during and
after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
A. THE LITANI
I
Zionism's "loss" of the Litani did not, at least during
the mandatory period, translate into Lebanon's gain.
Writing in 1936, Sa'id B. Himadeh commented that, "At present
the river is utilized to some extent for irrigation purposes
1 1 Pi
Hirsch, "Utilization of International Rivers in the




but no use has yet been made of its generating powers."
The limited amount of irrigation undertaken by 193& was
restricted almost entirely to the fertile Biqa' and coastal
120
plain, and France's contribution to the river's exploitation
(aside from plans and studies never effectuated) only amounted
to a few flood control projects completed between 192^ and
121
1928. During World War II British military authorities
in Lebanon encouraged the "Qasimiyah Irrigation Scheme" which
attempted to water the coastal plain "from Sidon to a point
122
ten kilometers south of Tyre." The plan was abandoned
during the war, but was later revived by independent Lebanon.
Franco-Lebanese neglect of the Litani did not go unnoticed
by the Zionists. In 193^ the League of Nations gave its
approval to the Anglo-French boundary agreement of 1923.
"and after that the Zionist leaders slowly lost hope of
123
ever achieving a change in the frontier line." v Yet in
119Sa'id B. Himadeh, ed. , Economic Organization of
Syria (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1936) » P- 3^«
120 James Hudson, "The Litani River of Lebanon: An
Example of Middle Eastern Water Development," Middle East
Journal , Volume 25, No. 1, Winter 1971, p. 7-
121Hedley V. Cooke, Challenge and Resnonse in the









1936 "the Zionists received a small measure of encouragement
in the matter of sharing with Lebanon the fruits of the
Litani's presence in Upper Galilee. A study on regional
electricity prepared for the American University of Beirut
suggested that, "The Litani concession in south Lebanon
could advantageously be given to one company which would
serve Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyyah, the Marj 'Ayun district and
12^ r 1possibly Safad in Palestine . " £ Emphasis added.y Yet the
Zionist interest in the Litani had far more to do with
irrigating the Negev Desert in southern Palestine, thereby
facilitating Jewish immigration, than it did with providing
electrical power to the Galilee. In 19^3 "the Lebanese
engineering firm of Alfred Naccache and Jewish engineers of
the Palestine Water Cooperative conducted a joint study which
concluded that Lebanon could usefully employ only one-seventh
of the Litani's flow. The study recommended therefore that
most of the water be diverted from a point near the river's
"elbow" through a tunnel into Palestine. In return for the
water, Lebanon would receive "all or part of the power
produced by the drop from the mountains to the Jordan Valley.
The study heartened the Zionists, whose "dreams of Negev
development could not be fully realized without the Litani
12S
water. " y It is worth noting however that the underlying
12*4-
Basim.A. Faris , Electric Power in Syria and Palestine
(Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1936) , p. 292.
-'Dana Adams Schmidt, "Prospects for a Solution of
the Jordan River Dispute," Middle Eastern Affairs , Volume
VI, Number 1, January 1955, P° ^-
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assumption of the 19^3 report was that Lebanon would use
the Litani for irrigation only, and not for a fully autonomous
power production project.
It certainly appeared however that the possibility of
Zionist-Lebanese collaboration in the exploitation of the
Litani was gaining momentum in the 19^-Os. Yet the Arab-
Israeli war of 19^8 served to fundamentally alter the
prospects for such a cooperative undertaking. The Zionist
victory had engendered much bitterness in the Arab world, and
the Lebanese government, built as it was upon the flimsy
basis of local and confessional interests, could ill-afford
to provoke Arab nationalists—both within and outside of
Lebanon—by striking a quick bargain with the new Jewish
State. Besides, as Charles Issawi pointed out, Lebanon
"profited from the Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent
boycott which eliminated the potential competition of the
126port of Haifa and the money market of Tel Aviv. '
Furthermore, a study undertaken by the United Nations Economic
Survey Mission for the Middle East in 19^4-9 suggested that the
projected hydroelectric needs of Lebanon were quite extensive,
and that Lebanon could use far more of the Litani 's flow
than the meagre fourteen percent envisioned by the survey
of 19^3 for the unilateral production of hydroelectricity
.
Yet the 19^9 report left open the possibility that a portion
126Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Liberalism
in Lebanon," Middle East Journal , Volume 18, Number 3,
Summer 1964, p. 285.
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of the Litani could be diverted over to the Hasbani for
127
eventual use by Israel.
Once the question of cooperative water development
became wrapped up in the troubled politics of the area,
Lebanese-Israeli collaboration became an impossibility.
Any sign of Lebanese willingness to supply "Arab" water
to the Negev, thereby facilitating Jewish immigration to
Israel, would have been regarded as treachery not only by
other Arab states, but by many Lebanese citizens as well.
As Saliba has observed, "For Israel the development of its
Negev area is not critically needed to feed the existing
population. Rather the purpose is absorption of Jewish
immigrants which Israel voluntarily seeks... for defensive
,,128purposes
.
Israel was not at all sympathetic with Lebanon's
delicate position in the Arab world. During the course of
fighting in 19^8, Zionist forces had occupied a strip of
Lebanese territory adjoining the 'elbow' of the Litani
River. Under the terms of the General Armistice Agreement
signed in March 19^9 > Israeli units pulled back from the
Litani and returned to what had been mandatory Palestine.
According to Earl Berger, Israel's willingness to abandon
127Don Peretz, "Development of the Jordan Valley Waters,''
Middle' East Journal
.
Volume 9, Number k, Autunnl955, p. ij-06.
. Samir N. Saliba, The Jordan River Dispute (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. W$,
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her foothold on the Litani was predicated on her belief that
Lebanon could be induced to sign a formal peace treaty.
Thereafter, presumably, the two countries would have pro-
ceeded with the joint exploitation of the Litani envisioned
by the 19^3 report, and the infant Israeli state would at
the same time avoid the international complications sure
to follow any formal annexation of Lebanese territory.
According to Berger, "If they fthe Israelis/ had felt... that
the Lebanese did not also consider the negotiations as
the penultimate step towards peace they would never have
129
withdrawn.
Having therefore failed to achieve through diplomacy
that which her soldiers had won in combat, the Zionist
leaders were once again forced to abandon plans of piping
the abundant waters of the Litani southward to the Negev
Desert.
In July 1953 Israel's cabinet approved a plan to draw
water from the Jordan River at the Banat Ya'qub Bridge
(north of Lake Tiberias) for diversion to the Negev.
Although her failure to strike a bargain with Lebanon over
the Litani had wrecked plans for large-scale desert irri-
gation, Israel decided that even a small Jewish agrarian
presence in the Negev would be an important symbol of the
vitality of the Jewish State. With or without Lebanese
water, Israel was determined to make patches of the desert
bloom.
129Earl Berger, The Covenant and the Sword (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. , 196 5) , p. 30.
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Work on the canal which would carry the water southward
began in September 1953- Thanks to international compli-
cations, however, the project was short-lived. The diversion
point for the scheme was located in a demilitarized zone
created by the 19^9 Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agree-
ment. Syria protested that the project was a clear violation
of that accord, and her position was supported both by
United Nations observers and the United States. American
opposition was underscored by the Eisenhower administration's
decision to suspend all economic aid to Israel pending
cessation of work on the project. Faced with a solid wall
of international opposition, Israel stopped work on the
diversion project on 27 October 1953-
The United States, which played the crucial role in
forcing Israel to back down, believed that the potentially
explosive water controversy could be converted into a show-
case of Arab-Israeli cooperation. Regional cooperation
over water, a substance needed by all regardless of political
persuasion, could aid in the resettlement of Palestinian
refugees and lead perhaps to accomodations of a political
nature. America's decision to pursue peace in the Middle
East by encouraging a multilateral water agreement served
to once again focus attention on the Litani.
In October 1953 President Eisenhower dispatched a
personal envoy, Mr. Eric Johnston, to the Middle East for
the purpose of trying to convince Israel and the Arab states
of the wisdom of undertaking the joint development of the
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Jordan Valley. Johnston carried with him a plan drawn up
in the offices of the engineering firm of Charles T. Main.
The "Main Plan" called for a dam and reservoir to be built
in Lebanon on the Hasbani River, but excluded the Litani
from the Arab -Israeli development plan "on the grounds that
it is a Lebanese national river that could not be included
130in an international scheme." -*
It was the Main Plan's omission of the Litani from use
in regional water sharing that prompted the loudest Israeli
objections. In order to counter Johnston's proposal,
Israel retained the services of John S. Cotton, an American
engineer. The "Cotton Plan" was unveiled in February 195^»
and constituted Israel's negotiating position with regard
to water. It tied the Litani into a regional development
scheme, and estimated that the surplus water not needed for
irrigation in Lebanon amounted to nearly fifty percent of
the river's flow. Accordingly the Cotton Plan urged that
large quantities of Litani water be diverted to Israel from
a point near Merj 'Uyun. As one observed noted at the
time of the negotations,
Given the right atmosphere. .. the Israelis hope Lebanon
might be induced to give Israel Litani water in exchange
for power. They hope Lebanon would on this basis sell
up to 4-00,000,000 cubic meters per annum of the Litani 's
flow of about 850,000,000 cubic meters. 131
130J Schmidt, "Prospects for a Solution of the Jordan





As was the case with the 19^3 report, Israel's hopes for
access to the Litani rested on the assumption that Lebanon
would not attempt to harness the river's hydroelectric
potential on its own.
It must be emphasized that Israel's "hope" of Lebanese
cooperation was simply that: a hope. As Brecher pointed
out, "while a strong case could be made on technical and
geo-economic grounds, Israel's legal claim was non-existent;
the Litani was a wholly national river--of an enemy state." J
James Hudson agreed, stating that "Since Israel has no real
share of the Litani Basin, it has no claim by right under
133international law to any Litani water." JJ Therefore,
according to Peretz, "Israel stood a far better chance of
eventually obtaining some Litani water if an acceptable
arrangement were first made and executed with the Arab
states for the Jordan. Such an agreement might pave the way
134for a deal with Lebanon later on. " In the absence of
such an agreement, an arrangement with Lebanon seemed to
be out of the question. As James Hudson has pointed out,
With the continuing Arab-Israel dispute, Lebanon would
not risk its standing in the Arab world to sell water
to Israel. Secondly, if an arrangement were made, past
decades of suspicion might be difficult to overcome.
Israel would possibly be unwilling to rely on Lebanese
goodwill as a guarantee of future deliveries, and
132J Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) > P« 197
^Hudson, "The Litani River of Lebanon, ' p. 13.




Lebanon would be hesitant to allow Israel an interest in
Lebanese water that might give an excuse for intervention.
Finally, if Lebanon did sell water out of the country, past
the eyes of the Shi 'a farmers in the south who do not have
irrigation water, there would be considerable local
discontent. 135
Israel apparently recognized that it would be impossible
for the politically-fragmented Lebanese Republic to break
ranks with the other Arab states and sign a water sharing
agreement. Following a course similar to that pointed out
by Peretz, Israel in early 1955 dropped her claim to a share
of the Litani's waters, and even permitted the idea of a
Hasbani River dam to die in negotiations. -' It appeared
at first that Israel's flexible bargaining position would
in fact lead to an agreement on the joint Arab-Israeli
development of the Jordan Valley, and that such an accord
would free Lebanon from the unspoken prohibition placed upon
her against making a deal with Israel. During the summer of
1955 an Arab-Israeli water compromise seemed to be within
reach. Yet on 11 October of the same year the Arab League
decided against signing an agreement with the Jewish state.
Twice therefore, in 19^9 and 1955, Israel withdrew
from the Litani--once militarily and once diplomatically—in
the hope of facilitating broader agreements that would
eventually allow her to achieve the long-standing Zionist
goal: assured and recognized access to the waters of the
Litani River. On both occasions the strategy failed. In
1
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19^9 Israel discovered that Lebanon could not make a
separate peace; and in 1955 she discovered that an agreement
with the states of the Arab League--one which would pave
the way for an Israeli-Lebanese accord on the Litani--was
equally elusive. Even though one observer thought, in 1955.
that Israel's renunciation of her claim to a share of the
Litani's waters was tactical in nature and "need not be
137final," •" the water negotiations' of the mid-1950s m fact
represented Israel's last chance to draw significant amounts
of water from Lebanon's largest river. Within a few short
years the fundamental assumption upon which Zionist calcu-
lations had been based would change.
In June 195^ a- report was issued by the U. S. Bureau
of Reclamation, whose experts estimated that Lebanon could
usefully employ almost all of the Litani's flow for power
•production as well as irrigation- The report recommended
that Lebanon undertake a 25-year developmental project that
would cost $97«8 million. Israel argued against Lebanon's
unilateral use of the Litani for power production, arguing
that the 550 meter drop in elevation from the Litani to the
Jordan Valley was far better suited for that purpose than
the mere 150 meter drop from the river's westward bend to
137^Schmidt, "Prospects for a Solution of the Jordan





the Lebanese coastal plain. J7 Yet the "Litani Project"
approved by Beirut in 1955 » and based upon the Bureau of
Reclamation's report, did not envision producing hydroelectric
power from the lower course of the Litani. Instead a dam
and reservoir would be constructed at Karaoun in the
southern Biqa' , tunnels would be blasted through the
mountains to the west, and a large volume of water would be
diverted down through the mountains to the Awwali River
where hydroelectric power would be produced.
Beirut's decision to proceed with a comprehensive
development project for the Litani after decades of inaction
seems to have been inspired by two factors: Israeli pressure;
and an insatiable demand for electricity in the booming
metropolis of Beirut. Israel's loudly-voiced complaints to
the effect that Lebanon was wasting the Litani by allowing
its waters to flow unused into the Mediterranean caused
considerable worry within the Lebanese political elite.
Knowing that the country lacked both the military capability
to defend the south, and the political strength to reach a
water sharing agreement with Israel, the leaders of Lebanon
found themselves obliged to do something. They elected to try
to remove the basis for Israel's criticism, and to do so in
such a way as to benefit primarily the commercial and banking
interests of the country. A totally autonomous power pro-





When construction began on the Litani Project in 1957.
the plan emphasized hydroelectric production but included
provisions for irrigating "parts of the southern Biqa'
,
scattered patches of good land in the Galilean Uplands,
140
and parts of the Sidon-Beirut coastal area." The project
evolved however into one whose primary thrust was the pro-
vision of electricity to Beirut. This came about for two
reasons: the near-immediate economic payoff resulting from
the production of electricity; and southern Lebanon's lack
of influence in the capital. Strong protests by the politi-
cal and religious leaders of southern Lebanon eventually
forced Beirut, in the mid-1960s, to adopt a plan whereby
enough water would be provided to irrigate patches of
good land south of the lower Litani, and near the towns
i in
of Nabatiyah, Sidon, and Merj 'Uyun.
Phase I of the Litani Pro ject--the hydroelectric
phase—was completed before the start of the June 1967
1/4.2
Arab-Israel War. The assumption upon which the Cotton
Plan and previous Zionist plans for utilizing the Litani
had been based were dramatically changed. Whereas Israel
had hoped to get -4-00 million cubic meters of water from the




1^2John K. Cooley, "Lebanon Fears Loss of Water to
Israel," Christian Science Monitor , 23 March 1978, p. 3,
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Litani, the creation of the Karaoun dam and reservoir left
only about 100 million cubic meters for the lower Litani.
The very location of the dam and reservoir, well-removed
from the frontier region, altered the Zionist assumption
that hydroelectric diversions would take place near Merj
'Uyun in the vicinity of the border. Although Karaoun was
one of the places mentioned in the Zionist Statement of
February 1919. the diversion site was for all practical
purposes located in a place where Israel had little interest
or influence.
American diplomacy and engineering expertise enabled
Lebanon to achieve two very important objectives: the
sustaining of a rapid urban economic expansion through the
provision of cheap hydroelectric power; and the deflection
of Zionist claims to a share of the Litani, claims which
had been based to a large degree on the contrast between
Zionist need and Lebanese neglect. It was Lebanon's
decision to develop her hydroelectric potentialities on
her own that blocked Zionist access to the Litani.
B. THE LEBANESE ROLE IN ARAB DIVERSION SCHEMES
Israel was determined, with or without Arab cooperation,
to divert part of the Jordan River's flow for irrigation
purposes. Consequently, in February 195& a "National Water
Carrier Project" for irrigating parts of the Negev Desert
was approved, and the scheme was activated in November 1958.
In order to avoid armistice complications, the diversion
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point was shifted from the Banat Ya'qub Bridge to a spot
entirely within Israeli territory on the northwestern corner
of Lake Tiberias.
Yet so far as the Arab states were concerned, the 195&
Israeli plan was every bit as objectionable as the 1953
scheme. The principle, from the Arab point of view, was the
same: "Arab water" from the rivers Hasbani and Banias would
flow into the Jordan and eventually be used to support Zionist
agricultural colonies in "occupied Palestine." On 30 January
196l the Political Committee of the Arab League adopted a
plan designed to defeat the Israeli National Water Carrier
Project. Much to the discomfort of Beirut's political leaders,
the plan assigned to Lebanon a very prominent role in the
coming confrontation with Israel. The scheme amounted to
an attempt to reroute the Arab headwaters of the Jordan--the
Hasbani and Banias—away from Israel. The Hasbani would be
diverted partially to the west into the lower Litani, with a
somewhat smaller quantity going eastward into Syria's Banias
River. The Banias would in turn be connected by canal to the
Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan forming the boundary
between Syria and the Jordanian Kingdom. The effect of the
project would be to greatly lower the amount of water flowing
into the Jordan Valley between the Israel-Lebanon-Syria
triborder area and Lake Tiberias.
Israel's reaction to such a project was understandably
negative. Noting that the Arab League had earmarked part
of the water from the diverted Hasbani for irrigation in
southern Lebanon, Israel argued
—
just as Zionists had argued
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for decades--that "Lebanon has ample water for irrigation;
arable land, not water, has always been the factor limiting
l4l
the development of Lebanese agriculture." -' Noting that
1^4
Lebanon was continuing to "waste" the waters of the
Litani , Israel argued that the Arab League diversion scheme
...would robe the villages in the northern Hula district
of the waters of the Hasbani and the Banias which they
have been using for centuries. As ancient canals and
their ancient names still testify, those waters have
been their primary source of irrigation for hundreds of
years
.
But what is even more serious: the effect of the
diversion on Israel would be to diminish, by at least a
third, the supply of water to its Lake Kinneret-Negev
water project, to cut off the sweet waters of the River
Jordan's tributaries, and to add heavily to the salinity
of the Lake, which is the intake point of the project, -, u c
thereby rendering its waters largely unfit for irrigation.
Lebanon of course was squarely on the spot. Irrigating
the Negev was a venerable Zionist dream, and now Lebanon
seemed to be willing to convert her passivity toward Israel
into an aggressive program of water denial. In January
1964 the Arab League voted to implement the project, and
Lebanon decided to proceed with her share of the undertaking
without inviting forces from other Arab states to help
1^-3
^"The Arab Plan to Divert the Headwaters of the
River Jordan," Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem),
April 1965, in Yoneh Alexander and Nicholas N. Kittrie,
eds., Crescent and Star; Arab and Israeli Perspectives on








defend southern Lebanon. By the early summer of 19^5 a track
had been leveled from the Hasbani in the direction of the
Syrian border, and work had begun on a diversion canal.
According to Bar-Yaacov, however, the government of Israel
was determined to stop the diversion of the Hasbani even
through force if necessary, and such a message was clearly
conveyed by Israel to Beirut. Sensing that she had gone
quite far enough in demonstrating her "Arabness," Lebanon
elected to stop work on the diversion project in July 19&5-
Syria continued to work on the Banias diversion site,
which from time to time was attacked by Israeli forces.
The June 19&7 Arab-Israeli war, caused in large part by
tensions arising from the water crisis, put a sudden and
final end to the Arab League's diversion plan. When the
war ended Israel was in complete possession of the Banias
River, the key to the whole scheme, The Hasbani of Lebanon
was the only source of the Jordan not located within
Israeli-controlled territory.
C. THE HYDROGRAPHIC FACTOR IN PERSPECTIVE
In a period of only six days, from 5 through 10 June
I967, the amount of territory controlled by the Jewish
State tripled. The Golan Heights, the balance of mandatory
Palestine, and the entire Sinai Peninsula fell under Israeli
military occupation. All of Israel's neighbors, with the
notable exception of Lebanon, went to war with their Zionist
14-6
N. Bar-Yaacov, The Israel-Syrian Armistice (Jerusalem:
Magnes Press, 1967) , p. 1^8.
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enemy and lost. In the wake of his country's stunning
military success, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was quoted
as stating that Israel had at last achieved "provisionally
satisfying frontiers, with the exception of those with
Lebanon . /"Emphasis added.J Dayan 's statement, coupled
with Israel's renunciation of the 19^9 General Armistice
Agreement with Lebanon (see section V below) led many Lebanese
to conclude that Israel intended to "invade and annex a part
1 Li. Pi
of Lebanon that would incorporate the Hasbani River.
"
Had Israel seized the Hasbani in 1967 she would have
completed the job of securing the sources of the Jordan
River. With the Dan River inside of Israel proper, and the
Banias controlled from June 1967-on by Israeli military
forces, only the Hasbani lay beyond Israel's grasp. In
order to understand Israel's somewhat bellicose attitude
toward Lebanon in the months following June 1967, it is
necessary to acknowledge that water disputes had contributed
heavily to the tensions which lead ultimately to war. From
the Israeli perspective Lebanon had not only frustrated
Zionist claims to a share of the Litani, but had also gone
as far as possible in support of Arab diversion schemes
involving the Jordan headwaters. Inasmuch as Syrian-Israeli
skirmishing over water diversion projects had helped to
1^7Cooley, "Lebanon Fears Loss of Water to Israel," p. J.
148
Paul A. Jureidini and William E. Hazen, The
Palestinian Movement in Politics (Lexington: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1976), p. 59.
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ignite the June 1967 war, Israel's position was that Lebanon
had indeed played a role—albeit an ineffective one--in
making war possible. Viewed in this light, Dayan ' s state-
ment about the unsatisfactory nature of the Israeli-Lebanese
frontier probably reflected two considerations: Israel's
desire to insure that the one remaining source of the Jordan
beyond her control would never again be tampered with; and
a feeling that Lebanon ought somehow to share in the
disasterous consequences suffered by her Arab allies.
Israeli frustration with and antagonism toward Lebanon
over the water issue had become apparent in the years
immediately preceeding the June 19^7 war. Three factors
contributed to Israel's displeasure. First was the issue
of the Litani. As Phase I of the Litani Project neared
completion in the mid-1960s, Israel realized that the amount
of water left for the river's lower course--water that could
presumably be diverted to Israel—would be sharply reduced.
Zionist exploitation plans which had been first drawn in the
early years of the twentieth century would thereby be con-
clusively nullified. Second was the issue of Arab diversion
schemes. Lebanon's decision to see how far she could go in
diverting the Hasbani was galling to Israel, particularly
when viewed in the light of Lebanon's success in denying
Israel access to the Litani. Finally, the questions of
the Litani 's utilization and the Hasbani ' s potential diver-
sion were evaluated by Israel's leaders in the context of a
tnird issue: the near total consumption of water available
within Israel itself. In 1965 it was estimated that Israel
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would be using ninety percent of her own water once the
149
National Water Carrier Project was completed. It is
no wonder that Lebanese water maneuvers were viewed with
neither sympathy nor amusement by Israel.
Israel's irritation with Lebanon became obvious in the
course of a parliamentary debate which took place on 3 March
1964, two months after the Arab League had decided to im-
plement its Hasbani River diversion plan. On that day the
Knesset witnessed an angry squabble over who was responsible
for "losing" the Litani River after the first Arab-Israeli
war. Former Prime Minister Ben Gurion, eager to advance the
political fortunes of his protege, Moshe Dayan, claimed
that Israel would have occupied more territory in 1948 had
Dayan been Chief of Staff at the time. Ben Gurion '
s
allegation was angrily rebutted by Minister of Labor Yigal
Allon, who said that it was Ben Gurion himself who had
ordered the army to halt when it had been "on the crest of
victory on all vital fronts from the Litani River in the
north to the Sinai desert in the south-west." Just a few
more days of fighting, according to Allon, would have
sufficed to "liberate the entire country." ^ Although the
debate had more to do with internal Israeli political
149 The Arab Plan to Divert the Headwaters of the River
Jordan, : ' p. 289.
''Dispute Over Size of Israel," Times (London), 9
March 1964, p. 8.
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rivalries than anything else, it nevertheless suggested that
Israel's leaders—all of whom participated in the 19^8 war-
had, by the mid-1960s, developed profound regrets over not
having adjusted the frontier with Lebanon when the oppor-
tunity existed. Those regrets had undoubtedly been prompted
by the contrast between Israeli water requirements on the
one hand, and Lebanese maneuvers with regard to the Hasbani
and Litani on the other. By 1967 Prime Minister Eshkolof
Israel was publicly resurrecting the age-old allegation
that Lebanon was wasting the precious water of the Litani
by allowing it to run into the sea.
By renouncing the armistice agreement and declaring the
Lebanese frontier to be less than satisfying, Israel seemed
in 1967 to be seriously considering an adjustment of her
boundary with Lebanon. Indeed, Michael Hudson reported in
1970 that "since the June war Israeli officials had gone out
of their way to communicate to Lebanon that the 19^-9 armistice
152
was no longer binding. " J There appear to be two reasons
why Israel ultimately chose not to occupy Lebanese territory
during or after the 19^7 war. First, the renunciation of
the General Armistice Agreement had to do only partly with
the festering water issue between the two countries. It was
also designed to solidify Israel's legal status with regard
P- 3.
Cooley, "Lebanon Fears Loss of Water to Israel,"
1 ^2J Hudson, "Fedayeen Are Forcing Lebanon's Hand," p. 7-
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to her continued military occupation of Arab lands conquered
in 1967 f an issue that will be addressed in section V of
this study. Second, the water issue itself lost much of
its urgency in the months and years following June 19&7-
On the one hand the diversion of large quantities of Litani
water at Karaoun became a fait accompli about which Israel
could do very little. Second, with the seizure of the
Banias stream by Israel in June 19^7 » the prospects of the
Hasbani ever being diverted became nil. Lebanon had been
severely chastened by the spectacle of the six-day war, and
she was obviously in no position to threaten the supply of
water to the upper Jordan Valley. An Israeli seizure of
southern Lebanon would have provoked international outrage
and condemnation without significantly enhancing Israel's
economic prospects.
3y October 1968 the water controversy, a dispute which
had led to the third Arab-Israeli war, and which for two
decades had imperiled Lebanon's sovereignty over her southern
districts, had faded considerably. In its place was a more
deadly confrontation, one which would eventually bring
Lebanon itself to the brink of destruction. The advent of
fedaveen commando activity in the frontier area, a phenomenon
which will be analyzed in the balance of this study, served
to completely change the focus of the Israeli-Lebanese ter-
ritorial problem from water to security. Perhaps nothing
better illustrates this change than an incident which occured
during the height of the recent Lebanese civil war. The
Christian town of Merj 'Uyun, cut off from the rest of
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Lebanon by severe fighting, developed some economic ties
with Israel. A water pipeline was eventually laid, linking
the Lebanese town with an Israeli settlement. When the
water was finally turned on, one of the great ironies of
the Israeli-Lebanese relationship transpired. Notwith-
standing the long and highly controversial history of Zionist
demands for a share of Lebanon's water, the water flowing in
the Merj 'Uyun pipeline came not from Lebanon for use by
Jewish farmers in the Negev, but from Israel for the relief
1^1
of beleagured Lebanese villagers. -^
Although some commentators still see traditional Zionist
claims on Lebanese water as an important motivating factor
1 5^behind Israel's involvement m Lebanon's civil war, there
is no evidence that the Israelis have done anything to procure
water from their wartorn northern neighbor. Instead it
appears that the recent activities of Israel in southern
Lebanon have far more to do with broader geopolitical con-
siderations, a finding which will be discussed in some detail
in the concluding section of this thesis. Yet even though
1 51
-"^Helena Cobban, "S. Lebanon: Integration with
Israel?", Christian Science Monitor . 9 November 1977, p. 3^.
1 ^^4-J See Hasan Sharif, "South Lebanon: Its History and
Geopolitics," in South Lebanon edited by Elaine Hagopian and
Samih Farsoun, p. 21. Sharif believes that use of Lebanese
waters is the quid pro quo that Israel will exact for her
assistance to Lebanese rightists, and that the rightists have
already acceeded to Israel's desire. This agreement, accord-
ing to Sharif, is "a well-propagated 'secret' among the
Lebanese." No evidence is offered however to document the
existence of such an "agreement."
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water seems no longer to be the key determinant in Israel's
approach to the problems of southern Lebanon, there is no
question that the frustrations and defeats suffered by
Zionism over the water issue between 1923 and 1968 served
only to increase the bitterness engendered by the initial
Anglo-French boundary compromise. It seems reasonable to
suggest that the prolonged Zionist frustration over the
issue of water contributed to the violent tenor of subsequent
Israeli actions in southern Lebanon, even though the proximate
reason for Israeli violence in southern Lebanon was f edayeen
violence against targets in Israel. To the extent that
Zionist frustration over water helped to dictate Israel's
subsequent attitude toward southern Lebanon, Beirut's
"victory" in the water controversy was quite costly indeed.
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V. THE SECURITY FACTOR
It will be recalled that in the course of negotiations
which led ultimately to the Franco-British Convention of
December 23> 1920, Dr. Weizmann and his colleagues argued
their case for the northern boundary on economic grounds.
They were also quite concerned however about the military
defense of Palestine, and the Tel Hai incident of March
1920 solidified their fears. Although the Zionists were
not able to openly debate the location of suitably
defensible terrain in the Upper Galilee (Great Britain and
France being, after all, "allies"), there is no question
that the security factor was considered. Colonel Meinertz-
hagen's boundary proposal of November 1919 > which may be
regarded as the Zionist response to the British "Deauville"
proposal, certainly took into account military geography.
Had Meinertzhagen' s proposal prevailed, the northern defense
line of Palestine would have been anchored in the west and
center on the Litani River, and in the east in the chain of
hills dividing the Biqa' and Merj Valleys, astride the
natural invasion corridor from the north. As was discussed
above in Section III, however, Great Britain and France
eventually contrived a northern boundary which was easily
penetrable by small units at almost any point.
Nevertheless between 1924- , when the boundary was finally
fixed, and 1968 , when fedayeen commandos made their first
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appearance in significant numbers, the preeminent Zionist
complaint about the location of the Lebanese border had to
do with water. That issue was discussed in the previous
section. Since 1968 however Israel has been preoccupied
with the presence of Palestinian commandos in southern
Lebanon, and since April 197^ in particular Israel has been
vitally concerned with providing security for her settle-
ments adjoining the border with Lebanon. Many of the security
problems faced by Israel in recent years were however first
exposed during those relatively tranquil times when no
sustained commando threat was present. There were even
occasions--in 1938, 19^1 1 and 19^8--when military operations
along the boundary with Lebanon overshadowed the issue of
Zionist, claims for a share of Lebanon's abundant water
resources.
The objective of this section is to present the results
of research which has attempted to place the security problems
associated with the Israeli-Lebanese frontier zone in historical
perspective. Hopefully it will be demonstrated that many
I
aspects of the current military situation in southern
Lebanon have their antecedants in events which occured years
ago and which were barely noticed at the time.
Although the drawing of historical parallels may prove
useful in explaining the current status of southern Lebanon,
it will also be shown that the advent of fedayeen activity
in 1968 brought about a significant change in Israel's at-
titude toward her northern neighbor. No longer preoccupied
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with the issue of Lebanon's water--a matter which had, in
any event, lost much of its urgency with the completion of
Phase I of the Litani Project—Israel concentrated her efforts
instead on providing security for her northern settlements.
The problem was complicated by the porousness of the boundary
itself, and by difficulties encountered by the Lebanese
government in controlling f edaveen activities. Reacting
both to commando raids and incidents of international ter-
rorism, Israel tried to force a Lebanese-Palestinian
confrontation through a program of military action against
Lebanon. The ultimate result of the Israeli strategy was
the civil conflict in Lebanon that began in 1975-
A. CHRISTIAN MILITIA ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON: 1925
As Israeli forces swept methodically across the Jabal
Aamel toward the Litani River in March 1978, their allies—
a
Christian Lebanese militia led by a Lebanese Army major--
followed in their wake, systematically looting and pillaging
Shi'ite Muslim villages. JJ The militia's behavior shocked
and embarrassed Israel, which had no intention of alienating
the religious community which accounts for the overwhelming
majority of southern Lebanon's population. Stephen Longrigg
made the following observation with regard to the arming of
southern Lebanon's Christians:




...whatever the admitted shortage of regular troops,
and the urgent pleas of defenseless Christians, the re-
sult could never be to produce effective or reliable
auxiliaries, but always to prejudice the future by
increasing ill-feeling, and sometimes vendetta, between
Christian and Muslim, from which the former must be the
greater sufferers . 156
Ironically, Longrigg's admonition was not directed at Israel
in 1978. Rather it was aimed at France in 1925«
The armed rebellion which broke out in the Jebel
Druze region of Syria in late 1925 had the unforseen side-
effect of producing conditions in southern Lebanon that
would later figure prominently in Israeli efforts to bring
security to the frontier region. The rebellion, which was
caused by misguided French efforts to impose social reforms
on the extremely conservative Syrian Druze community,
evolved rapidly into a general Syrian uprising against the
French mandatory regime. Sy November 1925 the insurrection
had spilled over into southern Lebanon.
At first the rebel campaign in Lebanon was quite
successful. After taking the village of Hasbaya the rebels
occupied the Christian towns of Kawkaba and Merj 'Uyun on
11 and 15 November respectively. France, which had a
skeletal security force in Lebanon, capitalized on the
traditional Maronite-Druze antipathy by arming the Christian
villages of southern Lebanon. The Christians, all too
aware of past encounters with the Druze, responded eagerly
p. 161.
"




to the French offer. From Merj 'Uyun the insurgents
launched an unsuccessful attack against Nabatiyah, and laid
siege to Rashaya. The French broke the siege on 2^ November
and the brief Druze campaign in southern Lebanon quickly
came to an end.
The Christians of southern Lebanon viewed the Druze
incursion not as an attack on France, but as an armed assault
on their own community. The fighting of 1925 "drove terri-
1 57fied Christians in thousands from their village homes," -"
an event facilitated no doubt by memories of ancestral ex-
periences with the Druze. The rebels had hoped to obtain the
"friendly neutrality" of the Christians, but sectarian
violence in Kawkaba made that an impossibility. D Although
the uprising never touched Palestine, it reinforced the
tendency of the outnumbered Christians on the Lebanese side
of the border to view politics largely in terms of communal
survival, and to reach out if necessary for assistance from
non-Arabs in order to fight other Arabs. Yet according to
one contemporary account of the campaign in southern Lebanon,
France's employment of untrained Christian volunteers helped
to insure the early loss of Merj 'Uyun to the rebels , and
constituted a "political disaster.
"
^Ibia.
Toynbee, ed. , Survey of International Affairs 1925
(Volume I ) , p. ii.33.
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By calling upon one community in the mandated territory
to take up arms against another the mandatory Power inten-
sified the traditional blood-feuds between Syrian
communities of different religions and thus actually worked
against the purpose of the mandatory regime, which had been
intended to educate the Syrians in the art of co-operation
as an essential step towards self -government. 159
The events of 1925 confirmed the isolation of the
Christian minority in southern Lebanon, and foreshadowed
the eventual collaboration of that Christian community
with Israel's efforts to secure her northern boundary.
B. TEGART'S WALL
Between 1924 and 1936 the Palestine-Lebanon boundary
was unfenced, virtually unguarded, and extremely quiet.
Zionist misgivings about a boundary that offered almost no
natural, defensible terrain seemed to have been rendered
irrelevent by two factors: friendly relations between
Great Britain and France, which were fully reflected in
the benign relationship between Palestine and Lebanon;
and the sensibly flexible frontier regulations embodied
in the 1926 "good neighbourly relations'' accord. The
boundary between the two Levantine states posed no par-
ticular problem to either of the mandatory regimes.
Growing tensions between Zionism and Arab nationalism
caused a change in conditions along the boundary however,
and resurrected Zionist worries about the defense of nor-
thern Palestine. In April 1936 a series of Arab uprisings
59Ibid.
, p. i+37 -
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began in Palestine, disturbances caused by "(i) The desire
of the Arabs for national independence TandJ (ii) Their
hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National
Home." There was much sympathy for the Arab revolt in
the states bordering Palestine, and in time the regions con-
tiguous to Palestine became staging areas and sanctuaries
for bands of Palestinian Arab guerrillas.
Within Lebanon the district of Bint Jubail became the
area "most notoriously utilized for the passage of aid to
the insurgents." ° The British authorities, finding
themselves completely incapable of stemming the flow of
men and materiel from Lebanon and Syria, appealed to the
French officials for assistance. The British discovered,
as would the Israelis some three decades later, that an
effective military defense of Palestine would have to begin
in southern Lebanon; that the political boundary itself
crossed terrain which permitted and in fact encouraged
infiltration from the north. The British also discovered,
as would the Israelis in the fullness of time, that the
authorities in Beirut were none too eager to lend a
helping hand. As one contemporary account explained,
Report of the Peel Commission as cited in Ibrahim
Abu-Lughod, ed. , The Transformation of Palestine (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 298.
Times (London), 10 October 1938, p. 16.
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Efforts made by the Palestine Government to obtain
the cooperation of the French mandatory authorities .. .have
been unsuccessful. The French have given over much of the
detail of government to the Syrian and Lebanese States,
whose sympathy with the Palestinian Arab Nationalists
in the one case and fear of antagonizing the French
in the other prevent them from doing anything. ^"2
Put differently, France had no desire to touch off another
rebellion in Syria by helping the British quell the Arab
uprising in Palestine. The Lebanese authorities, not wishing
to create difficulties either for their French patrons or
themselves (by stirring up Arab nationalist sentiment within
Lebanon) , simply ignored the use to which their southern
districts were being put.
Unable to seal the border, and unable to secure French
or Lebanese cooperation, the British were forced to act
unilaterally. "Unofficial" raids were launched against
Arab villages through Lebanese territory by Jewish commandos
led by a British officer, Orde Wingate. °^ These raids
probably helped the future military leaders of Israel
overcome any reservations about conducting military operations
on Lebanese territory. In 1937 the Inspector-General of the
Palestine Police, R.G.B. Spicer, proposed that the country's
land borders be physically sealed. His recommendation was
shelved due to the anticipated cost of the undertaking, but
worsening security conditions caused the idea to reappear
1 Times (London), 28 May 1938, p. 13-
-^Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes to War (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 57.
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in 1938 as a recommendation by Sir Charles Tegart, security
advisor to the Palestine government. Tegart ' s proposal was
accepted on 1 May.
A contract worth 90.000 pounds sterling was awarded to
the Jewish firm of Soleh Boneh, Ltd., of Haifa to construct
a harrier along Palestine's borders with Lebanon, Syria,
and Trans Jordan. With regard to the Lebanese border, the
specifications called for a barrier consisting of two or
three (depending upon the terrain) barbed wire fences,
with tangled wire between each fence. The wall itself
would be guarded by the frontier posts already existing,
with additional pillboxes to be constructed in areas where
1 c *
footpaths crossed the boundary. Even before construction
was finished the edifice came to be known as "Tegart's Wall."
The wall was built during the months of May and June
1938. Its objective was to strictly regulate the passage
of human traffic back and forth between Palestine and
Lebanon along the entire length of the common border. It
failed quite miserably. Instead of improving the security
of Palestine, Tegart's Wall spread rebellion to the frontier
zone itself. Instead of immunizing Palestine from the
activities of outsiders, it united Arab peasants on both
sides of the boundary in a violent campaign against the wall
l 6U
Times (London), 2 May 1938, p. 15.
1 5Times (London), 28 May 1938, p. 13-
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and against the British security forces trying to guard it.
A newspaper account of the problem which was printed in
July 1938 gave the following assessment of the wall's
impact:
Intended to be no more than an obstacle which would slow
up the passage of bandits and contraband arms , this fence
has stirred up the wrath of villagers on both sides of
the frontier because it has bisected village lands, in-
terfered with normal pasturage, and erected for the first
time an artificial barrier to the trade, both legal and
contraband, which has gone on between adjacent villages
from time immemorial. Attacks on the "Wall" became so
difficult to control that a special military force
was posted along it at the end of June.l66
The 800-man Rural Mounted Police force dispatched to guard
the fence was simply no match for the anger of Lebanese and
Palestinian Arab peasants. The authorities in Jerusalem
were obliged to impose curfews on the Arab villages of the
-I Cry
Acre and Safed subdistricts near the Lebanese border,
but resistance to Tegart's Wall was too intense to be
overcome without French cooperation.
The disasterous effects of Tegart's Wall induced Great
Britain to redouble her efforts to secure French assistance.
Eventually France agreed to field a 1,000-man unit to patrol
the Lebanese and Syrian boundaries with Palestine, a force
consisting of four squadrons of horse cavalry and two squad-
rons of mechanized cavalry. K" The French effort, belated
though it was, succeeded in impeding raids launched from
Lebanon. In the end however it was a political
1 £.C
Times (London), 26 July 1938, p. 11.
1 7Times (London), 1 July 1938, p. 15-
168
Times (London), k May 1939. p. 9-
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accomodation rather than Anglo-French security operations
that restored tranquility to the frontier area. The Arab
revolt itself ended in 1939. when Great Britain issued a
White Paper that did much to placate the fundamental Arab
169grievances over Zionist expansion in Palestine. ' Left
undefended, Tegart's Wall was rapidly dismantled.
Three significant lessons were learned from Britain's
experience with a physical barrier along the Palestine-
Lebanon boundary. First, Zionist qualms about the military-
geographic deficiencies of the border proved to be well-
justified. The 1920 Anglo-French compromise had sought to
assuage Zionist fears through the simple expedient of
drawing a boundary line around the northernmost Jewish
settlements, the unspoken assumption being that British
sovereignty itself would be an adequate security guarantee.
The real problem uncovered during the period 1936-1939
however was that northern Palestine was penetrable almost
everywhere. This revelation—which had actually figured in
Zionist boundary calculations from the beginning—helped to
reinforce that dimension of Zionist thinking that viewed the
Litani River not only as a potential economic asset, but as
a natural obstacle in a security sense as well.
1697See J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East, A Documentary Record;" 191^-1956
,
Volume II (Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 218-226.
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The second lesson to be derived from Tegart's Wall had
to do with the residents of the Palestine-Lebanon frontier
zone. If geographic homogeneity made border security
difficult, ethnic homogeneity made it impossible. The
existence of a preponderantly Arab population on both sides
of the boundary not only facilitated infiltration, but
substantially frustrated British attempts to deal with the
situation. During the 1930s Arabs comprised about ninety
percent of the population of the Safed subdistrict of
Palestine, and ninety-nine percent of Palestine's Acre
170
subdistrict. Furthermore, as late as 1944 Arabs held
eighty-two percent of the land in the former subdistrict,
171
and ninety-seven percent m the latter. By 1946 the
total Jewish population for both subdistricts bordering
172Lebanon was a mere 10,000. Throughout the mandate
period therefore the frontier region remained almost entirely
Arab, and cross-border contacts remained intact despite
the existence of a political boundary. As Sharif has
pointed out, "many families had branches in villages on
both sides of the border. Indeed it was difficult to find
17?
a family that did not have a relative on the other side." ' J
170Janet Abu-Lughod, "Demographic Transformation," in
The Transformation of Palestine
, p. 147
.
171 John Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation," in The
Transformation of Palestine
, p. 121.
172Janet Abu-Lughod, "Demographic Transformation," p. 153'
173^Hasan Sharif, "South Lebanon: Its History and Geo-
politics," in South Lebanon ed. by Elaine Hagopian and
Samih Farsoun, p. 14.
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Arab solidarity in the border area was conclusively
demonstrated by the negative public reaction to the im-
position of a fence along the border, an obstacle which
threatened patterns of life in the Upper Galilee in an
unprecedented manner. The security implications of the
public outcry against Tegart's Wall were therefore clear:
unless the Arabs living on each side of the line could be
induced to develop mutally-exclusive national loyalties to
Palestine and Lebanon respectively—a rather unlikely
prospect--then the ethnic homogeneity of the area would
forever preclude the effective closing of the border by
any non-Arab regime in Jerusalem. Unless that homogeneity
could be broken, northern Palestine would always constitute
a security nightmare for any authority seeking to pursue
policies contrary to the aspirations of the Arabs in the
frontier zone. Even with the severe military- geographic
handicaps presented by the frontier, an organized defense
of northern Palestine could in fact be undertaken by non-
Arab forces -provided the people on one side of the line
were clearly different from the people on the other side.
Finally, the use of Lebanese territory as a sanctuary
and staging area combined with the initial absence of
French/Lebanese cooperation provided a lesson for the
future. Beirut's lack of initiative in 1938, a prudent
course of inaction designed to placate both Lebanese and
Syrian supporters of the Arab rebellion in Palestine, gave
the guerrilla bands complete freedom of action for a limited
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period of time. Great Britain was in no position to force
French cooperation, and was obliged instead to build a
barrier which only exacerbated the security problem. Had
the two countries not been nominal allies, it is quite
possible that the British would have assigned responsibility
for the deteriorating security situation to Beirut and would
have undertaken retaliatory operations on Lebanese soil.
Indeed such a policy would eventually be followed by Israel
when faced with Arab commandos operating from neighboring
countries, a policy of retaliation applied not only to
Lebanon, but Syria, Jordan and Egypt as well.
The events of 193^-1939 enabled the Zionists to give
serious thoughts to the very weighty security problems pre-
sented by the boundary drawn for Palestine and Lebanon by
Great Britain and France. Within a very short period of time
Zionist military personnel would be given the opportunity
to conduct combat operations in southern Lebanon, operations
that would yield valuable data on how to "defend" the
Jewish Homeland from the vantage point of Lebanese territory.
C. OPERATION EXPORTER
Peace had barely been restored to the Palestine-Lebanon
frontier when events in Europe suddenly put an end to the
officially harmonious relationship between the mandatory
regimes in Beirut and Jerusalem. France fell to Nazi Germany
in April 19^0, and a collaborationist French government was
installed at Vichy. Lebanon and Syria were governed by an
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administration which opted to remain loyal to Vichy, thus
putting the French Levant at odds with British Palestine.
Great Britain viewed the Vichy presence in the Middle East
as an opening for Germany, and began quickly to formulate
plans for the invasion of Lebanon and Syria. General de
Gaulle's Free French were apprised of the British plans so
as to still the inevitable French fear that Great Britain's
real objective was to supplant the French imperial presence
in Beirut and Damascus with her own. An invasion plan was
174
eventually formulated and named 'Operation Exporter.
"
On 30 June 19^0 the Palestine-Lebanon border was partly
closed by the British authorities. On 25 May 19^1 it was
17 *!
officially closed. J Although the effect that these admin-
istrative measures may have had on the peasants of Upper
Galilee is not known, it is likely that the only area
really affected by the border closure was the official
crossing point at Ras En Naqurah. In any event Operation
Exporter commenced on 8 June 19^1. Although the campaign
included an attack on Damascus (as well as Dayr az Zawr on
the Euphrates) , this study will be restricted to the
operation's main thrust which was an invasion of Lebanon
launched from Palestine.
174Perhaps the most comprehensive account of Operation
Exporter is to be found in Major General I. S. 0. PIayfair,
The Mediterranean and the Middle East , Volume II (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956) . This work is part of the
History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military
Series ed. by J. R. M. Butler.
17 5
"Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate ,
pp. 298 . 309.
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The main objective of Operation Exporter was Beirut.
The attacking force consisted of two infantry brigades of
the 7th Australian Division and one battalion of Jewish
commandos. Opposing the invasion was a French ground force
of roughly equal strength. However the Australians possessed
significant air and naval advantages.
The Australians selected two axes of advance from
Palestine into Lebanon. The main attack would be launched
from Ras En Naqurah and proceed along the coastal road
directly to Beirut. A supporting attack would proceed from
Metulla, through Merj 'Uyun, into the Biqa' Valley and then
(if necessary) turn westward toward Beirut along the Beirut-
177Damascus highway. Both axes channeled the attackers into
relatively narrow corridors, thereby offering a significant
terrain advantage to the defense. Yet the Australians had
little choice. An attack launched at any point along the
boundary between the coast and Metulla would have had little
hope of ever progressing through the twisted terrain of
Jabal Aamel. Furthermore, the coastal axis gave the









On 8 June the 21st Infantry Brigade (Australian) seized
the Lebanese border post at Ras En Naqurah and began to move
north. Progress was slow, and it was feared that the French
would have ample time to destroy the coastal bridge span-
ning the mouth of the Litani River, thereby seriously impeding
the main attack. On 10 June a commando operation was mounted
which attempted to size the bridge intact. Battalion C of
the Special Services Brigade, a unit consisting of British-
trained Jewish commandos, conducted an unsuccessful and very
costly seaborne assault near the mouth of the Litani. It was
during that operation that a bullet took the left eye of
Moshe Dayan, ' who would serve as Israel's Foreign Minister
thirty-seven years later when Jewish soldiers would again
attempt to control the Litani River bridge. Despite the
failure of Battalion C's assault, the 21st Infantry Brigade
fought its way across the Litani and captured Sidon on
15 June.
The supporting attack from Metulla by the 25th Infantry
Brigade (Australian) succeeded in taking Merj 'Uyun on 11
June. However the failure of the Jewish commando assault on
the coast and the slow progress of the main attack led to a
change of plans. The 25th Infantry Brigade was ordered to
halt at Merj 'Uyun, and then execute a turning movement
toward the coast by way of Jezzin. Some twenty kilometers
of torturous mountain terrain would have to be traversed
1 7R




in marching northwest to Jezzin, with a similar distance
yet to be crossed over like terrain from Jazzin to the
coast at Sidon. What may have appeared to the hardy Aus-
tralians to be a mere forty kilometer hike--perhaps a day's
walk--proved instead to be a topographical nightmare. The
brigade became bogged down in the virtually impassable
mountainous terrain and was effectively out of action for
17Q
the balance of Operation Exporter. ' '
While the main body of the 25th Infantry Brigade was
busy losing itself in Lebanon's hills, a skeletal force con-
sisting of one cavalry detachment, one infantry battalion,
and one battery of artillery, was left behind to garrison
Merj 'Uyun. On 16 June the French, seeing that the Austra-
lians were betting everything on the coastal axis of advance,
counterattacked and recaptured Merj 'Uyun. Palestine itself
was open to attack through Metulla by way of the Merj Valley.
However the French had insufficient forces to exploit their
opportunity, and Merj 'Uyun was eventually recaptured by the
I On
Australians on 24 June.
The balance of the campaign in Lebanon was devoid of
turning movements and invasion threats to Palestine. The
21st Infantry Brigade on the coastal road made full use of
179^ According to Playfair, the 25th Infantry Brigade
was still bottled up north of Jezzin when the French in
Beirut capitulated. The Mediterranean and the Middle East
,







the air and naval superiority at its disposal, and simply-
bludgeoned its way to within five miles of Beirut before a
ceasefire was declared at midnight, 11-12 July 19^1. An
armistice was signed on 1^- July ending Vichy rule in
Lebanon and Syria.
Operation Exporter constitutes scarcely more than a
footnote to the history of the Second World War. Yet just
as events associated with Tegart's Wall provided Zionist
leaders in Palestine with vital information about the defense
of the border area, so Operation Exporter told them a great
deal about military operations in southern Lebanon. Such
information could provide useful guidance for future oper-
ations designed either to improve the security of the Jewish
border settlements, or even to expand the Jewish State to
the banks of the Litani River.
Operation Exporter demonstrated a fundamental asymetry
with regard to the military geography of the frontier region.
Whereas Palestine was open to infiltration from Lebanon at
almost any point, conventional axes of advance into Lebanon
were few. Keeping in mind that the Australian objective was
Beirut—not the seizure or pacification of southern Lebanon-
only two axes of advance were deemed to be approprate , and
in both cases the attackers were channeled into slow and
costly frontal assaults. Given parity in air and indirect
fire support, the French surely would have defeated both
1 8T





attacks. With forces of roughly equal size and capability
therefore, geography favors the conventional military
operations—offensive and def ensive--of the force facing
south. It must be kept in mind however that conventional
operations of an offensive nature would be difficult regard-
less of the direction of the attack because of the existence
of only two "high speed" approaches: the coastal road and
the Merj 'Uyun-Metulla route. The entire boundary region
between the coast and Metulla was (and is) characterized
by a preponderance of secondary roads which run west and
east, thereby rendering Lebanon's conventional offensive
"advantage" more apparent than real. Northern Palestine's
most critical security problem was its complete vulnerability
to small unit commando and irregular operations. Yet the
spirited Vichy defense of southern Lebanon and the momentary
threat of invasion from Merj 'Uyun--when combined with sub-
sequent experiences of the 19^8 Arab-Israeli war--seemed to
convince the Zionists that the threat of conventional
invasion from the north outweighed the unconventional threat.
Although the experiences associated with Tegart's Wall
and Operation Exporter certainly refocused the attention
of Zionist military thinkers on the security problems pre-
sented by the northern boundary, the two episodes yielded
contradictory prescriptive concepts. If on the one hand
the threat to northern Israel was one of commando raids by
irregular forces , it would certainly be in the Zionists
'
best interests to secure the cooperation of a sizeable
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Lebanese security force in controlling the commandos. Both
the British and the Zionists would have welcomed such a
force in 1938. If on the other hand the threat were
conventional in nature, the Zionists would demand that
southern Lebanon be garrisoned by forces of a very small
size and limited capability. A skeletal security force
in southern Lebanon would have been welcomed by the Aus-
tralians and Zionists in 19^-1 • It later became clear, by the
terms of the armistice between Lebanon and Israel signed
after the end of the first Arab-Israeli war, that the
Zionist military planners finally opted to give more
weight to the potential conventional threat from the north.
D. WAR AND ARMISTICE
Shortly after the conclusion of World War II Levantine
politics became transfixed once again on the clash between
Arabs and Zionists over the future of Palestine, Great
Britain found her position as mandatory power to be unten-
able, and following her failure in February 19^7 to
negotiate an Arab-Zionist accommodation she called upon the
United Nations to deal with the question of Palestine. On
29 November 19^7 the General Assembly approved a resolution
which called for "dividing Palestine into Arab and Jewish
states which were to remain in economic union and the estab-
lishment of a special international regime for the City of
1 Op
Jerusalem..." " The resolution was rejected by the
1 Op




Palestinian Arabs, who undertook to prevent its implementation
"by means of force.
Had the partition resolution of November 19^7 ever been
implemented, its impact on the Palestine-Lebanon frontier
would have been quite considerable indeed. According to the
terms of the resolution, that part of the 1923 boundary
extending from the Mediterranean coast at Ras En Naqurah
across to a point just north of the Palestinian village of
Saliha would have been under the jurisdiction of the Arab
State. Along the coast the Arab jurisdiction would have
extended from Ras En Naqurah south to Acre, and inland the
northern portion of the Arab State would have reached south
1 Q o
to a point just below the town of Nazareth. ^ Map #12 on
page 131 shows how the Palestine side of the frontier zone
would have been affected by implementation of the partition
resolution. It is worth noting that nearly the entire
subdistrict of Safed--an area which figured so prominently
in the post-World War I Anglo-French boundary negotiations
because of the presence of Jewish settlements—was set
aside for inclusion of the proposed Jewish State, despite the
presence of a preponderantly Arab population in the
subdistrict.
Arab opposition insured however that the partition
resolution would never be implemented. As the British
^ :,UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II)," in
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mandate drew to a close in May 19^8, conditions along the
Palestine-Lebanon boundary reverted to the chaotic state
that had prevailed during the Arab uprising of 1936-1939
•
An Arab guerrilla band known as the Arab Liberation Army,
under the leadership of one Fawzi al-Quwaqji (a veteran of
the 1936 Arab uprising) , operated with a great deal of free-
dom on both sides of the border in the Upper Galilee.
Southern Lebanon, now part of the independent Republic of
Lebanon, again served as a sanctuary and staging area for
Arab raiders.
As was the case one decade earlier, Lebanon was
disinclined to interfere with commando operations against
targets in Palestine launched from her southern districts.
Like the other Arab countries, Lebanon harbored serious
doubts that an autonomous Arab state would ever emerge in
partitioned Palestine. Furthermore, like her sister Arab
governments, Lebanon entertained the notion of gaining some
territory at Palestine's expense. Beirut decided therefore
to use the Lebanese Army to support and supply Quwaqji's
forces "in the hope that if there was to be a carve-up
of Arab Palestine, she at least might lay claim to the Upper
184Galilee... " There were however limits to the extent of
Lebanon's armed commitment to the "rescue" of Palestine.
With a small army tailored to the requirements of maintaining
internal security, Lebanon was in no position to conduct
sustained offensive operations in Palestine. Her military
1 Oh
Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War , 19^8 (London:
Paber and Faber Limited, 1956), p. I85.
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involvement in the struggle for Palestine would "be largely
symbolic, an attempt to derive maximum political and terri-
torial gains from minimal military efforts.
From the point of view of the Zionist military leadership
there were three avenues of approach leading from Lebanon
into Palestine: on the left from Ras En Naqurah straight
down the coast toward Acre; in the center from the vicinity
of Bint Jubail to any number of border crossing points; and
on the right through the Hula Valley by way of Marjayoun and
1 Of
Metulla. * Yet, as Sacher has pointed out, "The lines of
communication were not. . .favorable to the attack. As the
roads across Galilee ran west and east and not from north
to south, an advance from Lebanon was handicapped.
"
Aside from occupying the Palestinian border post at Ras En
Naqurah on 24 May 19^8, the Lebanese Army's involvement in
the first Arab-Israeli war was limited to the Bint Jubail
sector of the frontier. On 15 May 19^8, Israel's first day
as a self -proclaimed independent state, two Lebanese
infantry battalions and a company of armor attacked and
overran the tiny settlement of Malkiya. The seizure
Malkiya formally placed Lebanon in opposition to the U.N
1 Qr
<Lt. Colonel Netanel Lorch, The Edge of the Sword:
Israel's War of Independence 19^7-19^9 (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1961), p. 155
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partition plan for Palestine, as the settlement was located
in an area designated by the U.N. as part of the projected
Jewish State.
Three days later Israel launched a counterattack. A
small motorized Israeli force entered Lebanon near the
hamlet of Aadaisse, some eighteen kilometers north of the
Malkiya crossing point. The Israeli force drove south
within Lebanese territory past the hamlets of Markabah,
El Hula, Meis el Jabal , and Blida. South of Blida the
Israelis turned southeast and reentered Palestine, taking
the small Lebanese garrison by surprise and recapturing
1 P1P1
Malkiya from the rear.
The Lebanese Army reacted to the loss of Malkiya by
conducting, on 6 June 19^8, its only real combat operation
of the war. Malkiya was successfully stormed and another
small settlement, Kadesh-Naf tali , was overrun on the next
day. According to O'Ballance,
This assault on Malkiya was the solitary Lebanese success
of the war, and it consisted of an infantry attack by
about 800 men, with only mortar support. Not much can
be deduced from this action as the victory was perhaps
as much due to overwhelming numbers as to any other
factor. 189
Lebanon was not however emboldened in the least by her
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Malkiya she prudently retired from active participation in
the war, turning over her gains in the central sector to
the Arab Liberation Army. At the end of the first Arab-
Israeli truce (9 July 19^8) Lebanese forces in the frontier
region were deployed at Bint Jubail and a few meters across
the border in the "Arab" sector of Palestine at Ras En
190Naqurah
.
Lebanon found however that disengagement from the war
in Palestine was no simple matter. Israeli forces, intent
upon securing as much of mandatory Palestine as possible
for the Jewish State, launched in October 19^8 a campaign
designed to clear the Arab Liberation Army from northern
Palestine. "Operation Hiram," named after the ancient King
of Tyre, was an unqualified Israeli success. The Arab
Liberation Army was forced to abandon Palestine, and retreated
into the Lebanese district of Bint Jubail. Israeli forces
pursued the enemy into Lebanese territory where (according
to an Israeli observer) they "were molested less by Kaoukji's
men than by aggressive Levantine salesmen armed with fountain
pens, nylons, and souvenir trinkets from the markets of
1 Q1Beirut and Tyre. " ' The Lebanese Army judiciously refrained
from taking a stand against the invading Israelis , and the
Jewish forces found themselves in control of eighteen
190
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191Dan Kurzman, Genesis 19^-8 (Cleveland: The New
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Lebanese villages in an area "running parallel to the Manara
road up to Wadi Du-ba and the Litani River, which geo-
graphically and historically marked the boundary of Upper
Galilee."192 Map #13 on page 137 depictsthe extent of
Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory at the end of the
first Arab-Israeli war.
At last the Zionists had secured a foothold on the
Litani River, and there was at first every indication
that they intended to keep it. In late 1948 claims emanated
from Israeli diplomatic and journalistic circles to the effect
that the occupied Lebanese villages were asking to be placed
under Israeli military authority, and that there was a
193pro-Zionist "Free Lebanese movement" active in Israel. J
In short it appeared that some public relations groundwork
was being done to justify the outright annexation of
Lebanese territory by Israel.
Instead of changing her northern boundary however,
Israel adopted the strategy of trading land for political
concessions. As was discussed in the previous section of
this study, the leaders of Israel believed in early 194-9
that they could conclude a very attractive peace settlement
with the Christian-dominated Lebanese state. Presumably such
a treaty would not only secure for Israel access to the
waters of the Litani, but would further fragment the Arab
192Lorch, The Edge of the Sword , p. 378.
193^George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The









world by detaching Lebanon from the Arab coalition.
Consequently when armistice talks with Lebanon under U.N.
auspices began in January 19^9. Israel displayed a willing-
ness bordering on eagerness to part with territory, as she
quickly withdrew from four of the occupied Lebanese villages
in return for a miniscule Lebanese pullback from the Israeli
side of Ras En Naqurah. However several weeks of stale-
mate followed, as Israel tried to couple her withdrawal from
Lebanon with a Syrian withdrawal from a tiny piece of
Palestinian territory in the Hula Valley. The issues were
eventually separated however, and on 23 March 19^9 a General
Armistice Agreement (GAA) between Israel and Lebanon was
signed.
The GAA was not a peace treaty. It left Lebanon and
Israel in a technical state of war, even though Israel
regarded its signing as 'the penultimate step towards
19 ^peace." Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanon behind an
Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) , the purpose of which was
to "deliniate the line beyond which the armed forces of
196the respective parties shall not move." As to the
location of the ADL, the GAA provided that "The Armistice
9 Times (London), 1? January 19^9. p. b.
19 "5
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Demarcation Line shall follow the international boundary
197between the Lebanon and Palestine."
Not only did the GAA restore the 1923 boundary in the
form of an armistice line, but it established specific
military limitations to be observed on both sides of the
ADL. The text of the GAA called for the stationing of
"defensive forces only" in the "region of the Armistice
198Demarcation Line." "Defensive forces" were defined as
follows in the Annex to the GAA:
1. In the case of the Lebanon:
(i) Two battalions and two companies of Lebanese
Regular Army Infantry, one field battery of k
guns and one company of 12 light armoured cars
armed with machine guns and 6 light tanks armed
with light guns (20 vehicles). Total 1500
officers and enlisted men.
(ii) No other military forces, than those mentioned
in (i) above, shall be employed south of the
general line Sl-Qasmiye-Nabatiye Ett Tahta-
Hasbaya.
2. In the case of Israel:
(i) One infantry battalion, one support company with
six mortars and six machine guns, with six ar-
moured cars and one reconnaissance company, six
armoured jeeps, one battalion of field artillery
with four guns, one platoon of field engineers
and service units such as Quartermaster and
Ordnance, total not to exceed fifteen hundred
officers and enlisted men.
(ii) No other military forces, than those mentioned
in 2 (i) above, shall be employed north of the
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Thus it is clear that the "region of the Armistice
Demarcation Line" called for the virtual demilitarization
of southern Lebanon. Map #14 on page 1^1 depicts the limited
forces zone agreed upon by the two sides. It will be
noticed that on the Lebanese side of the ALL offensive
forces were prohibited not only south of the Litani River,
but south of Nabatiyah, a full seven kilometers
north of the river. The point at which offensive forces
could be closest to Israel was approximately twelve kilo-
meters north of Metulla near the village of Blat.
In Israel the limited forces line was drawn much closer
to the ADL near the Mediterranean end of the boundary
than was the corresponding line in Lebanon, but at its
eastern terminus was much further from Lebanon than was
the Lebanese limited forces line from Israel. Under the
terms of the GAA it would be clearly permissable for Israel
to concentrate the bulk of her "defensive forces" in the Hula
Valley region, where she also had Syrians to contend with,
and still have unlimited forces behind a line only ten
kilometers south of the Lebanese boundary from the
*
Mediterranean coast to the vicinity of Malkiya, where the
boundary turned sharply to the north. Furthermore the
GAA said nothing whatever about paramilitary forces being
stationed in newly created Jewish settlements being built
right up against the ADL.
If the demilitarization of southern Lebanon eased
Israeli anxiety about the possibility of a conventional
]>0







militay threat from the north, the demographic transformation
of northern Israel was seen as at least a partial answer
to the problem of irregular warfare. Thousands of Arabs
fled to Lebanon from northern Palestine during the fighting
of 19^8, and their abandoned villages abutting the Lebanese
border were converted into armed Zionist settlements. During
the years 19^8-1950 many such settlements were established,
and Arabs still living near the border were relocated for
security purposes. In effect on ethnic security belt
was stretched across northern Israel, and with a string of
Zionist outposts facing Lebanon the Upper Galilee would no
longer offer unchallenged access for infiltrators and raiders
based in southern Lebanon. As Israel's Attorney General
stated in 1972, "we do not want Arab villages near the
(Lebanese) border. We do not want to provide an opportunity
for them to contact, or be contacted by Arabs on the other
side." Arabs expelled from the border villages of Ikrit and
Berem in 19^8 have been refused access to their villages
by the Israeli government, despite the fact that several of
the villages' young men have served loyally in the Israeli
201
armed forces.
The following Jewish settlements were established
either during or soon after the 19^8 war: Rosh-Hanikra,
Bar 'am, Yiron, Malkiya, Yifta, Shelomi , and Khiryat Shemona.
See Zev Vilnay, The New Israel Atlas. Bible to Present Day
(Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1968)
,
pp. 109-112.
For an account of Arabs displaced from the border region
within Israel, see Peter Grose, "Arabs Ejected from Homes







In summary therefore, the immediate military effect of
the GAA was to mollify Zionist fears about the def ensibility
of the northern border. Lebanon, hardly a potent offensive
threat in any event, was prohibited from stationing more
than 1,500 soldiers south of a line running from the mouth
of the Litani across to Hasbaya. Although Israel was sub-
ject to parallel limitations, there was nothing in the GAA
preventing her from transforming her side of the boundary
into a series of fortified Jewish settlements. The ethnic
homogeneity of the frontier region was destroyed, the fear
of invasion from the north was diminished, and the southern
Lebanese battleground which had claimed many Australian and
Jewish lives in 19^1 was almost completely disarmed. Israel
was not able to foresee in 19^9 that a stronger Lebanese
presence south of the Litani would have helped facilitate her
own security. From the Israeli perspective of late March
19^9. all that remained to be accomplished was the signing
of a peace treaty with Lebanon.
E. A QUIET INTERLUDE: 1949-1967
Israel's hope of rapidly concluding a peace treaty with
her northern neighbor proved illusory. In April 19^9 the
U.N. established a Conciliation Commission for Palestine
which undertook to sponsor Arab-Israeli peace discussions
at Lausanne, Switzerland. It was at Lausanne that Israel





The Israeli proposal to Lebanon at Lausanne was stark
in its simplicity but rich in its implications. Tel Aviv
suggested that the ADL between the two countries be trans-
formed by a treaty of peace into an official, internationally-
202
recognized boundary. The new Jewish State was prepared to
renounce the traditional Zionist claim to southern Lebanon
in return for a simple declaration of peace, one which would
imply (a) Lebanon's defection from an Arab world hostile to
Israel; (b) a de facto alliance between the Jewish and
Catholic minorities in the predominantly Muslim eastern
Mediterranean coastal region; and (c) a cooperative, bilateral
approach toward the exploitation of southern Lebanon's water
resources
.
The promise of an official Zionist acknowledgement of
Beirut's sovereignty over southern Lebanon proved however
to be an insufficient inducement. Lebanon made two counter-
proposals: first, that the 125.000 Arabs who had fled to
Lebanon from Palestine during the fighting of 19^8 be
repatriated by Israel; and second, that that portion of
Western Galilee which had, in 19^7 » been set aside by the
UN for the Arab sector of partitioned Palestine, be turned
20 3over to Lebanon. J Presumably the refugees, ninety percent
20^-
of whom were Muslims, would be settled in that region,









thus insuring that the narrow Christian majority in Lebanon-
proper would be preserved. Israel rejected the Lebanese
proposal, which if accepted would have expanded "southern
Lebanon" to include Acre on the coast and Nazareth inland,
The discussions ended with no agreement being reached, and
Lebanon settled into a policy of non-recognition of Israel-
Although she was obliged by the other Arab states and
by a significant portion of her own citizenry to adhere to
a tough negotiating line with the Zionists, Lebanon was quite
sensitive to the military facts of life in the border region
adjoining Israel. As was the case during the 19^8 Arab-Israeli
war, Beirut sought from 19^9-on to enjoy the best of both
worlds. She gave up the opportunity to obtain official
Zionist recognition of her jurisdiction in southern Lebanon,
but by so doing she reaped a financial harvest from the
Arab economic boycott of the Jewish State, Furthermore she
took substantive steps to insure that Israel would have no
reason or justification for the seizure of Lebanese terri-
tory. Diplomatic obduracy toward Zionism was offset by
a policy of cooperation with Israel in the frontier zone,
a policy that sometimes bordered on obsequiousness.
Article VII of the GAA signed by Israel and Lebanon in
March 19^9 established an Israeli-Lebanese Mixed Armistice
Commission (ILMAC) under U.N. auspices. The ILMAC was
authorized to establish two headquarters, one at the Israeli
frontier post north of Metulla, and the other at the
Lebanese frontier post a Ras En Naqurah. The mission of the
145

ILMAC was to enforce, on the basis of unanimous consent, the
20 "5provisions of the GAA. J Both sides initially had good
reasons for seeing the ILMAC perform effectively. Lebanon
wanted to avoid any and all all acts of provocation that
could bring about the reintroduction of Israeli forces to
southern Lebanon. Israel desired Lebanese cooperation in
preventing the return of Arab refugees while she consolidated
a line of Jewish settlements along the boundary.
In November 19^+9 the ILMAC faced its first difficult
task. The Lebanese government, claiming that raids were
being conducted from Israel against its southern villages,
requested that the ILMAC undertake the project of clearly
demarcating the ADL. The objective of the proposed boundary-
marking exercise was to "put an end to frontier incidents,"
thereby presumably reducing the likelihood of an Israeli
206invasion.
Prior to the Lebanese request the U.N. Conciliation
Commission at Lausanne had indeed recommended that in cases
where no competing territorial claims existed, Israel and
her Arab neighbors should move toward the creation of
207
recognized boundaries. That suggestion had focused
attention on the Lebanese-Israeli ADL, because notwithstanding
20 ^
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the longtime interest of Zionists in southern Lebanon there
were no territorial disputes of a magnitude similar to
those between Israel and Syria and Israel and Jordan.
Lebanon rejected the idea of a formal boundary settlement
however on the grounds that it would imply her recognition
of the Jewish State. Still, Lebanon very badly wanted the
ADL redemarcated. Every time a Lebanese villager strayed
across the poorly-marked boundary the Lebanese authorities
feared an Israeli military response. Lebanon did not intend
to give Israel any excuse to occupy Lebanese territory
but neither did she want to give the boundary international
legal status through a peace treaty. Troubled by the border
crossing propensities of her own citizens, Lebanon invented
the pretext of Israeli raids in order to seize the initiative
in requesting that the ADL be better defined on the ground.
Inasmuch as the original Anglo-French Boundary Commission
had published a detailed report of its surveying procedures,
it appeared that the ILMAC ' s task was simple and straight-
forward: mark the ADL and post warning notices for the
inhabitants of the frontier zone. Yet the 1923 boundary
line bisected parcels of land in some places which were
owned by single villages or individuals, a defect which
had been successfully ameliorated by the 1926 "good
neighbourly relations" treaty. That accord, which validated
patterns of human interaction predating the existence of
Lebanon and Palestine, institutionalized cross-border
movement in the frontier region. The GAA of 19^9 was
14-7

however a military agreement undertaken by two hostile states,
and as such it authorized both sides to prohibit civilians
from crossing the ADL. Whereas the Jewish settlers
occupying abandoned Arab villages near the Lebanese border
had no reason or desire to cross the ADL, Arab villagers in
Lebanon were under the impression that they could continue
to graze cattle or plant tobacco on "their" land--even though
some of that land was now on the "wrong" side of an all but
invisible boundary. Israel took sharp exception to Arab
border crossings, so Beirut concluded that the requirement
for absolute quiet in the frontier zone outweighed the
property rights and economic well-being of the Lebanese
villagers living next to Israel.
The ILMAC established a special subcommittee en 16 November
19^9 to study the 1923 boundary agreement and to post warning
signs along the ADL. The subcommittee completed its work
209
on 27 January 1951 » leaving the boundary unfenced but
well-marked except for six kilometers "where the two sides
maintained different interpretations of the Franco -British
210frontier agreement of 1923 • " Although some Jewish-owned
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Arab peasants of southern Lebanon. Not only did they lose
valuable land, they were also denied access to jobs and
markets on the Israeli side of the border. A valuable
economic safety valve had been lost, and ironically the
loss had been facilitate by official Lebanese initiative.
The boundary-marking project was supplemented by mixed
Israeli-Lebanese police investigations which were designed
to stop cross-border smuggling and theft. Many minor dis-
putes involving wandering livestock and fishing boats were
expeditiously settled by the mixed police, who operated
under ILMAC auspices. Lebanese police even assisted Israel
in expelling to Lebanon several hundred Arab refugees who
had infiltrated into Israel for the purpose of returning to
211their homes
.
According to Lieutenant-General Bums, Chief of Staff
of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) from
August 195^ to November 1956,
UNTSO had very few difficulties in connexion with the
General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon.
In fact, the Israel -Lebanon MAC worked as it had been
intended all MAC ' s should. It met at periodic intervals,
and seldom had serious complaints to deal with. Those
that were presented related mostly to grazing of cattle
on the wrong side of the ADL.212
Burns did note, however, that the Lebanese were obliged to
go out of their way to appease the Israelis in the border
21
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region. In 1955 some Israelis were killed by Arab infiltrators
from Lebanon. The incident alarmed the Lebanese authorities
who set about quickly to remove "all refugees and people
other than old established residents. .. from a zone ten
213kilometers deep on the Lebanese side of the border. " J
By paying careful attention to Israeli sensitivities in
the border area, Lebanon bought nearly two decades of peace
with her southern neighbor. Yet her policy of local appease-
ment eventually came to naught. In the wake of the June
1967 Arab-Israeli war--a war which Lebanon characteristically
avoided—Israel declared the 19^9 armistice to be void.
Furthermore, by the end of 1968 Israel began to hold Lebanon
directly responsible for the activities of the armed Palestin-
ians in the frontier region. After two decades of peace and
prosperity, Lebanon found herself being drawn into the Arab-
Israeli vortex.
F. CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUNE 1967 WAR
Israel's stunning military successes of June 1967 left
her in possession of the Sinai Peninsula, the balance of
mandatory Palestine, and the Golan Heights. Her decision
not to relinquish those territories to their former owners—
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—meant that the 19^-9 armistice
agreements with those states no longer corresponded with
de facto conditions. Three of the four armistice demarca-






of June 1967 f well to the rear of Israel's forward military
positions. If the armistice agreements were still valid,
Israel obviously would have been obliged to withdraw to
positions behind the 19^9 demarcation lines. However
Israel had no intention of making any such withdrawal , and
instead took the position that "Arab aggression" in June 196?
had demolished the legal validity of the 19^9 armistice accords
Furthermore, according to Israel, "The texts of the Agreements
between Israel and Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt clearly
point to the fact that the lines dividing them were of a
provisional and non-political nature: they were not intended
21^
to , and did not constitute international boundaries.''
If the purported aggression of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria
had provided Israel with justification for repudiating the
19^9 armistice regime, what would her attitude be toward the
GAA with Lebanon, her ostentatiously non-belligerant northern
neighbor? According to General Odd Bull, commander of UNTSO
at the time of the 1967 war,
There had been no hostilities between Israel and
Lebanon during the June War, though Israeli planes were
reported to have flown over Lebanese territory. . . In spite
of this Israel announced that its armistice agreement with
Lebanon. . .was ended. 215
21L
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According to Bull Israel took the position that Lebanon
had indeed been a legal participant in the conflict even
though she had conducted no offensive military operations.
During the war a junior Lebanese officer had refused an
Israeli request for a meeting of the ILMAC , stating that
such a meeting was impossible because the two countries
Pi £
were at war. That, claimed Israel, amounted to a
declaration of war.
Furthermore, an article of very questionable origins
appeared in the New York Times in June 19^7 » alleging that
the Prime Minister of Lebanon had ordered the army to attack
Israel, but that the army commander refused. The report
suggested that military insubordination alone had kept
Lebanon from invading Israel. Inasmuch as the Lebanese
Prime Minister lacks the authority to order the army into
action, and in the light of the report's additional claim
that Lebanon had participated in the 19 56 Arab-Israeli war
(along with Syria;), it may be concluded that the article
was either a piece of very careless reporting, or a crude
plant by Israeli intelligence. When combined with the
"declaration of war" proclaimed by the Lebanese officer,
the New York Times report clearly suggests that Israel was
most interested in portraying Lebanon as the malevolant
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The issue to be examined here is not however the merits
of Israel's public relations campaign against Lebanon.
Rather the key question is whether or not Israel's deter-
mination to scuttle the GAA signaled a renewed Zionist effort
to adjust the northern boundary and seize Lebanese water.
The answer to that question appears to be a qualified "no."
It is quite true, as was discussed in the preceding section
of this thesis, that water disputes played a large role in
causing the 1967 war, and that Lebanon had indeed played a
role in those disputes. There were undoubtedly some Israelis
in influential positions who would have liked to take the
Hasbani , thereby bringing under Israel's control all of the
Jordan River's sources, and perhaps even the lower course
of the Litani. Yet such a course of action surely would
have provoked a storm of international protest , especially
in the light of Lebanon's evident docility toward her
southern neighbor ("declarations of war" notwithstanding).
By failing to move into southern Lebanon during the June War
itself, when an adequate pretext surely could have been in-
vented, Israel demonstrated quite clearly that her repudia-
tion of the armistice was not intended as a prelude to a
new conquest.
It appears instead that Israel's decision to terminate
the GAA with Lebanon was prompted by a desire to take a
legally and logically consistent position toward the entire
Arab-Israeli armistice regime. Article VIII of the Israel-




could be modified "by mutual consent. " The other three
Arab-Israeli armistice agreements contained similar
language. None of the agreements provided for either
bilateral or unilateral repudiation of any provision by any
party, unless of course the GAAs were to be replaced by
peace treaties. Israel's desire to hold Arab territories
overrun in June 196? forced her to take the position that the
GAAs were dead. She could not very well adhere to the terms
of the GAA with Lebanon while at the same time rejecting
near-identical language appearing in the other three. She
would have to repudiate all of the agreements or none.
Furthermore, if she wished to base her repudiation of three
of the agreements on a claim of Arab aggression in June 1967
,
then she would be- obliged to find similar grounds on which to
base her renunciation of the GAA with Lebanon. The purported
Lebanese "declaration of war" supplemented by the bogus
New York Times report gave Israel the pretext to reject
the GAA, thereby enabling her to take a consistent—if
legally questionable—position toward all of the armistice
agreements. This conclusion is supported by the existence
of a March 1971 statement issued by the Israeli Ministry of








Lebanon even though the objective of the statement was to
provide the legal justification for the continued occupation
of territories taken in June 1967- To uphold the Israel-
Lebanon GAA would be to uphold the validity of the 19^9
armistice demarcation lines with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria
as well.
In addition to the breakdown of the GAA, the 1967 war
extended the length of the Israeli-Lebanese border by about
twelve miles, due to the advance of Israeli forces into the
Golan Heights. Whereas the easternmost point of the common
boundary had formerly been located just to the north of the
Hula Valley, Lebanon now had to contend with the presence of
Israel along the slopes of Mount Hermon to a point south of
the village of Chebaa. The extension of the common boundary
might have been of little or no significance had it not been
for yet another consequence of the June War: the rise of
f edayeen commando activity.
G. THE FEDAYEEN FACTOR
According to Edgar O'Ballance the first f edayeen attack
on Israel from Lebanon took place on 1 June 19^5 > when a
small band of Palestinians slipped over the unguarded
220boundary and blew up a house in the hamlet of Yiftah.
It was not until October 1968 however that Palestinian
commandos first entered Lebanon in significant numbers.
The defeat of the conventional Arab armies in June 19^7
had left the growing Palestinian resistance movement as the
•





only force capable of continuing an armed struggle against
Israel. Although the main fedayeen bases for armed oper-
ations were (prior to September 1970) located in Jordan,
commandos did begin to make their presence felt in southern
Lebanon by late 1968. The official Lebanese reaction to
the prospect of an organized fedayeen raiding campaign
against Israel headquartered on Lebanese soil was predictably
negative and fully in keeping with Beirut's desire to keep
the frontier region totally quiet. According to Kamal
Salibi,
If the Lebanese authorities were willing to condone
a limited amount of Palestinian military training on
Lebanese territory, one thing which they were determined
not to tolerate was Palestinian commando infiltration
from Lebanon into Israel. . .While Israel argued that
the former frontier between Palestine and Lebanon could
only be regarded as an armistice line so long as Lebanon
remained formally in a state of war with Israel, the
Lebanese authorities were anxious not to give Israel any
excuse to question this frontier and force even the
least change in it... 221
Three factors combined however to thwart Beirut's efforts
at controlling Palestinian activities in the south.
First was the small size of Lebanon's armed forces which,
222by 1968 had reached a strength of approximately 13,200 men.
Such a small force would be hard-pressed to enforce discipline
on the growing numbers of f edayeen in Lebanon who were receiving
financial and logistical support from other Arab states,
221Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon
19^8-1976 (Delmar: Caravan Books , 1976), p. 27.
222Area Handbook for Lebanon (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 197^), p. 297.
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particularly Lebanon's sizeable Syrian neighbor. The
second factor which limited Beirut's ability to deal with
the armed Palestinians was the skeletal governmental presence
in southern Lebanon, a deficiency that allowed f edayeen
forces relative freedom of movement. As Michael Hudson
observed in early 1970,
Often, the only evidence of Lebanese government presence
in South Lebanon's little hamlets is the shabby, one-room
police post, with its faded flag hanging over the entrance.
There are reports that guerrillas have been cordially re-
ceived in these villages, despite the appalling danger
they carry with them, because they minister to the medical
and economic needs of the villagers more effectively than
the Lebanese government has been able to. 223
The third, and by far the most significant factor preventing
Beirut from controlling the commandos was Lebanon's chronic
lack of consensus on the question of national identity.
Whereas most of Lebanon's Muslim citizens and some Christians
(especially members of the Greek Orthodox sect) saw Lebanon
as an Arab state obligated to aid the Palestinian resistance
movement, the Lebanese economic and political elite--
predominantly Maronite (but not without Muslim Lebanese
support) --viewed Lebanon as a halfway house between East
and West and urged that the country remain aloof from the
Arab-Israeli controversy. In April 19^9 the Prime Minister
of Lebanon, Rashid Karami , summarized the government's
dilemma by stating that
223^Michael Hudson, "Fedayeen are Forcing Lebanon's




There are two sides in Lebanon, one saying commando
action should be carried out- from Lebanon whatever the
circumstances, /"and the other sayingj the commandos
represent a danger to Lebanon. .. That is why no government
can take either view without splitting the country. 22^
Yet the President of the Republic, Charles Helou, did not
share Karami ' s sober appreciation for the explosiveness
of Lebanon's national identity problem. On 2^ June 1969
Helou called for the removal of the f edayeen from Lebanon
on the grounds that their presence constituted an invitation
22^
to Israel to seize southern Lebanon. J While Karami could
clearly foresee the destruction of Lebanon as the ultimate
consequence of Israeli-Palestinian fighting, Helou took the
more traditional view that what was really at stake was
the potential loss of southern Lebanon to Israel.
The official Israeli policy toward the f edayeen presence
in Lebanon was first enunciated before cross-border operations
from Lebanon had begun in earnest. An attack on an Israeli
civilian airliner at the Athens airport on 26 December 1968
by two Arab assailants from Lebanon prompted Israel's
Transport Minister Moshe Carmel to state that Israel would
not "relieve the government of Lebanon from responsibility
for acts of sabotage organized on Lebanese soil with govern-
mental encouragement." ' Two days later, on 28 December
ooh,
Lester A. Sobel, ed. , Palestinian Impasse : Arab
Guerrillas&International Terror (New York: Facts on File
,
Inc.









1968, Israeli commandos raided the Beirut International
Airport and destroyed thirteen civilian planes. Unlike
their British predecessors thirty years earlier, the
Israelis chose not to politely inquire about the possibility
of Lebanese assistance in controlling the activities of anti-
Zionist Arabs.
During the early part of 1969 f edayeen activity in
Lebanon consisted almost exclusively of establishing base
camps in the foothills of Mount Hermon (the Arqub) , and
securing supply trails into the Arqub from Syria. Later
the area would become known as "Fatahland," after al -Fatah ,
the largest and most active of the many autonomous f edayeen
organizations. Gradually the Lebanese government disappeared
from the Arqub, and the Lebanese Army took up positions on
the west bank of the Hasbani River to prevent the Palestinians
from establishing bases near the old Palestine-Lebanon
boundary. Commando activity emanating from Lebanon was
therefore limited for the most part to raids on Israeli
targets in the occupied Golan Heights. In the Spring of
1969 however the f edayeen began to probe along the Hasbani
River, thereby provoking clashes with the Lebanese Army.
The first major encounter occurred on 14 April 19^9. when
the Army evicted armed Palestinians from the village of
227Dayr Mimass. Open warfare raged during the Autumn of
1969 as the Lebanese Army attempted, with some success, to
bottle up the fedayeen east of the Hasbani and restrict
227Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese




the flow of men and supplies to the Arqub from Syria. On
3 December 1969 the fighting ended and an accord known as
the "Cairo Agreement" was signed. Designed to govern
Lebanese-Palestinian relations, the Cairo Agreement reportedly
divided southern Lebanon into three regions. In the Arqub,
or eastern sector, the f edaveen were granted virtual autonomy.
In the central sector of the Israel-Lebanon border region
responsibility for military defense was left with the
Lebanese Army, but a f edayeen presence in limited numbers
and in specified locations was permitted. In the western
sector, or coastal plain, no armed Palestinians would be
228
allowed outside of refugee camps.
In reality the Cairo Agreement settled nothing. Fedayeen
raids into the occupied Golan Heights continued and Israeli
retaliation against Lebanese territory followed very pre-
dictably. The Lebanese government was caught squarely in the
middle. Michael Hudson expressed the triangular relation-
ship as follows:
Victory for the Lebanese government was in proportion
to its ability to seal off the commandos from Israeli
territory and avert Israeli reprisals, but for the com-
mandos such an outcome would mean defeat. Lebanon's
gains would be the Palestinian's losses. But enhanced
commando access to Israel meant certain retaliation:
commando gains would be Lebanese losses. As a third
part to the conflict, it was to Israel's interest to
hinder any modus vivendi between the two by keeping
up the pressure on the Lebanese. .. 229
pop.
Sharif, "South Lebanon: Its History and Geopolitics,"
p. 16.
229Hudson, "Fedayeen Are Forcing Lebanon's Hand," p. 14.
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Pressure was indeed applied. On 6 March 1970 the Israeli
Northern District Commander, Major General Mordechai Gur,
reportedly threatened to "turn a six-mile stretch of southern
230
Lebanon into a scorched-earth desert." J Fifteen years
earlier the Lebanese government had felt constrained to
remove all Palestinian refugees from that same six mile
(ten kilometer) strip. In May 1970 a thirty-two hour sweep
of the Arqub was conducted by an Israeli force of about
2,000 men. Another sweep of the Arqub took place between
25 and 28 February 1972 following a warning by Israeli
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General David Elazar that f edayeen
activity was "liable to bring disaster upon the villages of
231
south Lebanon." J After the completion of the Arqub oper-
ation Defense Minister Moshe Dayan announced that Israel
reserved the right to occupy Lebanese territory indefinitely
unless Beirut took steps to oust the commandos from the
232
slopes of Mount Herman. J Another Israeli sweep--this time
through the Mer.j Valley and along the Mediterranean coast
—
took place on 16 and 17 September 1972 following the murders
of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games.
Following the September 1972 operation the commandos
acceeded to new territorial restrictions imposed by the









Lebanese government. However on 15 October 1972 Israel
launched air attacks against Palestinian bases in Lebanon,
and announced that she would no longer wait for commando
acts or terrorist incidents before striking targets in
Lebanon. Former Israeli Chief of Staff Chaim Herzog announced
that, "We are not engaged in reprisal, but a war against
terror. The very presence of terrorists in the area
between the border and the Litani River is a provocation
^"and Israel isj free to act against them. " -3-5
According to Lebanese government sources there were
44 major Israeli attacks on Lebanon between mid-1968 and
mid 1974, resulting in the deaths of 880 Lebanese and
234
Palestinian civilians. J As Hudson has observed,
That these attacks were a major drain on Lebanon's thin
governmental legitimacy is self evident. It is also
manifest that the traditional Maronite leaders and
their constituencies had come to regard the Palestinian
guerrillas, rather than Israel itself, as chiefly to
blame for this state of affairs. 235
Prior to 1971 the main f edayeen bases for operations
against Israel were located in northwestern Jordan. J
The camps in the Arqub of Lebanon were strictly subsidiary.




234J Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil
War," p. 263.
235ibid.
^ John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September (London:
Frank Cass, 1973). P- 103-
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mopping-up operations by the Jordan Arab Army in the Spring
of 1971 caused the focus of f edayeen activity to shift to
"Fatahland," with the result being a fundamental shift of
Israeli anti-f edayeen activities from Jordan to Lebanon.
According to O'Ballance some 9.000 f edayeen escaped from
Jordan to Syria in 1971. and by November of the same year
the commando buildup began in the Arqub. Nevertheless,
Raids from the Lebanon /'Arqub region7 into Israel had
been limited in scope as the Israelis were in good
positions in the overlooking hills , and in fact had
constructed a road to supply them, a mile or so of
which actually lay within Lebanese territory . 2377
In summary, f edayeen activity in southern Lebanon between
the third and fourth Arab-Israeli wars was not particularly
effective and had a very limited impact on northern Israel.
The commandos were, for the most part, restricted to the
Arqub region of Lebanon. With a few minor exceptions their
cross-border activities were limited to the occupied Golan
Heights and had little effect on Israeli settlements lying
astride the 19^9 GAA. It is worth noting that it was not
until May 197^ that Israel began to build a barrier--a
latter-day version of Tegart's Wall --along the old Palestine-
Lebanon boundary. Between the Autumn of 1968, when f edayeen
-^O'Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power
, p. 122.
J Terence Smith, "Israel Builds New Border Fence,"
New York Times
.
Ik July 197^, pp. 1, 17-
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in noticeable numbers began to arrive in southern Lebanon,
and July 197^» the border between Lebanon and Israel con-
239
tained no significant physical obstacle.
Israel's policy of striking at Palestinian targets in
Lebanon was not therefore the result of a commando campaign
being waged in the Acre and Safed subdis-tricts , as had been
the case in 1938. To the extent that Israeli attacks on
Lebanon were retaliatory in nature, they stemmed from acts
of international terrorism against Israelis and from com-
mando activity in the occupied Golan Heights. To the extent
that the attacks were not retaliatory—as indicated by
Herzog's statement cited above— Israel ' s main interest
seemed to lie in provoking a violent confrontation between
Lebanon's Maronite nationalists and the Palestinian commandos.
Following a bold Israeli commando raid on Beirut on 10 April
1973 > one which resulted in the deaths of three Palestinian
leaders, fighting broke out between the Lebanese Army and
the fedaveen which lasted from 1 through 17 May. According
to Hudson the fighting, which took place mainly in the
vicinity of the Palestinian refugee camps of Beirut, "led
only to a standoff" and was a "psychological defeat for the
Army." 2^
239
-""For the most of its length the border is marked by
neither fences nor mine fields. It takes little bravado to
stroll a few yards into Lebanon, and people do so." Charles
Mohr, "Lebanese Border with Israel Calm, " New York Times
,
7 November 1969, p. 5.
2^0Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese
Civil War," p. 266.
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In the Spring of 197^ "the Palestinian-Israel confrontation
acquired a new dimension, as fedayeen raiders from southern
Lebanon began to strike into Israel proper. On 11 April
197*4- three commandos stormed an apartment building in the
Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona, ultimately killing sixteen
Israeli civilians and two soldiers. On the next day Israeli
forces retaliated by blowing up buildings in the Lebanese
border villages of Dahira, Yarun, Mehebab , Blida, Ett Taibe
,
and Aitarun. Defense Minister Dayan called upon Lebanon
to eliminate the commando presence, adding ominously, "The
Lebanese villagers will have to abandon their homes and
flee if the people of Qiryat Shemona cannot live in peace.
22+1
All of southern Lebanon will not oe able to exist.""" The
U.N. Security Council condemned the Israeli raids, prompting
Israel's delegate to state that Israel would "continue to
hold the Lebanese government responsible for any armed
2^4-2
attacks organized m or perpetrated from Lebanon.
"
On 15 May 197^ three f edayeen commandos raided the
Israeli border village of Maalot, killing twenty-five
Israelis. Israel refrainedfrom a ground attack against
Lebanon, but bombing raids against Palestinian targets in











fedayeen attack on the Israeli settlement of Shamir resulted
in the deaths of three women and brought more Israeli air
attacks on Lebanon. A seaborne raid on the Israeli town
of Nahariya on 24 June 1974 produced four Israeli deaths and
brought Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon under heavy-
Israeli artillery attacks. Later, Israeli gunboats raided
three Lebanese ports in further retaliation for the Nahariya
245
operation.
Shortly after the raid on Qiryat Shemona Israel decided
to try to seal the Lebanese boundary with a twelve-foot
high security fence topped with barbed wire and equipped with
electronic warning devices. A smooth dirt track was created
on the Israeli side of the fence to pick up footprints, and
machine gun positions were established at intervals along
the fence. The security barrier proved to be far more
effective than its 1938 predecessor because of the absence
of Arabs (except for loyal Israeli Druze) on the Israeli
side of the border. Yet the new security system was not
infallable . As one Israeli officer observed,
We realize it's impossible to seal the border completely,
But this fence will at least slow a terrorist down. If the
kill him before
way through
system works properly, we'll be able to






246Smith, "Israel Builds New Border Fence," p. 1
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Indeed, the largest number of commandos who participated in
any of the bloody raids that terrorized northern Israel in
197^ was only four . Even with an elaborate security system
it would be no easy task to stop small groups of infiltra-
tors, particularly if they were willing (if not eager) to
sacrifice their lives.
It is clear that the sudden rash of assaults on Israeli
civilians dramatically increased popular pressure on the
Israeli government to "do something" about the f edayeen
presence in southern Lebanon. Civil war in Lebanon--a
conflict brought on by the seemingly endless cycle of
Palestinian-Israeli violence in the border region--afforded
Israel the opportunity to "do something" far more effective
than conducting retaliatory raids and building security
fences. The total collapse of Lebanon's weak central
authority enabled Israel to enlist the aid of anti- fedayeen




VI. CIVIL WAR AND THE SOUTH
Between April 1975 and October 1976 Lebanon was convulsed
in a civil war that resulted in widespread physical de-
struction, the collapse of the country's fragile political
system, and over 40,000 deaths, most of which were innocent
civilians. The war began as a confrontation between the
Maronite militias, eager to restrict or eliminate the trouble-
some Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and the f edayeen . In
short order however Lebanese leftists nursing old grudges
against the country's political and economic elite entered
the fight, transforming the Maronite-Palestinian clashes
into a true civil war. Syria intervened twice in Lebanon
to restore order. In January 1976 units of the Damascus-
controlled Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) entered Lebanon
on the side of the fedaye en-Lebanese leftist coalition and
successfully overcame the rightist Christian militias.
Shortly thereafter however the war again erupted, as the
Lebanese left rejected the mildly reformist Syrian political
247formula for peace. That rejection caused an unbelieveable
turnabout in the Syrian position. As James Markham put it,
247
'The Syrian-backed program, known for a time as the
"New Lebanese National Covenant," is summarized by Salibi,
Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 19 58-1976 , pp. 163-164.
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Most dramatically, at the height of the Lebanese civil
war in the summer of 1976, Syrian armor lunged deep
into Lebanon and clashed with the Palestinians, who
seemed on the verge of victory over Christian rightists
that might have provoked what Mr. Assad [the President
of Syria7 feared most--an untimely war with Israel. 2^8
The Syrian military campaign, conducted in concert with
the rightist militias, eventually overcame the Palestinian
resistance and a shaky peace was restored to Lebanon—except
for the south. On 14 April 1976 Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin, anticipating further Syrian armed intervention in
Lebanon, announced the existence of an unspecified "red
line" in Lebanon south of which Syrian forces would not be
249permitted to move." Although it was widely assumed that
the "red line" was the lower course of the Litani River,
subsequent developments proved that it was in fact the
limited forces line of the 19^9 GAA. It will be recalled
that that line extended from the mouth of the Litani,
through Nabatiyah, to Hasbaya. When in January 1977 a
Syrian battalion occupied Nabatiyah, vigorous Israeli
complaints led to a Syrian withdrawal. D
The Lebanese civil war had induced most of the f edayeen
commandos stationed near the Israeli border to move north in
9/4.8
James M. Markham, 'Syria's Role in Lebanon is
Murkier than Ever," New York Times , 26 March 1978, p. 2E
2 9New York Times
. 15 April 1976, p. h
25




order to fight the rightist militias and the Syrians. The
Rabin government viewed the Palestinian evacuation as an
opportunity to solve once and for all the vexatious problem
of border security. It therefore became Israeli policy to
bar the reintroduction of f edayeen commandos to the frontier
region. The lessons of the past clearly indicated to
Israel that the pacification of southern Lebanon was the
prerequisite for the security of her own northern settle-
ments. The balance of this section will focus on Israeli
efforts to secure her northern boundary by attempting to
control events in southern Lebanon.
A. THE GOOD FENCE PROGRAM
The new Israeli policy, as announced by Defense Minister
Shimon Peres on 19 July 1976, was what Peres called the
2 51
"good fence program. " There were three basic aspects
of the program: humanitarian relief for the beleaguered
residents of southern Lebanese border villages; the ex-
clusion of all non-Lebanese military forces from the area
adjoining Israel; and the creation of a pro-Israeli
southern Lebanese militia to aid in barring the reintro-
duction of f edayeen commandos. Although Israelis, when
referring to the "good fence program" stress its
humanitarian aspect, it is more accurate to view the entire
undertaking in the context of a comprehensive security
policy.
251Ibid. , 20 July 1976, p. 3-
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The humanitarian element of the program amounted to a
series of Israeli gestures designed to establish a bond of
friendship between the impoverished Lebanese civilians of
2 52
the border region and the government of Israel. •* The
security fence which had divided Lebanon and Israel since
1974 was opened at two places: Metulla and Dovev. 3y
providing to Lebanese citizens (most of whom--due to the
location of the fence openings--Maronite Christians) such
vital services as water, medical care, employment, markets
for agricultural produce, and access to Israeli manufactured
goods, Israel hoped to turn the residents of the Lebanese
border villages into willing collaborators against the
fedayeen . It appears that some strong cross-border links
were established, although many southern Lebanese were
understandably leery of becoming identified too closely
with Israel. Yet one measure of Israel's success was
indicated by a story in the Jerusalem Post of 21 February
1978, which reported that Lebanese Major Saad Haddad, the
leader of the pro-Israeli Maronite militia in southern
Lebanon, visited Israel to remonstrate with Israel's top
labor union official about underpaying Lebanese laborers.
He reportedly secured an agreement to the effect that Lebanese
2 52An account of the humanitarian side of the "good
fence program" was written by Gertrude Samuels, "Israel's





workers- in Israel would receive wages equal to those of
their Israeli counterparts. ^ J
The second element of the "good fence program" was the
attempt to exclude non-Lebanese (Syrian and Palestinian)
military forces from the south. Rabin's "red line" state-
ment of 1^ April 1976 was later supplemented by Foreign
Minister Allon's proposal of 31 January 1977 that a
multilateral agreement be reached concerning the presence
2^
of Arab military units near the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Allon reiterated his proposal on 13 February 1977. empha-
sizing that Israel would accept the stationing only of
Lebanese forces in the frontier zone. "^ Israel was
obviously opposed to the reintroduction of f edayeen
commandos, and was likewise opposed to the idea of Syrian
regulars directly facing Israel on a new front.
The third element of the security program involved an
attempt to fill the security vacuum which Israel and the
virtually nonexistent Lebanese central authority had imposed
on southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army, reflecting the
same contradictions that had brought Lebanon itself to ruin
in 1975 and 1976, had all but collapsed. It was simply not
prepared to move south in 1976. In order to obstruct the
return of the Palestinians therefore, Israel was faced with
2 S3 MJJ
"Lebanese Claim for Equal Wages," Jerusalem Post
(International Edition), 21 February 1978, p. W,
2-5 New York Times
, 1 February 1977, p. 5-
255Ibid., m- February 1977, p. 5-
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the choice of either occupying southern Lebanon or creating
and supporting a pro-Israeli Arab force to police the area.
Beginning in August 1976 Israel greatly increased the fre-
quency of armored patrols which penetrated several miles
into Lebanon in order to check for f edayeen concentrations.
By October of the same year however much of the patrolling
activity in Lebanon was being carried out by a pro-Israeli
Maronite militia led by Major Haddad, an officer of the
recently disintegrated Lebanese Army. Armed, clothed, fed,
and trained by Israel, the militia's mission was to give
northern Israel an "early-warning system, permitting it
[the IDF7 to move a task force into Lebanon quickly" should
2S7
the Lebanese militia encounter Palestinian commandos. -"
Although many of the militiamen were local natives who,
like their kinsmen in 1925. had no great love for non-
Christian Arabs, some were reportedly transported by Israel
to southern Lebanon from Junieh (the Maronite "capital" north
of Beirut) by way of Haifa. -* Haddad' s strange role in
the southern Lebanese political vacuum was demonstrated by
9 cA
Terence Smith, "Israelis Stepping up Patrols in
Lebanon," New York Times
, 3 August 1976, pp. 1, k,
2^7J Henry Tanner, "In South Lebanon, an Odd War: Arab
Soldiers with Israeli Arms," New York Times , 8 October





the fact that as leader of the 3f000-man militia, ^ he
(l) collaborated fully with Israel, (2) received orders from
and reported directly to Maronite political and military
leaders in Beirut, and (3) continued to receive his
regular pay from the official Lebanese government of
President Sarkis , whose desires were routinely ignored
and obstructed by Haddad.
So long as f edayeen forces in Lebanon found themselves
fighting Syrians, the "good fence program' work relatively
well for Israel. Yet the Syrian-imposed peace in Lebanon
north of the Litani in the Autumn of 1976 permitted large
numbers of armed Palestinians to again move south and join
their Lebanese leftist allies still active in the Shi'ite
villages of southern Lebanon. Syria, angered and embarrassed
by the open collaboration of certain of her Maronite "allies"
with Israel, again changed direction and facilitated the
reentry of armed Palestinians to the south of Lebanon. The
Syrian objective was not to help reinstitute f edayeen
attacks on Israel, but to punish those elements of the
Maronite community who had welcomed Syrian intervention in
2S9
^ Jay Bushinsky, "Lebanese Major Shows Israelis His
Touchy Position," Christian Science Monitor
, 14 October 1977,
p. 10.
Le Figaro (Paris), 20 April 1978, p. 16 (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, 2^ April 1978, p. G4.
)
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June 1976 only to seriously humiliate the Asad regime
(itself based on a religious minority group) " by open
cooperation with the Israeli military. Inasmuch as Syria
could not move her own forces south of the "red line"
without provoking an Israeli military response, the only
alternative was to turn the Palestinians loose on Major
Haddad's militia.
B. WARFARE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON
Severe fighting broke out in southern Lebanon in
February 1977. as Haddad's rightist militia attacked
Palestinian and Lebanese leftist positions in the villages
of Kfar Tebnit and Ibl as Saqi, ' north of Israel's Hula
Valley. Attacks and counterattacks continued through
July 1977. with Israel providing artillery and logistical
support to her Arab allies in an effort to create an
anti- f edayeen buffer zone along the entire length of the
Israeli-Lebanese boundary. Syria gave parallel support to
the Palestinian-leftist forces. Israeli support for the
Maronite militia in the south became more open and militant
with the coming to power of Prime Minister Menachem Begin
in June 1977. On 8 August Begin publicly called attention
to Israel's support of the rightist militia, claiming
As a member of the minority Alawite Shi ' ite sect, Asad's
position in predominantly Sunnite Syria was jeopardized by
his "rescue" of the Lebanese Maronite elite. See "Syria Has
an Enemy Within," New York Times , k Sept. 1977, Sect. 4, p. 2.




that the f edayeen had embarked on a program of "genocide"
against the Christians of southern Lebanon. By affirming
that Israel would "never abandon the Christian minority
264
across the border," Begin was clearly raising the stakes
in southern Lebanon. No longer was Israel engaged in a
tactical campaign aimed simply at providing adequate frontier
security. Begin' s open proclamation of support for the
Maronites appeared to signal Israel's interest in, if not
open support of, the idea of partitioning Lebanon itself
along sectarian lines, with the predominantly Christian
areas of Mount Lebanon and east Beirut linked to its
Jewish neighbor to the south by a neutralized southern
Lebanon. As one observer noted,
...some sections of the Lebanese right wing have been
so encouraged by the Israeli premier's recent public
statement of support for their cause that they have been
echoing Israeli calls for an international buffer force
to be deployed in south Lebanon. 265
Alarmed by the implications of the budding relationship
between Israel and prominent Maronite leaders—most notably
former President of the Republic Camille Chamoun--the
Lebanese government, in concert with Syria, pressed for an
end to the hostilities in the south. They obviously
recognized that instability in the south was keeping all
of Lebanon strapped to a powder keg. On 19 July 1977
Ibid.
-'Helena Cobban, "Pacifying South Lebanon Tied to




the Palestinian forces agreed to stop fighting in southern
Lebanon. ' On the next day delegations representing the
Palestinians, the Syrian Army, the Lebanese Army, and the
Arab Deterrent Force (a predominantly Syrian peacekeeping
force in Lebanon authorized by the Arab League) met at
Chtaura, Lebanon, to map out a common strategy. An
agreement was reached on 25 July. With regard to southern
Lebanon, the Chtaura Agreement provided that f edayeen
commandos would withdraw to a line roughly fifteen kilom-
eters from the Israeli-Lebanese border, and that the
reconstituted Lebanese Army would move south and relieve
the pro-Israeli militia of its border security functions. '
The United States moved quickly to capitalize on the
Chtaura Agreement by pressing for Israeli cooperation. On
11 September the New York Times reported Lebanese press
sources as stating that Israel had informed the United
States that she "would not object" to the presence of the
Lebanese Army along the boundary provided that the promised
Palestinian withdrawal was effected, and that the Pales tin-
of,p.
ians agree to conduct no more cross-border operations.
It appeared that an agreement was within reach, and that
?66
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Lebanon was ready to deploy approximately two-thirds of its
2693,000-man rebuilt army to southern Lebanon.
Despite its promising start, the Chtaura Agreement
foundered on the all-important matter of timing, and was
never implemented. President Sarkis was extremely
reluctant to deploy his new army to the south without first
assuring himself that the pacification plan would work.
He did not want the army, a key institution in the rebuild-
ing of Lebanon, to be subjected again to devisive forces.
Yet the question of who exactly would make the first move
in the pacification of southern Lebanon became the major
stumbling block. The Palestinian forces made their
withdrawal contingent upon the insertion of the regular
Lebanese Army in the border area. Sarkis however refused
to deploy the army without assurances from the United
States that Israel would not undermine the operation.
Israel refused to give such assurances without first seeing
a total Palestinian withdrawal. In an atmosphere of
mutual distrust the fighting in the south resumed. Clashes
in the vicinity of Merj MUyun and Khiam, just north of
Metulla, again brought Israeli forces onto Lebanese
271territory in support of their rightist militia allies.
Ibid.





The United States refused however to allow the Chtaura
initiative to die, and on 26 September 1977 arranged a
ceasefire in southern Lebanon. Under the ceasefire
formula, the entrance of the Lebanese Army and withdrawal
of f edayeen units would take place simultaneously in early
272October. Israeli forces immediately withdrew from Lebanon.
However the ceasefire was vigorously opposed by Major Haddad,
who made the following statement:
The cease-fire was forced on us... No one asked us.
Others obligated us. We were against it. We are not
against peace, but this cease-fire is not fair.
They should have provided for a concurrent withdrav/al
by the Israeli Army and the guerrillas. That's the way we
thought a cease-fire should be. I cannot understand how
Israel accepted a condition like this, specifying a one-
sided troop pullback, even if it was imposed by the
United States. 273
Of course, the "concurrent withdrawal" envisioned by Haddad
and his mentors in Beirut would have left his own forces in
control of southern Lebanon, a prospect none too pleasing to
either the Palestinian-leftist coalition or the Syrian
backers of President Sarkis.
Within three weeks the ceasefire had broken down.
Despite the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and
the initiation of direct talks between Israeli and Lebanese
officers in early October, the rightist militia and
272Ibid.
, p. 28737.
273Tushinsky , "Lebanese Major Shows Israelis His
Touchy Position, p. 10.
27^4-
1 New York Times
. 29 October 1977, p. 5«
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Palestinians simply could not refrain from firing at one
another. The rightist forces in southern Lebanon urged
their Israeli supporters to scrap the ceasefire, and the
Israeli Defense Minister obliged them by making the imple-
mentation of the ceasefire contintent upon a unilateral
Palestinian withdrawal from Khiam, only five kilometers
27 "5
north of Metulla. The Palestinians refused, fighting
resumed, and again Sarkis declined to insert his army into
the southern Lebanese maelstrom. Adding to the general
confusion were demands by Israel that Lebanon recognize
Major Haddad's militia as part of the regular Lebanese
Army, and that Israel be permitted to maintain her "good
fence" relationship with Lebanese border villages for an
indefinite period. Despite the fact that Haddad remained
on the Lebanese government payroll , the Sarkis regime was
in no position to accept the Israeli demands.
The abortive ceasefire was killed on 8 November 1977
when fedayeen forces, firmly in control of the coastal
sector of southern Lebanon, rocketed the Israeli town of
Nahariya for the second time in three days, killing three
Israelis. Israel retaliated by bombing the Rashidiya refugee
277
camp, killing about seventy people. Sporadic fighting
27 5
-^Jason Morris, "Shaky Truce Invites Israeli Troops
Again," Christian Science Monitor
, 17 October 1977, p. 7-
on £
Cobban, "S. Lebanon: Integration with Israel?", p. 3^.
277Geoggrey Godsell, "Israeli Retaliation Raids Buffet
U.S. Peace Efforts," Christian Science Monitor
, 10 November
1977, pp. 1, 11.
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continued in the south, with Israeli forces occasionally
crossing the border to assist Haddad's militia.
By March 1978 however it was clear that Israel's attempt
to establish an anti- fedayeen security zone on Lebanese
territory along the length of the boundary had met with
only patrial success. Although the combination of
Israeli patrolling and rightist militia activity had re-
duced Palestinian actions against Israel to infrequent and
ineffective indirect fire attacks, the fact remained that
long stretches of the boundary were still vulnerable.
According to a map appearing in the Israeli press, only
three small Christian enclaves existed on the Lebanese
side of the border, and it was only in those areas where
Israel could rely upon her allies to effectively provide
security. Despite the sound civic action principles
embodied in the "good fence program," Israel apparently
succeeded in securing the cooperation of only 20,000
279Lebanese living in the Christian border enclaves. 7 By
supporting Major Haddad's militia Israel had forfeited
the cooperation of the Shi ' ites in southern Lebanon.
This was recognized by an Israeli journalist who recently
observed that,




9^Cobban, "S. Lebanon: Integration with Israel?"
181

Without forsaking its alliance with the Christians and
without leaving the Christian militias to their fate,
Israel must now show initiative and imagination and pave
a way to the heart of the Moslim population residing right
next to it. Precisely because the Shi ' ites are a minority
within the Sunni Moslim world encircling us, they will
need the defense of those same elements who had shown
their loyalty to other minorities in the Middle East. 280
In February 1978 the Israeli military reportedly made a
serious effort to establish such links with the Shi'ite
community in the frontier zone. According to the Shi'ite
spiritual leader, Mufti Abdel Amir Kabalan, Israeli forces
occupied the Shi'ite village of Meis al Jabal in early
February and offered the town's residents the entire "good
fence" package in return for cooperation against the
Palestinians. The villagers politely refused, pointing out
that no fedayeen were based in Meis al Jabal. According
to the Mufti, the Israeli overtures were rejected in six
p Q -j
other Shi'ite border villages.
By basing her security policy on the small Maronite
minority of southern Lebanon, Israel found herself on
shaky ground in the highly-charged atmosphere of sectarian
and village rivalries in the Jabal Aamel region. Unless
she could build bridges to the Shi'ite community of the
south--a process that would probably require the reining-in
Shemu'el Segev, Tel Aviv Ha'arez
, 12 April 1978,
p. 5 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 13 April
1978, p. N5).
pQ-|
Marvine Howe, "Israelis Said to be Seeking Use of
Lebanese Villages," New York Times , 26 February 1978, p. 11
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of Haddad's Maronite militia--Israel would be obligated to
continually intervene in those parts of the border region
beyond Haddad's control. On 11 March 1978 however a
terrorist atrocity in Israel gave the Begin government an
opportunity to create a new set of facts for southern
Lebanon. On 15 March 1978 Israel undertook a full-scale
invasion of southern Lebanon.
C. OPERATION STONE OF WISDOM
On 11 March 1978 Palestinian commandos seized an
Israeli bus near Tel Aviv in a raid which resulted in
thirty-seven deaths. Although the entire world recog-
nized the inevitability of an Israeli reprisal against
Lebanon, the scope and intensity of the Israeli operation
came as a great surprise.
In retrospect it appears that the Palestinian action
of 11 March was not the cause of Israel's subsequent
invasion. Rather it provided the Begin government with a
strong public relations basis upon which an already
urgently-needed military operation could be launched. The
salient feature of the military situation in southern
Lebanon in the beginning of March 1978 was the conspicuous
failure of Major Haddad's militia to extend its control
beyond the three Christian border enclaves. The very size
of the Israeli invasion on 15 March suggests that it was
a well-planned action designed to clear fedayeen and
282Arab Report and Record
.




Lebanese leftist forces from the frontier region, not a
spontaneous reaction to a particularly gruesome incident
of Palestinian terrorism.
On 2 March 1978 Haddad's militia made a strong effort
to break out of a Christian enclave. The rightist militia
seized the small village of Maroun er Ras , ' located
only slightly more than a single kilometer from the
Israeli border. The significance of Maroun er Ras lay
not however in its proximity to Israel, but in its elevated
position overlooking the town of Bint Jubail two kilometers
to the northwest. As was the case forty years earlier when
Arab guerrillas were raising havoc along the Palestine-
Lebanon border, Bint Jubail was, in March 1978, the major
Palestinian-leftist stronghold in the central sector of the
boundary region. Despite the many changes wrought over six
decades, Bint Jubail still enjoyed some significance as a
road junction in the Lebanese portion of the divided Upper
Galilee.
The Palestinian-leftist forces counterattacked immediately
and expelled Haddad's militia from Maroun er Ras. The
engagement, though hardly a candidate for inclusion in a
list of the world's great battles, nevertheless demonstrated
conclusively to Israel that Haddad would not be able on his






In order to sweep the fedayeen and their Lebanese partners
from the Shi'ite border villages Israeli regulars would have
to be used. It was because of Maroun er Ras that Israel
decided that the time had come to invade southern Lebanon.
At 01^0 on 15 March 1978 Isareli artillery opened up on
the following villages held by the Palestinians and leftists:
Ras el Biyada, Bint Jubail , Maroun er Ras, Taibe , Khiam, and
Rashaya al Foukhar. D The shelling was followed by a ground
attack, with approximately 20,000 Israeli soldiers advancing
on the following five axes: Ras En Naqurah-Ras el Biyada;
Yarine-Tair Harfa; Maroun er Ras-Bint Jbail ; Aadaisse-Taibe
;
and Metulla to the vicinity of Merj 'Uyun (Blat, Ibl es
Saqi, and Khiam). In only two places, Bint Jbail and
Taibe, did the Palestinian-leftist coalition offer significant
resistance. The overwhelming majority of commandos simply
evacuated their positions and headed north.
Although Israel had obviously contemplated a large incursion
into Lebanon prior to the Palestinian terror action of 11
March, it appears that military events which unfolded after
15 March involved a good deal of politically-inspired impro-
visation. At first the objective was limited: "to break
the tightening terrorist stranglehold around the Christian
^Hirsh Goodman, "Israel Forces Holding Southern
Lebanon," Jerusalem Post (International Edition), 21 March
1978, p. 7.
Arab Report and Record , 1-15 March 1978, No. 5,
p. 184.




enclaves in the central and northern sectors of southern
poo
Lebanon." L '" In other words, the Israeli operation--code-
named "Stone of Wisdom" --was designed to save Major Haddad's
crumbing position. Indeed, Haddad greeted the invasion with
undisguised relief, saying "I've been waiting for this
289
night a long time." So were his men. As the Israeli
forces moved north, Haddad's militia followed in their
wake, looting the Shi'ite villages which had successfully
290held out for so long. It was 1925 all over again, with
some old local vendettas settled and some new ones created.
The military objective was achieved within approximately
fifteen hours. The significance of the operation was
explained as follows by the Israeli Chief of Staff:
In southern Lebanon there were a number of junctions,
large villages and, closer to the border with Israel, key
regions which we took on the first night when we spoke
about a security belt. If we go from west to east the
region of Ras al-Bayyadah, on the seashore; in the center
we have the Maroun al-Ras-Eint Jabayl area; opposite Rahim
and Misgav 'Am we have At-Taiyba ridge and on the Fatahland
front, what we call the Naqurim ridge--a ridge that controls
the roads coming from 'Abaqah south. On this front they
split further south to the region of Metulla. These ter-
ritories must be controlled by some force or another if




29°Arab Report and Record
.
16-31 March 1978, No. 6, p. 200.
2917
"Press Conference with Ezer Weizman & Mordechai Gur,"
Jerusalem Domestic Service
, 20 March 1978 (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, 21 March 1978, pp. N3-N5 . )
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By the end of the first day Israel had secured that which
Major Haddad's militia had failed to provide: a buffer zone,
ranging in depth from five to twenty kilometers, stretching
from the Mediterranean Sea to the foothills of Mount Hermon.
It appeared that the operation had ended.
Between 16 and 18 March Israeli forces continued to make
small advances in those areas where the security belt was
less than ten kilometers deep. Tibnine and Qantara fell on
17 March, and Israeli forces pushed up the coast to Mansoura.
In the eastern sector the offensive continued in the general
292direction of Kawkaba and Hasbaya. Concerned about
casualties, the IDF abandoned its traditional practice of high
mobility, choosing instead to advance its mechanized infantry
very cautiously behind a devasting wall of artillery fire.
Although that technique did indeed minimize Israeli casual
-
29 3ties, ^ it maximized non-combattant deaths and civil
destruction, and permitted the great bulk of enemy commands
to cross the Litani River to relative safety. According to
the military affairs writer of the Jerusalem Post , "The
Israeli Army, once renowned for its Davidian finesse, was
used as a huge, stomping Goliath, hitting with all its might
29^-
at places from which the terrorists had already fled.
"
292Arab Report and Record , 16-31 March 1978, No. 6,
pp. 222-223.
293^The IDF suffered only eighteen deaths during the
operation. Newsweek
. 3 April 1978, p. 39.
7 As quoted in Newsweek
, 3 April 1978, p. k2.
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On 19 March, with the invasion seemingly ended, the IDF
suddenly broke out of the newly-created buffer zone toward
the Litani River. According to one Israeli source the new
advance "was designed to carve out a PLO-free security belt
in the 1,200 sq_. km. between Israel's northern border and
the Litani River. . . " ^ The Jerusalem Post offered the
following explanation as to why a decision was made to seek
a wider security belt:
It is believed that the decision to thrust deeper into
Lebanon was taken only on Saturday night prior to Premier
Menachem Begin 's departure for the U.S. Israel had ini-
tially announced that it would penetrate no deeper than
10 kilometers into Lebanon, but the decision was apparently
prompted by several factors: continued terrorist shellings
on Israeli targets; the lack of Syrian involvement in the
fighting; the desire to do further harm to the terrorist
organizational infrastructure, specifically in the Tyre
area; and the tactical advantage of bringing terrorist
concentrations north of the Litani into Israel's artillery
range, and the desire to control access routes. 29o
The Post'
s
explanation of Israeli motives for expanding the
operation is of interest both because of what it says and
because of what it does not say. It is true that Israeli
mop-up operations were being harassed by enemy artillery
and mortar fire. That was due in large part to the ponderous
IDF advance of 15-18 March which had permitted large numbers
of enemy commandos to escape and regroup. It was also true
that Syria abstained from the fighting, thereby leading
29 ^
^-^AnanSafadi, Jerusalem Post Magazine
, 7 April 1978, p. 4.
296Hirsh Goodman, "IDF Extends its Control of Southern




Israel to believe that an expanded operation need not lead to
a war with Syria. By the same token however Israel knew
that the overextended Syrians were not likely to intervene
anyway. The destruction of the enemy infrastructure in the
Tyre area never did take place, as the IDF--seeking to mini-
mize its own casualties—completely bypassed the port city.
The references to enemy concentrations north of the Litani
and the importance of access routes can again be tied into
the slowness of the initial Israeli thrust. What the Post
failed to mention was the fact that a resolution, sponsored
by the United States, was being placed before the U.N.
Security Council calling upon Israel to get out of Lebanon.
The notion that Israel might want to seize more territory
for bargaining purposes seems not to have occured to the
Post .
In the second stage of the Lebanon operation Israeli
forces moved as far north as Aabbassiye in the west--bypassing
the Palestinian-leftist stronghold of Tyre--and consolidated
a line just south of the Litani River from Aabbassiye to
297Taibe. 7[ This brought the two Litani River bridges— the
Qasimiyah on the coast (where Dayan had been wounded in 19^1)
and the Akkiyah in the central sector--under Israeli artillery
fire. The third Litani bridge, the Khardali near Merj 'Uyun,
had already been subjected to Israeli bombardment in the first
phase of the invasion,. Map #15 on page 190 depicts the
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Although the expanded operation was explained in terms
of tactical military necessity by General Gur, who empha-
sized the importance of controlling access to southern
Lebanon across the Litani bridges ("Whoever holds these
territories can control, in a satisfactory manner, what
OQQ
happens on the routes to southern Lebanon"), international
politics played the crucial role in the decision to expand
the operation. On 19 March 1978, hours after the IDF began
to move toward the Litani, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution '425- The two key points of the resolution, which
was sponsored by the United States, were (1) a call upon
Israel to immediately "cease its military action against
Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its
forces from all Lebanese territory;" and (2) the establish-
ment of a "United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon"
(subsequently known as UNIFIL—United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon) , for the purpose of "confirming the withdrawal
of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security
and assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the
return of its effective authority in the area. . . "^"" The
Israeli thrust toward the Litani was therefore seen in many
quarters "as a burst aimed at achieving as much as possible
"298
"Press Conference with Ezer Weizman and Mordechai
Gur, "p. N4.
299The complete text of Resolution k2S may be found
in Arab Report and Record , 16-31 March 1978, No. 6, p. 221.
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before the vote on the proposed UN Security Council
Resolution. "^ Even General Gur acknowledged on 19 March
that "We are not talking about a security belt any more, but
301
about a general agreement in the area. "-' Phase II of the
Israeli invasion was aimed at giving Israel the best
possible bargaining position in the pursuit of a "general
agreement.
"
The political objective of the expanded operation was
quickly achieved. On 20 March Israeli Defense Minister Ezer
Weizman and General Gur met with General Siilasvuo, Commander
of UNTSO, and Major General Erskine, newly-appointed UNIFIL
commander. Despite Israel's vehement opposition to the U.S.-
sponsored Resolution ^25> the four men quickly reached
agreement on its implementation. It was reported that three
points were established: (1) the area between the Litani and
a line running from Ras al Biyada to Ibl es Saqi--roughly
the area overrun by the IDF in the second stage of the
invasion—would become a buffer zone; (2) UNIFIL would be respon-
sible for patrolling the buffer zone; and (3) the strip of
land lying between the Israeli-Lebanese boundary and the
UNIFIL buffer zone would be designated a "peace zone" to be
patrolled by the rightist militia of Major Haddad and
(eventually) units of the Lebanese Army. Israel would be
permitted to continue its 'good fence program" with the









instead of being pressured into turning over her ten
i
kilometer "security belt" to UNIFIL, Israel simply bargained
away her additional conquests of 19 March, thereby buying
time in which to solidify Major Haddad's grip on the strip
of Lebanese territory immediately adjacent to the border.
Seen in this light, it is clear that the second stage of
the Israeli invasion was designed to immunize the conquests
of the first stage from occupation by an international force.
Having achieved her objective, Israel unilaterally declared
303
a ceasefire on 21 March. J
Despite the widespread physical destruction visited
upon southern Lebanon between 15 and 21 March by Israeli
artillery and airstrikes--including the total destruction
30^.
of Bint Jubail and several other Shi'ite villages-- it was
estimated that the Palestinian-leftist coalition lost only
between 200 and 300 men out of a total force in southern
30 KLebanon of approximately 10,000. -* That represents
relatively insignificant combattant losses in the context
of an operation that caused the deaths of about 1,000 Arab
civilians J and which, according to the Jerusalem Post , sent
3°3ibid.
J
"They /"the Israelis^ also seemed to be engaging
in a general leveling of almost every significant structure
in the occupied area..." Newsweek , 2? March 1978, p. 40
.
3
-5john K. Gooley, "PLO-Israeli Strife Shakes Uneasy Peace
in Lebanon," Christian Science Monitor
, 7 April 1978, p. 4.
According to a survey by the International Committee
of the Red Cross, as reported in the Arab Report and Record
,
1-15 April 1978, No. 7, p. 2^7-
Ifl3

100,000 civilians (about forty percent of the southern
Lebanese population in March 1978) fleeing to the north
307for their lives. ' Given the practice of near- total reliance
on artillery and airstrikes by the IDF--tactics described
308
as "unprofessional' by the London Sunday Telegraph— it can
be reasonably concluded that operation "Stone of Wisdom"
was designed not to inflict a conclusive military defeat
on the fedayeen and leftist commandos, but to create new
facts in southern Lebanon. These facts may be summarized
as follows: (l) the securing in Lebanese territory of a
security belt along the entire length of the boundary,
not just in areas populated by Christians; (2) the occupation
of the rest of southern Lebanon by an international force,
on whose shoulders would fall the burden of preventing
new commando infiltration; and (3) a new appreciation
by the inhabitants of southern Lebanon—eighty percent of
whose villages were damaged or destroyed by Israeli bombing
and shelling--of the dire consequences of trafficking with
those who would attack Jewish towns and villages. Asked
whether or not the Israeli invasion could be considered a
success, an unnamed western military expert replied, "If it
was meant to drive the Palestinians out of the south and denude
the area of its civilian population, the operation was a
307 Jerusalem Post (International Edition), 21 March 1978,
p. 2.
As quoted in the Arab Report and Record , 16-31 March
1978, No. 6, p. 222.
309According to a survey by the International Committee
of the Red Cross, as reported in the Arab Report and Record
,
1-15 April 1978, No. 7 » P- 2^7.
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complete success. But if it was meant to destroy the
310guerrilla movement ... then it was a complete failure. " J
Perhaps the Israelis expected that the refugees and armed
commandos leaving the south would, by their very presence in
and around Beirut, serve to reignite the Lebanese civil war.
D. CONTINUING UNREST: AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION
The first contingent of UNIFIL entered Lebanon by way
of Israel on 22 March 1978,
3
11
and in the months of April
through June the international force, projected to reach
312
a total strength of 4,000, began to take up positions
south of the Litani. The Israeli withdrawal called for
by Resolution 425 took place very slowly and in several
stages commencing on 11 April. By 30 April Israel had turned
over to UNIFIL some 550 square kilometers of Lebanese
territory overrun between 19 and 21 March, and was left
in control of the security belt seized during the first
phase of the invasion.-^ -*
With regard to the evacuation of the security belt
itself, Israel dragged her feet. She insisted that UNIFIL
J As quoted in Newsweek , 3 April 1978, p. 42.
^i:LArab Report and Record , 16-31 March 1978, No. 6,
p. 225.
312John K. Cooley, "UN Faces an Uncertain Role in South
Lebanon," Christian Science Monitor . 22 March 1978, p. 34.




take full responsibility for preventing the reintroduction
314
of commandos south of the Litani. Although UNIFIL was
created primarily for the purpose of "confirming the with-
drawal of Israeli forces," Israel's position coincided with
that of the Lebanese government, which was once again
showing great reluctance to send army units to the troubled
south. According to an unnamed Lebanese senior official,
"We see /Resolution k 2$Jreferring to the return of Lebanon's
effective authority in the area as meaning the removal of
any armed forces that are present without our authorization,
"
31 5Palestinians as well as Israelis. y Despite the cooperation
of Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat,
fedayeen elements apparently not under his control sniped at
UNIFIL positions and launched rockets at Israeli settlements
from positions north of the Litani River. UNIFIL 's position
became increasingly difficult, as members of the peacekeeping
force found themselves being harassed not only by Palestin-
317ians, but by Major Haddad's militia as well.
Israel took the position that although she had no
claim on Lebanese territory, she would leave Lebanon only
31
4
J Cooley, "UN Faces an Uncertain Role in South Lebanon,"
p. 3^.
31 *>J
-^Marvine Howe, "PLO Reports Raids on Israeli Troops,"
New York Times . 26 March 1978, p. 10.
Cooley, "PLO-Israeli Strife Shakes Uneasy Peace in
Lebanon, " p. h.
317Arab Report and Record , 1-15 April 1978, No. 7, p. 2^8.
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"when it was certain that UNIFIL was strong enough to prevent
attacks on Israel from Lebanon.' Furthermore, Israeli
Foreign Minister Dayan affirmed that Security Council
Resolution 242, not Israeli territorial annexations, would
provide the basis for settling the differences between
319Lebanon and Israel. Even though Dayan 's statement was
interpreted in some quarters as meaning that Israel would
eventually ask for some Lebanese territory in order to




242) , it certainly appeared to rule out a unilateral border
adjustment. Under strong international pressure Israel,
on 21 May, finally set a firm date for her final withdrawal
from Lebanon: 13 June 1978. The withdrawal, according to
Israeli Cabinet Secretary Ayre Naor, would be unconditional,
but Israel would be obliged to "take measures to ensure
321
the security of the local Christian Lebanese population. "^
On 13 June, as promised, the IDF ended its ninety-one
day occupation of southern Lebanon. In a military ceremony
322
at Meis el Jebel the Israeli flag was lowered. However,
the security belt occupied by Israel since 15 March was
3l8Facts on File . 21 April 1978, p. 274.
319Ibid.
, p. 275.
320J See "New Government, Old Problems," An-Nahar Arab
Report and Memo , 24 April 1978, p. 3.
321Arab Report and Record , 16-31 May 1978, No. 10, p. 389.
^ "Israel Leaves Southe
Monitor , 14 June 1978, p. 3.
322 rn Lebanon," Christian Science
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handed over not to UNIFIL , but to Major Saad Haddad and
his rightist militia. As Israel's northern commander
Major General Avigdor Ben-Gal explained, "The Israeli
Government is insisting upon its commitment to protect the
323Christian minority in southern Lebanon."^ J Accordingly
Major Haddad was given responsibility for securing the
entire eastern sector of the border, from Khiam to Bint
Jubail and his associate, Major Shidiaq, was put in charge
32^4-
of the western sector, from Bint Jubail to Ras el Biyada.
The two officers would henceforth secure for Israel a
strip of Lebanese territory ranging in depth from five to
eight kilometers, with an even larger bulge in the Merj 'Uyun
area.
As one observer noted, the transfer of the security
belt to Haddad by Israel raised the "central question" of
"the chain of command between the Lebanese Government and
32 "5Haddad."^ J If Haddad were not Beirut's official repre-
sentative in the south, Israel's action would have clearly
been contrary to the will of the Security Council as ex-
pressed by Resolution ^25. Yet President Sarkis, hoping
to mollify the extreme Maronite nationalists in Lebanon,
3 2 3iMd .
3 Arab Report and Record , 1-15 June 1978, No. 11, p. ^27.
-'Louis Wiznitzer, "UN Troops Sitting on a 'Volcano'
Now That the Israelis Have Pulled Out," Christian Science
Monitor, 15 June 1978, p. 6.
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accorded provisional recognition to Haddad, thereby-
granting a measure of legitimacy to Israel's action.
The question of Major Haddad 's attitude toward the
officially recognized Lebanese government remained however
unanswered for the time being. Although President Sarkis
was willing to accord an aura of legitimacy to Haddad, he
was also eager to dispatch Lebanese regulars to the border
area in order to supplement the rightist militia. With
characteristic caution Sarkis dispatched several Lebanese
officers to meet with their Israeli counterparts at the
TTNIFIL Headquarters at Naqurah to discuss the impending
327
southern movement of the Lebanese Army.
During the meeting, which took place on 30 July 1978,
Israel issued four guidelines for the southern deployment
of Lebanese regulars: (l) the positions of Majors Haddad
and Shidiaq must be officially recognized by the Lebanese
government; (2) units of the Lebanese Army could be de-
ployed only outside of the Christian border enclaves; (3)
no Syrian officers or advisors could accompany the
Lebanese; and (^) no interference with the "good fence program"
would be tolerated.
326IMd<
327J Hirsh Goodman, "Israel 'Guidelines' for Lebanese





The nature of the demands made it clear that Israel
would accept no Lebanese military deployment along the
border except under conditions that would make the Sarkis
regime—still propped up by Syria--an active accomplice
in the Israeli security plan for the border region.
Points (1) and (3) probably could have been accepted by
Sarkis inasmuch as he had already provisionally recognized
Haddad and the Syrians had no particular desire to challenge
the Israeli "red line" policy. Yet points (2) and (^) were
clearly aimed at luring Sarkis into an arrangement whereby
the Christian enclaves would be Lebanese in name but governed
in fact by Israel. Had he accepted the Israeli conditions
Sarkis would have undermined the already tenuous domestic
position of Syria's Asad and enraged the Lebanese left.
Israel was in the ideal position of having nothing to lose
regardless of Sarkis' choice.
On 31 July 1978 the Lebanese President dispatched a
650-man army battalion from Ablah, in the central Biqa',
to the south. The unit planned to establish its headquarters
in Tebnine, a village north of Bint Jubail and outside of the
Israeli security belt. The Lebanese soldiers reportedly
received enthusiastic receptions in the villages of the
Biqa' as they marched south. The cheering stopped at
Kawkaba, however, as the battalion came under an artillery
attack by Major Haddad ' s militia. By entering Kawkaba the
Lebanese unit indicated its intention of moving to Tebnine.
by way of the Christian enclave in the vicinity of Merj 'Uyun,
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a violation of point (2) of the Israeli guidelines. In
fact Israeli Television "blamed Sarkis for provoking the
shelling by having the unit attempt to pass through
Christian territory rather than through leftist-controlled
Nabatiyah. Apparently the guidelines were meant to be
taken quite literally. Rather than redirecting the unit
so as to conform to the march plan established for it by
Israel, the Lebanese Defense Ministry ordered its ex-
329peditionary force back to its barracks.
If the abortive movement of Lebanon's Army to the south
accomplished nothing else, it clearly demonstrated the in-
tentions of Majors Haddad and Shidiaq. The pretense of
loyalty to the Lebanese government--an illusion that had
been maintained by Haddad, Sarkis, and Begin--was finished.
The military affairs writer of the Jerusalem Post , Hirsh
Goodman, blamed both Haddad and the Israeli government for
the continuing mess in southern Lebanon. According to
Goodman, Haddad 's extremely close relationship with Israeli
military commanders was in fact subverting the Begin
' s govern-
ment's policy toward southern Lebanon. Goodman noted
Israel's willingness to permit the Lebanese Army to patrol
roads on the periphery of the Christian enclaves, but
3 9Arab Report and Record
.
16-31 July 1978, No. 14,
p. 518, and Francis Ofner, "Lebanon Christians Block Army
Drive," Christian Science Monitor , 1 August 1978, pp. 1,10.
According to Ofner, the Syrian Minister of Information
had stated on 29 July 1978 that the Lebanese unit would





observed that Haddad would not even go along with that.
The IDF, complained Goodman, seemed to be willing to grant
Haddad 's every wish. Goodman concluded his analysis with
the following observation:
Major Haddad should be made to realize that moderation
is a price he has to pay— in the interest of ultimate
stability in Southern Lebanon, and in order to ensure
the continuation of the Israeli support upon which he
has been able to rely until now. 330
Whether Haddad is obstructing or facilitating Israeli
policy in southern Lebanon is moot. According to one high-
ranking Lebanese Army officer who worked with and counseled
Haddad before the Lebanese civil war, the rightist major
is an "extraordinarily weak man" capable of little or no
self-initiative . The officer interviewed found it incon-
ceivable that Haddad would fire on the Lebanese Army
without the permission of either Israel or the Maronite
331
military leaders in Beirut. J
The distinct possibility exists therefore that southern
Lebanon has become for Israel a stage upon which a scene
far more important than those played over the past six
decades in the Upper Galille is now being acted out.
Perhaps Mr. Goodman has missed the point in assuming that
Israel seeks "stability" in southern Lebanon, and that a
330
"-' Hirsh Goodman, "Muddling Along in Lebanon," Jerusalem
Post (International Edition), 15 August 1978, p. 8.
331JJ Interview with a senior Lebanese
Monterey, California, 23 December 1978.
202

renegade Lebanese Army Major is stupidly wrecking the
policies of Mr. Begin. As James M. Markham as noted,
As long as southern Lebanon remains unstable, the rest
of Lebanon remains unstable; in the south artillery
shells have been exploding daily, killing people, but
farther north, in the beautiful mountains above Beirut,
one can hear Bashir Gemayal ' s /"the Phalangist military
chiefJ militiamen practicing with mortars and automatic
weapons. Guns continue to be shipped into the Maronite
port of Juniye, and there have been occasional sharp
clashes .. .between Syrian peacekeepers and Christian
militia. "Many of us do not consider that this war has
ended," says Charles Malik [a. leading Lebanese Christian
ideologue^ calmly. 332
The war cannot end until the problem of southern Lebanon
is settled, and for the present time it appears that
Israel has little interest in pursuing such a settlement,
or in promoting stability in southern Lebanon.
33 2James m. Markham, 'The War That Won't Go Away,"
New York Times Magazine




It was stated at the outset that perhaps a resolution
of the Israeli-Lebanese frontier crisis could lead to
other Arab-Israeli accommodations. That in any event was
the idea that provided the genesis for this study. A
decision was made to examine the frontier area from a
historical perspective, analyzing events of the past six
decades which led to the current crisis. Implicit in such
an approach was the assumption that much could be learned
about the current situation in southern Lebanon and its
possible resolution by a thorough examination of the past.
Nevertheless the guiding question for the entire research
effort was, "What do all of these facts—all of these little-
known and somewhat esoteric events, all of the past crises-
tell us in terms of a possible Israeli-Lebanese accomodation?"
The research effort centered on two fundamental Zionist
objections to the northern boundary given to Palestine by
Great Britain and France: water and security. Although
the issue of southern Lebanon's water resources, and Zionist
claims to a share of them, dominated the frontier question
for a half century, the dispute finally died in 1968.
The Litani Project enabled Lebanon to divert huge quantities
of Litani water away from southern Lebanon westward into the
Awwali River, thus ending Zionist hopes of drawing significant
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amounts of water from the lower Litani for use in the Negev.
The water issue was also killed by Israel's seizure of the
Banias River (on the Golan Heights) in June 1967 i thereby
ending Arab plans to divert the Jordan headwaters, plans
in which Lebanon had been a cautious, and ultimately non-
active participant.
On the other hand, the security problem never died--though
it slept from 19^9 to 1967. Beginning in 1968 it completely
dominated the frontier region. The Israel i- f edayeen con-
frontation, fought to a large degree on Lebanese soil,
aggravated Lebanon's chronic identity problem and finally
plunged the country into a monumentally destructive civil
war in 1975- Israel took advantage of the situation by
attempting, through an alliance with southern Lebanon's
Christian minority, to completely exclude the f edayeen and
their Lebanese allies from the border region. The attempt
failed and produced the devastating invasion of March 1978.
In the aftermath of the invasion Israel reiterated, often in
strident terms, her determination to "protect" the Christians
of Lebanon from "genocide." In southern Lebanon that trans-
lated into a policy of supporting a Christian Lebanese
militia which, on 31 July 1978, openly rebeled against
Lebanese authority by firing upon a unit of the official
Lebanese Army attempting to move south.
It was assumed throughout the course of the research
effort that despite sixty years of controversy it would
somehow be possible for Israel and Lebanon to work out an
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arrangement whereby Lebanese sovereignty could be restored
to all of southern Lebanon, and Israel's security require-
ments could be accommodated. In that context it seemed that
Foreign Minister Dayan's April 1978 statement that U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2^2 would guide future Israeli-
333Lebanese negotiations was helpful. "^ Of course the Lebanese
press viewed Dayan's statement with alarm, claiming among
other things that "Israel is serving notice that it intends
33^
to renegotiate this f rontier. . . at Lebanon's expense
.
" JJ
In the light of subsequent events it would be safe to say
that if all that befalls Lebanon in her dealings with Israel
is a renegotiated southern frontier, she will be able to
count herself lucky. Indeed, under current conditions
Lebanon would be fortunate to be able to constitute a
truly national government capable of giving away patches
of southern Lebanon. Recent events indicate however that
Israel's interest in a conventional settlement, even one
that might incorporate the Christian enclaves into Israel,
is minimal. The very assumption that a settlement is
possible must therefore be challenged.
On 21 May 19^8 David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister
of Israel, made the following entry in his diary:
^Facts on File
. 21 April 1978, p. 275-
33A-JJ
"New Government, Old Problems," An-Nahar Arab Report
and Memo , 24 April 1978, p. 3.
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The Achille's heel of the Arab coalition is the Lebanon.
Muslim supremacy in this country is artificial and can
easily be overthrown. A Christian State ought to be
set up there, with its southern frontier on the river
Litani. We would sign a treaty of alliance with this
state. 335
Of course the above quotation can be used to "prove" the
existence of Zionist irredentism in southern Lebanon, with
the words "river Litani" either underlined or italicized.
One pro-Arab publication has even gone so far as to mis-
quote Ben Gurion ' s subsequent letter on the same subject
to President De Gaulle of France, changing it from a dis-
claimer of further interest in the Litani to a reaffirmation. ^
-^Quoted by Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion: The Armed
Prophet (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968),
p. 130.
-^ According to Hasan Sharif, Ben Gurion wrote to De
Gaulle stating that "My dream is to see the Litani River as
the northern border of Israel." Sharif based his Ben Gurion
quote on a "special report of the PLO Planning Center. " See
Elain Hagopian and Samih Farsoun, eds. , South Lebanon
, pp.
19. 33- However C. C. Aronsfeld in "The Historical Boundaries
of Palestine," Contemporary Review , December 1968
, pp. 296-
297. gives the following version of Ben Gurion 's letter to
the President of France:
In his recent correspondence with General de Gaulle, Ben
Gurion recalled how the French President once, in i960,
asked him 'What are your dreams about the real frontiers
of Israel? Tell me (de Gaulle added), I shall not speak
of it to anybody. ' Ben Gurion then replied, 'If you had
asked me that question twenty-five years ago, I would have
told you: the river Litani in the north and Trans Jordan in
the east. But you are asking me today. I will tell you
then. We have two principal aspirations--peace with our
neighbours and large-scale Jewish immigration. The area
of Palestine in our possession can absorb many more Jews
than are likely to come.
'
Even if Ben Gurion secretly longed for the Litani, it is
not likely that he would have specified his claim to
southern Lebanon in writing to a foreign chief of state.
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If Ben Gurion's statement has any relevance at all to the
current situation in southern Lebanon, the only two words
worth emphasizing are "Christian State."
During the years 1968 through 1975 Israel was aware
that her attacks—retaliatory and otherwise—on Lebanon
were escalating the fears of Maronite nationalists that
"their" Lebanon was being sucked into the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and that the Palestinians were responsible for
Lebanon's perilous position. Seeing that successive
Lebanese governments could only straddle the Palestinian
issue, thereby avoiding an inter-Lebanese confrontation
over the explosive national identity question, Israel
quite naturally hoped that the Maronite nationalists would
themselves take on the Palestinians. After all, when
rockets landed in Jewish settlements, and f edayeen commandos
managed to slip across the border to commit acts of ter-
rorism, the Israeli government was obliged to strike back.
It did so with increasing ferocity, and often without
provocation. Every encouragement was given to Maronite
nationalists to demand Palestinian respect for Lebanese
sovereignty. That the accumulated tensions of some seven
years of violence should lead to civil war ought to have
come as no surprise to Israel.
Until the advent of the Begin government however it
could be argued that Israeli policy toward Lebanon, though
often destructive, was predicated on the desire to achieve,
regardless of the means employed, an acceptable level of
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security for the northern settlements. Drawing on the
lessons of the past, Israel sought to preempt f edayeen
action on Lebanese soil. Eventually the strategy bore
fruit. Not only did the Maronite militias engage in open
warfare with the armed Palestinians , but in one of the
oddest twists of Levantine politics, Syrian forces invaded
Lebanon to defeat the fedaye en-Lebanese leftist coalition.
By mid-1976 Israel could view with satisfaction the fact
that southern Lebanon was free of large numbers of
Palestinian commandos.
The character of the entire question of southern
Lebanon changed however with the occurence of two devel-
opments in 1977 • First was the reintroduction of f edayeen
and armed Lebanese leftists to the border region. Their
presence was a direct challenge to the "good fence program"
and represented the potential undoing of Israel's security
policy. Second was the election of the Likud government.
Beginning in August 1977, with Begin 's open embrace of
Lebanese Christendom, Israeli policy toward Lebanon
gradually made the question of the south subsidiary to the
question of Lebanon itself. The invasion of March 197S
represented the last large-scale attempt to clear southern
Lebanon of enemy commandos. Events subsequently demonstrated
that Israel was more interested in encouraging Maronite
separatism than in settling with President Sarkis the age-
old security problems of southern Lebanon.
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Hirsh Goodman's analysis of Israeli support for Major
Haddad's militia, presented in section VI above, probably
provides the key for understanding Israel's current policy.
If it were simply a matter of border security, Israel would
lose nothing by instructing Majors Haddad and Shidiaq to
subordinate their forces to the regular Lebanese Army.
Such an order would of course be opposed by the Maronite
leaders in Beirut and would probably lead to a breakdown
in the Israeli-Maronite alliance. Nevertheless, in terms
of border security, with Haddad's 3,000 men supplemented by
perhaps 1,000 Lebanese regulars the boundary would be
patrolled by far more men than had ever previously been
the case. Furthermore Syria, struggling to prop up the
fragile Sarkis regime, would have every reason to ensure
that f edayeen not be given the opportunity to fire on
Lebanese soldiers. As Goodman plaintively asserted, support
for Haddad is subverting Israel's efforts to finally secure
the northern border through active and effective Lebanese
cooperation. In other words, a renegade Lebanese Army
major is presumably all that stands in the way of a
solution to a problem that has concerned Zionists for some
six decades.
By supporting Haddad's defiance of Sarkis, Israel is
obviously thinking of something bigger than security pro-
blems in the Upper Galilee. By permitting Haddad to defy
the Lebanese government, Israel appears to be acknowledging
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her support for the extreme Lebanese rightwing idea of
partitioning Lebanon. An accommodation with Sarkis, even
one which adds territory to Israel, would undo the Israeli-
Maronite connection. For Israel the support of an emerging
"Christian Lebanon" entails few risks. If it succeeds it
creates, in effect, another Israel; a homeland for a
"persecuted" minority, one which would certainly ally
itself with the Jewish State-- just as Ben Gurion suggested
in 19^8. If the partition of Lebanon never comes about,
Israeli support for the project will, at the very least,
keep Lebanon in a state of constant turmoil. This will
have the effect of (1) keeping alive the publicity cam-
paign designed to portray Arab Muslims as practitioners
of genocide against oppressed Christians ; (2) forcing
Syria to keep large amounts of soldiers bogged down in a
'Vietnam " of its own; (3) neutralizing Palestinian com-
mandos in Lebanon; and (^) keeping the northern border
relatively free of fedayeen harassment. As Markham has
noted, "Southern Lebanon is a highly useful pressure point
for Israeli diplomacy, and instability in the south keeps
337both Assad and the Palestinians off-balance..."^ Added
an American diplomat, "Certainly the Israeli position about
the poor defenseless Christians about to be slaughtered is
more than questionable. Everybody is using everybody else
in a most cynical way."-^




The question of the overall political relationship
between the exponents of Maronite nationalism and Zionism
is beyond the scope of this study. It will be recalled
however that in 1919 the two political forces, acting as
local clients for French and British imperialism, vied
with each other for the title to Upper Galilee. Until
recently it appeared to be possible for the two forces
—
one contained within the state of Lebanon and the other in
Israel--to remedy the problems still remaining from the
Anglo-French partition of the lands which they both claimed.
Yet while Zionism became Israel, Lebanon became much more
than Maronite nationalism. Efforts by leading Maronite
nationalists to create, in opposition to Arab nationalism,
a distinctive "Lebanese" nationalism never took root.
The resurgence of pure Maronite nationalism as a force
allied with Israel and opposing the official government of
Lebanon makes a settlement between Israel and the Sarkis
regime all but impossible.
Unless the issue between Lebanon and Israel can be
refocused on the security situation in their common frontier
region, it must be concluded that much of the information
generated by this research project will be of more use to
historians than diplomats or military officers. If the
West, led by the United States, is able to vigorously oppose
the partition of Lebanon and insist upon the restoration
of full Lebanese sovereignty in areas contiguous to Israel,
then an accommodation can be salvaged. Yet so long as the
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central issue remains whether or not Lebanon will continue
to be a unitary state, a settlement in southern Lebanon is
not possible. It will be impossible because Israel will
either wait for a Maronite-dominated state to come into
existence, or will regard perpetual turmoil in Lebanon as
the solution to her own security problem on the Lebanese
border. If Lebanon is eventually partitioned (officially)
,
Israel will no doubt embark upon a close working relation-
ship with the predominantly Maronite state. A Christian
Lebanese state (with a significant Druze minority) would
probably consist of the old Ottoman Mount Lebanon with the
addition of east Beirut. If such a state comes about it
will probably join Israel in insisting that a U.N. force
continue to occupy southern Lebanon, turning it into an
international no man's land. The Maronite-dominated state
would welcome Israeli protection for the Maronites of sou-
thern Lebanon, perhaps even asking Israel to annex the
Christian enclaves.
If however Lebanon remains a unitary state, the
historical perspective on the frontier region developed in
this study can help guide a settlement. Although it is
impossible to say what form such a "settlement" would
take
—
peace treaty, revised GAA, or gentleman's agree-
ment—a historical perspective on the frontier region
suggests that lasting stability requires three basic
elements: Israeli security, effective Lebanese sovereignty,
and a "New Deal" for the people of southern Lebanon.
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A. SECURITY FOR NOTHERN ISRAEL
Strong measures must be taken to secure Israeli
settlements from armed attacks originating in southern
Lebanon. Suggested guidelines as to how this might be
achieved are as follows:
1. The total exclusion of Palestinian armed forces
from an area south of the 19^9 GAA limited forces line,
and east of the lower north-south stretch of the Litani
River. This would mean no f edayeen in the districts of
Tyre, Bint Jubail , and Merj 'Uyun (all three of which
comprise all Lebanese territory south of the Litani) , and
also no armed Palestinians in the Arqub region (district
of Hasbaya) . A complete revision of the 1969 Cairo
Agreement between Lebanon and the PLO would probably be
needed to effect such a program, which would also include
the demilitarization of refugee camps south of the Litani.
Although many Palestinian elements will reject and attempt
to frustrate such an undertaking, the mainstream leaders
of the PLO must realize by now that f edayeen attacks on
Israeli-controlled territories set into motion a process,
fully abetted by Israel, that as (a) encouraged Maronite
separatism, (b) alienated the PLO from its chief supporter
(Syria), and (c) sharply divided the Arab world. In short,
the fedayeen have found themselves fighting other Arabs,
a condition rooted in the political unsuitability of
Lebanon as a commando base. It is not likely that too
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many PLO leaders actually believe that the road to West
Bank-Gaza autonomy (or independence) passes through such
places as Qiryat Shemona, Maalot, Shamir, or Nahariya.
No matter how distasteful it may seem, the PLO can do
little more than accept that which the Arab states are able
to procure from Israel through the negotiating process.
2. Israel should accept the presence of a sizeable
Arab security force stationed along the boundary. The
"red line" policy adopted by the Rabin government and con-
tinued by the Begin administration has had disasterous
consequences for the inhabitants of southern Lebanon and
for Lebanon itself. Israel is aware that Syria's June
1976 invasion of Lebanon was designed to prevent the
emergence of a militant leftist regime in Beirut, one that
could easily drag Syria into an unwanted war with Israel.
Had Syrian forces been permitted to garrison southern
Lebanon
—
perhaps without entering the Christian enclaves-
Israel's security on the northern border would have improved
dramatically. Surely Israel did not seriously entertain
the notion that Asad would strip his Golan defense line,
thereby leaving Damascus itself open to attack, in order
to strike Israel from southern Lebanon. The lessons of the
past, drawn from the Arab uprising in Palestine of 1936-1939
and from the fedayeen activity of recent years, suggest
that the absence of conventional armed forces in southern
Lebanon constitutes a vacuum that is rapidly filled by
commandos, marauders, and terrorists. Israel's security
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would be enhanced greatly by the presence of regular army
personnel—be. they Lebanese, Syrian, Arab League, or a
mixture--in southern Lebanon and along the border.
Specific weapons limitations (medium and long-range
artillery, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles) and
the possibility of mixed Arab-Israeli patrols can be
addressed. However the provision in the Annex of the 19^-9
GAA restricting Lebanon to 1,500 soldiers in the limited
forces zone should either be ignored altogether or else a
much higher limit--perhaps 10 ,000--should be set. If
southern Lebanon could support a population of 10,000
armed Palestinians and leftists, there is no reason for
Israel to object to the region being policed by 10,000
trained soldiers.
3- Minor adjustments in the boundary line, facilitating
the placement of Israeli observation posts on favorable
terrain, should be considered. This however will not be
possible in the Arqub area, where the final disposition
of the occupied Golan Heights awaits determination. Given
however the severe terrain disadvantage inflicted upon
Palestine by the 1923 boundary accord, it would be reasonable
to permit Israeli outposts to be established at various
points within what is now Lebanese territory. Whether or
not this need entail minor boundary rectifications ought
to be left to the parties themselves. Hopefully the issue
of village and individually-owned lands will receive care-
ful consideration if boundary changes are made.
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B. THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY
This issue, which must be resolved in any kind of a
settlement, is a double-edge sword. On the one hand
Israel must be prepared to disassociate herself politically
from the affairs of her sovereign neighbor to the north.
On the other hand however, Lebanon must be prepared to
do that which she has never tried before: to govern her
southern districts.
Israel must be induced to withdraw her support for
the militia of Majors Haddad and Shidiaq. This indeed is
a fundamental prerequisite for discussing the frontier
issue with the duly constituted Lebanese government, for
Israel's support of the militia is the most blatant
manifestation of her support for Maronite separatism.
Inasmuch as Haddad and Shidiaq would probably forgo re-
integration with the Lebanese Army at this point--they
would in all likelihood face disciplinary action and per-
haps execution—Israel should be permitted to extend
asylum to them and their associates. The disposition of
Christian villages which have become virtually attached
to Israel since 1976 is an issue that will be discussed
in the next subsection.
Once Israel agrees to allow Lebanese authorities
unlimited access to the southern districts, the central
government of Lebanon must be prepared to govern. One
theme that ran continuously through this research effort
was the unwillingness and inability of the Lebanese governing
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elite to provide basic services to the poverty-striken
south. France procured for Lebanon a portion of the Upper
Galilee after listening to many pleas concerning the
"historic frontiers" of the Lebanse "nation." Once in
possession of the land, however, the French and their
Lebanese friends found the south too poor and too Muslim
to be worth caring about. That attitude continued through
the Arab-Israeli era, with the Lebanese elite inventing the
additional excuse that Zionism planned to seize the land
anyway, so why invest Beirut's capital in such a losing
proposition? Beirut's attitude toward the south made it
an ideal place for armed Palestinians and their Lebanese
allies to build an infrastructure capable of both harassing
Israeli settlements and resisting Lebanon's crumbling cen-
tral authority. If the Lebanese state is again permitted to
raise the cedar flag in the villages of southern Lebanon,
it must demonstrate the willingness and ability to both
police the area and provide basic, reliable governmental
services such as health clinics, schools, roads, electricity,
and water. The return on the investment may not at first
seem as lucrative as a new Beirut high-rise luxury
apartment building, but by stabilizing the south such an
investment may help preserve the Lebanese state.
C. THE PEOPLE OF SOUTHERN LEBANON
The historical perspective on the Israeli-Lebanese
frontier zone offered in this study also suggests that in
addition to the issues of Israel's security and Lebanon's
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sovereignty, a good settlement will provide benefits for
the long-suffering residents of southern Lebanon. It has
been suggested above that a serious Lebanese effort to
govern the region would constitute a good beginning. There
are other elements of a settlement however that would entail
a measure of Lebanese-Israeli cooperation.
1. The "good fence program" developed by Israel in
mid-1976 should be converted into an "open border" arrange-
ment similar to that agreed upon by Palestine and Lebanon
in 1926. Village and individually-owned parcels of land
severed by the imposition of the 19^9 C^AA should either be
returned, or the owners granted adequate compensation. A
policy which allows residents of southern Lebanon reliable
access to Israeli jobs, goods, markets, and services will
aid Beirut in alleviating the chronic poverty of its southern
districts. In return Israelis should be permitted to sell
goods duty free within the border districts of Lebanon. It
may even prove possible for the two governments to agree
upon a limited program of cross-border land purchases and
private, profit-seeking enterprises. Unlike the 1926 agree-
ment however, a new "good neighbourly relations" accord would,
for an indefinite period of time, be subjected to stringent
security precautions. Nevertheless an expanded "good fence
program," one stripped of its military civic action aspects,
may even permit a gradual repatriation to Israel of some
Palestinians now living in refugee camps near the Mediter-
ranean coast south of the Litani River.
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2. Inquiries should be made as to the desires of
Lebanese Christian villagers in the immediate border area
with regard to their own future nationality and that of
their villages. The apparent willing collaboration of
several Christian border villages with Israel has raised
fears of retribution should the villages be returned to
Lebanese control. It is impossible to know at this point
just how many of the permanent Christian residents of the
border area willingly collaborated, and how many were
coerced by gunmen imported by Israel from other parts of
Lebanon. It appears though that the behavior of some
southern Lebanese Christians paralleled that of their
fathers and grandfathers during the 1925 Druze uprising.
Furthermore it would appear that the "good fence program"
has indeed linked several Christian villages to Israel in
terms of public services and economic interactions. As
part of a general settlement therefore it might be wise
for neutral observers, perhaps from the U.N. , to conduct
referenda in each "security belt" village to determine
if the inhabitants wish themselves and their villages to be
part of Lebanon or Israel. The referenda should be conducted
on the basis of pre-civil war official voting lists in order
to preclude outsiders from taking part. If certain Lebanese
villagers desire formal integration with Israel, a joint
Lebanese-Israeli boundary commission should be formed to
demarcate a new border.
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3. Israel should be prepared to assist in the
reconstruction of southern Lebanon. Although the word
'reparations" should probably be avoided because of its
implication of guilt, there is no doubt that Israel has a
moral obligation to help (as does the ?L0 for that matter).
Israeli military actions in southern Lebanon, particularly
the March 1978 invasion, have been characterized by a com-
bination of massive civil destruction with relatively little
damage to the opposing military force. Although it might be
possible, in theory, to justify the destructive Israeli
tactics as being necessary to either (a) punish civilians
for aiding the commandos, or (b) warn them in advance against
offering such aid, it is clear that the civilians of southern
Lebanon suffered losses of life and property totally out of
proportion to whatever assistance they may have rendered to
the enemies of Israel.
D. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
Returning finally to the thoughts and assumptions that
provided the genesis of this thesis project, several closing
observations are in order. First, it is clear that an
analysis of the Israeli-Lebanese border region from the
perspective of six decades of alternating conflict and
cooperation does indeed yield data that can be usefully
employed in a settlement process. Second, it is obvious
that such a settlement would help to unravel the extremely
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tangled Lebanese political situation, thereby freeing Arabs
and Israelis to expand the negotiating initiative of Egyptian
President Sadat. Third, a fundamental change in Israeli
policy toward Lebanon is needed before serious consideration
can be given to settling the frontier problem.
Israel is not, as some pro-Arab propagandists would
allege, intent upon seizing Lebanese territory as part of
a final, calculated effort to undo the consequences of the
post-World War I Franco-British compromise and fulfill the
territorial specifications of the 1919 Zionist Statement.
As Israeli Defense Minister Weizman stated on 21 March
1978, "The case of Jerusalem does not resemble the case of
Ar-Rashidiyah [in southern LebanonJ. There is no reason
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to fight the entire world.' Israel does not covet the
Litani , or the Hasbani , or the port of Tyre. Yet she is
intent at present upon using southern Lebanon to destabilize
the rest of Lebanon and encourage Maronite separatism.
Only when Israel's attention is refocused on the problems
of the Lebanese border region as such will a settlement be
possible, and only then will this historical perspective
on that troubled region be of use. Until that time it
must be concluded that Israel will try to "solve" the
problem of its northern frontier by encouraging Lebanese
partition and chaos.
-^--^Jerusalem Domestic Service
, 21 March 1978. (Foreign
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